Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

Possession in the Russian clause
Towards dynamicity in syntax

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Possession in the Russian clause
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To my family, old and new

Contents

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The aim of this dissertation is to argue for an approach to meaning-to-structure mapping that has a certain degree of freedom, in contrast to what is observed in current generative research. The dissertation supports the dynamic approach to syntax, as opposed to the cartographic approach. The object of the dissertation is possession in the clausal domain, where the topics include predicative possession, external possession and modal possessive constructions, among others. The analysis is couched within the Minimalist framework and also employs findings from typological, cognitive and historical linguistics.

Predicative possession constructions with the meaning 'X has Y' are the core, simplest case of possession in the clausal domain; a lot has been written and claimed about these constructions. This thesis focuses on the much discussed Russian *be*-possessive, the main means of expressing predicative possession in this language:

(1) U menja jest' mašin-a.
     at I.GEN be.PRS car.F-NOM.SG
     'I have a car.'

The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 sets the stage for the discussion. I first identify the object of the study, speaking about the notion of possession in general, its modes, semantic types and encoding strategies. The mode of possession that is relevant within this thesis is the predicative one; the adnominal mode is presented for comparison in the explanation of semantic types of possession, but is left out of the discussion in the rest of the thesis. In the description of the encoding strategies of possession cross-linguistically I stress the

diversity of the observed construction types. The languages of the world in general display four types of encoding strategies: the locational possessive, the *have*-possessive, the Topic possessive and the *with*-possessive. This typological picture is more complex than the one currently assumed in generative research that restricts the typology of possession to the first two strategies. After the discussion of the typological diversity of predicative possession I return to the pre-theoretical notion of possession and emphasize that the role of the proximity parameter should not lead to hasty conclusions about the conceptualization possibilities of the possession relation. Further in the chapter I describe the predicative possession landscape in Russian that at the present stage of development includes three construction types: the *be*-possessive (an instance of the locational strategy), the *have*-possessive and the anticausative possessive (a *have*-locational hybrid). The chapter also introduces the constructions that have been claimed to be related to *be*-possessives by virtue of using the same prepositional phrase with a general possessive meaning. These are external possession and involuntary causer constructions, modal possessive constructions, and constructions with world-creating *u*-PPs.

The second part of the chapter introduces the formal conceptual ground for the discussion, namely the opposition of cartography and dynamicity in syntactic theory. In dynamic syntax relations are defined in terms of the operation Merge: the derivation proceeds on the basis of relations established in a strictly local sisterhood configuration. The cartographic approach assumes that there is a fixed structural goal towards which the derivation has to work. After introducing some of the issues to which the dynamic approach has been applied (such as the notions of c-command and subject, the mechanism of binding and agreement) I proceed to the issue of meaning-to-structure mapping at the level of argument structure. I claim that an analysis assuming a rigid universal argument structure for predicative possessives cross-linguistically is not only undermined by the typological and cognitive data discussed in the first part of the chapter, but is also not motivated by theory-internal constructs such as the Uniformity of Theta-Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH). I conclude the chapter by hypothesizing that a construct such as the UTAH is not necessarily a natural minimalist assumption and may be substituted by cognitive primitives, e.g. Event schemas.

Chapter 3 describes the main construction for expressing predicative possession in Russian – the *be*-possessive. I review the semantic and structural types of this construction and conclude that what is generally referred to as 'the *be*-possessive' is actually a collection of constructions that involve the same elements, but in a

completely different configuration. The constructions can be divided into two groups with regard to what type of the verb *byt'* 'be' they use: the existential *be*-possessive and the copular possessives. The construction type that has enjoyed the most linguistic attention is the existential *be*-possessive which is used to express a permanent possession relation. One of the reasons for linguistic interest in this construction is the challenge it presents for the notion of subjecthood: the majority of works on *be*-possessives agree that in contrast to what is generally observed in a Nominative-Accusative language like Russian, the subject status in the construction belongs to the prepositional possessor, not to the Nominative possessum. I dedicate a separate section to the issue of subjecthood. Chapter 3 is intended to be analysis-neutral and is supposed to supply the reader with sufficient overview to handle the following chapters.

In Chapter 4 I review the existing generative analyses dealing with Russian *be*-possessives. These are the early transformational analysis of Chvany (1975) and the newer minimalist approaches of Harves (2003), Dyakonova (2007) and Jung (2011). Where possible, I also comment on the authors' proposals for the constructions that they consider to be related to *be*-possessives. In the discussion of the analyses I show that they cannot derive the diverse properties displayed by *be*-possessives; the fallibilities with regard to the related constructions are discussed in Chapter 6 and 7.

Chapter 5 presents my proposal for the structure of *be*-possessives. Referring to the insights of such cognitive linguistic works as Langacker (1993) and Cienki (1995), I assume a projection that introduces possessor arguments in the locational possessive strategy; I term this predicate Anchor. The different properties of the *be*-possessives are derived by assuming different merging possibilities for the Anchor phrase. The Russian existential *be*-possessive is constructed by the merging of AnchorP to the existential base. The copular *be*-possessives also involve the AnchorP projection, but it is merged at different points in the structure.

I dedicate a separate chapter, Chapter 6, to the Russian *have*-possessive. The structural unification of all possessives is a deep-rooted assumption in current minimalist syntax and needs to be addressed in sufficient detail. Continuing the line of thinking laid out in Chapter 2, I argue that the *have*-possessive in Russian is an instance of a transitive encoding strategy and should not be attributed the same syntax as the *be*-possessive. I point out that unificatory analyses are based on outdated typological data with regard to types of encoding strategies and grammaticalization patterns. I thus assume a *v*P-structure for the

have-possessive; the analysis has the advantage over other analyses in being able to derive the structure of the anticausative possessive.

Chapter 7 considers a range of constructions that make use of the prepositional possessor form involved in the *be*-possessive; these are constructions involving external possession, involuntary causation, and also modal possessive constructions and constructions with world-creating *u*-PPs. Attempts to provide a unified account for these constructions have been made in different linguistic schools: functional, cognitive and generative. Several of the generative analyses presented in Chapter 4 include some of these constructions into their range. I propose that the Anchor predicate that introduces the *u*-PP is also employed in these constructions and takes complements of different size.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. The Introduction may be a good place to explain the cover photo – a metaphor of the theoretical message of this thesis. Like a predicative possession statement that finds different structural expressions in different languages, in this picture one notion – martial arts gloves – is represented by three different variants: these three pairs in particular are used in karate, taekwondo and kickboxing. Furthermore, all of these gloves are used in sparring – a process where decisions are made on the spot, based on the moves of your opponent; this is a reference to the local decisions in dynamic syntax. Those who find this explanation too strained may simply regard the picture as a representation of some of the things the author of this book possesses.

Chapter 2

Setting the stage

This chapter introduces the basic ideas and facts we need to be aware of throughout the thesis.

The first part of the chapter deals with the object of the study – possession in the clausal domain. I introduce the reader into the area of possession, discussing the general notion of possession, its modes and semantic types. In the investigation of possession in the clausal domain it is predicative possession that stands central – accordingly, predicative possession receives considerable attention in this thesis. I discuss the typological diversity of predicative possession and then proceed to the implications of this diversity for the theory of possession. When it comes to Russian, the predicative possession landscape is dominated by the *be*-possessive construction, but features also such constructions as the *have*-possessive and the anticausative possessive – all of which are discussed in the course of this thesis. Extending the view further into the clause, we find constructions that have been claimed to be related to *be*-possessives due to the employment of the identical prepositional possessor phrase. These constructions are also presented in the first part of this chapter.

The second part of the chapter introduces the bigger frame for the thesis: the opposition of cartography and dynamicity in syntactic theory. After discussing the general theses of the two approaches, I focus on the issue of argument structure.

2.1 Possession

Possession is generally described as a relation between two entities: possessor and possessum. Taylor (1989) lists the following properties that are intuitively

associated with the relation of possession:

(1)   a.   The possessor is a human being.

        b.   The possessee is a concrete item.

        c.   The possessor has the right to make use of the possessee.

        d.   Possessor and possessee are in spatial proximity.

        e.   Possession has no conceivable temporal limit.

The more properties are associated with a particular possessive construction, the more 'prototypical' this construction is. When talking about possession, one uses several dimensions, such as mode (predicative/attributive) and semantic type (alienable, inalienable, etc.). Typology of possession has played an important role in linguistic theory; I discuss various types of encoding and theoretical consequences in a separate section.

It is generally agreed that possession can be expressed in two modes: predicative and attributive. In the predicative mode the relation of possession constitutes the main assertion of the sentence, as in (2-a). In attributive possession the relation between the possessor and the possessum is presupposed, as in (2-b).

(2)   a.   John **has a motorcycle**.

        b.   **John's motorcycle** got stolen.   Stassen (2009: 26)

The predicative construction in (2-a) is the more specific one, whereas the attributive construction is more general, as it can involve more relations than possession per se: a phrase of the form 'X's Y' in English can refer to such relations as possession, authorship, the object of some action and other contextually determined relations.[1] Attributive possession is generally ascribed to the sub-clausal, nominal level, but we shall see that this possession mode is also possible in the clausal domain, involving bigger structural units – such as in the case of external possession construction.

With regard to semantic types, Heine (1997: 34-35) singles out a range of possessive notions that cross-linguistically 'tend to be distinguished in some way or other': physical, temporary, permanent, inalienable and abstract. The possessive notions, according to Heine, can be used both predicatively and attributively. In (3)-(8) I give English examples for both modes of a particular semantic type. (3) instantiates **physical** possession where the possessor and the possessum are physically associated with one another at reference time:

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[1]The range of interpretations is not completely unconstrained and context-dependent. See Seiler (1977: 224-225) for a discussion of some interpretations that can be excluded.

(3)   a.   I want to fill in this form, do you **have a pen**?
      b.   Steward, **my glass** is empty, can you bring me another beer?   Heine (1997: 34-37)

In **temporary** possession possessor can dispose of the possessum for a limited time but cannot claim ownership to it:

(4)   a.   I **have a car** that I use to go to the office but it belongs to Judy.
      b.   You can't have **my car** because it belongs to my wife.   Heine (1997: 34-37)

In the examples in (4) the second *belong*-clause spells out the actual (permanent) possession relation. The first predicative possession clause in (4-a) thus describes a temporary possession relation. The adnominal possessor in *my car* also describes a temporary possession relation, as made clear by the second clause. **Permanent** possession is possession par excellence, it is 'prototypical' with regard to the properties given in (1). The possessum in permanent possession is the property of the possessor for an extended period of time, and there is no requirement of shared location:

(5)   a.   Judy **has a car** but I use it all the time.
      b.   **My car** had an accident, I have to buy a new one. Heine (1997: 34-37)

Linguists are usually concerned with permanent possession; this applies to typological works (e.g. Stassen 2009) and generative syntactic analyses (e.g. Jung 2011) alike.

In **inalienable** possession the possessum is regarded inseparable from the possessor – it typically involves body-part or relative possessums, as illustrated in (6), with animate possessors:

(6)   a.   He **has** blue **eyes**. **His eyes** are blue.
      b.   I **have a sister**. **My sister** has majored in Chinese.

Inalienable possessors can also be inanimate, with both animate and inanimate possessums. (7-a) shows a part-whole relation, whereas (7-b) involves a relational term:

(7)   a.   That tree **has** few **branches.The branches of that tree** are deformed.
      b.   The apartment **has** two official **owners**. I have never seen the **owners**

of that apartment.

Abstract possession involves a possessum that is a concept, not visible or tangible:

(8)   a.   He **has no time/mercy**.
        b.   my flu, my thoughts   Heine (1997: 34-37)

Heine also mentions **inanimate alienable** possession, where the possessor is inanimate and the possessum is separable from the possessor, as represented by the English examples for predicative and attributive modes in (9-a-b):

(9)   a.   That tree **has crows** in it.
        b.   **the chairs from this room**.   Heine (1997: 34-37)

In the investigation of possession in the Russian clause we will deal with both the predicative and the attributive mode and most of these semantic types. The mode and semantic type of a possessive construction are analytical tools that are useful for the understanding of the data, even though not all of the combinations have distinct characteristics.

2.1.1   Understanding possession in view of the typological diversity

The meaning 'X has Y' can be expressed in a variety of ways across languages. Typological data are important for linguistic theory as they exemplify a subset of constructions that the theory must take into consideration. In generative linguistics typological findings have had long-reaching theoretical consequences for the field of possession. The well-known claim in the generative tradition is that the typology of predicative possession is restricted to two construction types (the *have*-possessive and the locational possessive) – the claim was for the first time forthrightly stated by Freeze in his 1992 article where he proceeds to reduce the two construction types to one underlying structure. Although Freeze's misrepresentation of the typological picture was criticized already in Heine (1997: 215-222), the reductionist view of possession caught on in generative research and gave rise to several types of analyses. I discuss Freeze (1992) and several analyses of Russian possessives in Chapter 4; here I present a more adequate typological picture of possession.

The latest comprehensive typological overview of possessive constructions is offered in Stassen (2009), who singles out the following major types of encoding for predicative possession:

(10)   a.   *have*-possessive
        b.   locational possessive
        c.   topic possessive
        d.   *with*-possessive

The last three construction types are grouped by Stassen into the locative/existential strategy, as all of them may involve a locative/existential predicate with the rough meaning of 'be', instead of the transitive predicate employed in the *have*-possessive. Note, however, that in some languages this predicate may be lacking altogether; Heine (1997:228) stresses the presence of *be*-verbs in these structures as epiphenomenal to possession per se and largely attributable to the nature of cognitive source structures.

The *have*-possessive receives the following definition in Stassen (2009): the construction contains a transitive predicate, the possessor NP is constructed as the subject/agent and the possessum NP is constructed as the direct object/patient (Stassen 2009: 62). (11) presents examples of the *have*-possessive strategy from Norwegian (Indo-European, North Germanic) in (11-a) and Abun (Papuan, West Papuan) in (11-b):

(11)   a.   Mannen ha-r   en hund.
              man.DEF have-PRS a   dog
              'The man has a dog.'
        b.   An rem kwokwe bo   yo.
              3sg had egg.plant CLASS DET
              'She had some egg plants.'   Stassen (2009: 65-66)

Stassen (2009:63) states that *have*-verbs tend to be derived from verbs that indicate physical control or handling, such as 'grab', 'seize', 'take', 'obtain', 'hold', 'carry', 'rule'. In many cases the etymology of the verb is still transparent.

The locational possessive receives the following description in Stassen's typology: the construction contains a locative/existential predicate, the possessum NP is constructed as the grammatical subject of the predicate and the possessor NP is constructed in some oblique, adverbial case form (Stassen 2009: 49-50). The locational strategy is represented by examples from Irish (Indo-European, Celtic) in (12-a) and Mundari (Austro-Asiatic, Munda) in (12-b):

(12)   a.   Ta   airgead aig-e.
              be.3SG.PRS money   at-3SG
              'He has money.'

    b.   Ain-a   sadom mena-i-a.
           1SG-DAT horse exist-3SG-INDIC
           'I have a horse'.   Stassen (2009: 51-52)

The *with*-possessive involves a *be*-like verb, the possessor argument constructed as the 'grammatical subject', and the oblique possessum, as is illustrated by (13-a) for Amele (Papuan, Madang) and (13-b) for Tshiluba (Niger-Kordofanian, Central-West Bantu). The prepositional marking in these examples belongs to the possessum.

(13)   a.   Ija sigin ca.
            1SG knife with
            'I have a knife.'
      b.   Mu-kalenge u-di   ne   ba-pika.
            CLASS-chief 3SG-be with slaves
            'The chief has slaves.'   Stassen (2009: 56-57)

The Topic possessive construction contains a locative/existential predicate, the possessum NP is constructed as the grammatical subject of the predicate and the possessor NP is constructed as the sentence topic of the sentence (Stassen 2009: 58). The possessor argument in the Topic possessive 'indicates the frame within which the sentence holds' and the construction can be literally translated as '(As for) possessor, possessum is/exists' (the notion of sentence-topichood should not be confused with the discourse-functional concept of topic). The examples from Mandarin (Sino-Tibetan, Sinitic) in (14-a) and Navajo (Na-Dene, Athapaskan) in (14-b) illustrate this strategy:

(14)   a.   Ta yǒu san-ge   háizi.
            3SG exist three-CLASS child
            'He/she has three children.'
      b.   Baa' bi-dibé   da-hólǫ.
            Baa' his-sheep 3PL-exist
            'Baa' has sheep.'   Stassen (2009: 59-61)

Topic possessives are also known in the literature as 'Double Subject Possessives', due to the fact that none of the arguments here is oblique (Stassen 2009: 59). Besides the major encoding types discussed above, Stassen (2009) mentions a number of other possessive strategies, such as: the Conjunctional possessive, the Clausal possessive and a Topic-Locational hybrid.
Works like Heine (1997) and Stassen (2009) have shown that languages of the world display a variety of possessive strategies, beyond the popular *have*-locational

dichotomy à la Freeze (1992). The inclusion of the *with*-possessive and the Topic possessive into the range of major encoding strategies certainly complicates the overall typological picture and presents a challenge for Freeze-inspired analyses: the enterprise of deriving all construction types from one underlying structure now becomes more non-economical. Chapter 6 discusses in more detail the significance of the new typological findings for the current analyses of possession.

Heine (1997) ascribes the diversity of predicative possessives to the multiplicity of templates that may serve as a cognitive source for the linguistic expression of possession. *Event schemas* are cognitive concepts that are 'based on the stereotypic description of recurrent experiences' (Heine 1997: 45). Heine singles out eight event schemas that serve as cognitive templates for most predicative possession constructions cross-linguistically, (15) represents a formulaic description of schemas used for the expression of predicative possession, (Heine 1997: 47):

(15) a.   Action: X takes Y
      b.   Location: Y is located at X
      c.   Companion: X is with Y
      d.   Genitive: X's Y exists
      e.   Goal: Y exists for/to X
      f.   Topic: As for X, Y exists
      g.   Equation: Y is X's (property)

Possession is an abstract concept, according to Heine, and to describe this abstract concept, expressions from more concrete domains are employed. 'A car that belongs to me may be described as one that is regularly found to be located close to me (Location), that I drive (Action), that I am accompanied by (Companion), or that is there for me (Goal)' (Heine 1997: 76). Possessive constructions are derived from the expressions in (15) through the process of grammaticalization whose driving force is context extension.

Heine's generous list of source templates contrasts sharply with the localist analyses of possession. A popular direction in various linguistic schools has been the reduction of possession to location – the tradition to interpret 'possessor' as a metaphorical extension of location includes such scholars as Benveniste (1960), Lyons (1967), Clark (1978), Arutjunova and Širyaev (1983), Freeze (1992), Borschev and Partee (1998). The generative tradition is heavily influenced by this localist line of thinking: one can find analyses that construct possessors as external arguments in the base syntactic representation and still assume that on

the cognitive level a possessor is a type of location.[2] However, in view of the typological findings discussed above, this line of thinking is compromised. Location is one of the properties that is included in the pre-theoretical notion of possession given in (1), and it remains an important component in theories that choose to represent possession as a composite notion, involving the additional component – CONTROL. Stassen (2009) refers to Evans (1995) for a formulation of the role of control in possessive constructions:

(16)   'X [the possessor] can expect Y [the possessee] to be in the same place as X when X wants, and X can do with Y what X wants.' Evans (1995, 146)

The control component is responsible for the fact that the relation between the possessor and the possessum is asymmetric, i.e. that the possessor is the more prominent element than the possessum. According to Stassen (2009, 14), the notion of control has been developed in functional/typological analyses touching upon such phenomena as agency, transitivity, ergativity, voice systems and causativity. The cognitive notion of control should not be confused with the generative linguistic term describing interclausal dependencies; in order to avoid confusion, I refer to the cognitive notion of control as C-CONTROL in this thesis. The composite understanding of the notion of possession is supported by a range of authors: Seiler (1973, 1983), Hagège (1993), Heine (1997), Baron and Herslund (2001), Stassen (2009). Building on previous typological research and his own findings, Stassen proposes the following definition of a possessive relation:

(17)   A prototypical case of possession is characterized by the presence of two entities (the possessor and the possessee) such that

a.   the possessor and the possessee are in some relatively enduring locational relation, and

b.   the possessor exerts control over the possessee (and is therefore typically human).   Stassen (2009, 15)

Stassen (2009, 14-15) points out that if control is accepted as one of the semantic parameters defining the notion of possession, it is no longer necessary 'to view the human or humanized status of the possessor as a defining factor in the possessive relation'. Rather, the frequently human status of possessors follows from their control-exerting role. The presence of the second parameter in the notion of possession gives more flexibility to an analysis that aims to give an appropriate

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[2]Cf. Błaszczak (2007b).

account of the data: different degree of prominence of the two parameters would yield different strategies of encoding possession. Thus, for instance, in the locational possessive the proximity parameter would have the most prominence, whereas in the *have*-possessive the special status would be given to the control parameter.

I propose to reconcile the localist tradition with Heine's theory of event schemas. Namely, the role of the location component for the concept of possession is not to provide the only possible conceptualization frame, as assumed in the localist tradition, but to determine the choice of the event schemas that may serve as cognitive templates for possession. The common feature for all (or most) of the event schemas in (15) is the achievement of proximity. The Location schema is the direct reflection of the proximity requirement and does not need to be commented on. In the Action schema where the possessor is construed as the agent, proximity is required for a direct action to be possible; this is reflected by the tendency of the transitive sources for *have*-predicates to have the general semantics of '*grab, seize, hold*' – predicates that require direct contact, as opposed to predicates like *shoot* or *see*.[3] For *with*-possessives, the proximity effect is achieved by construing the two arguments as companions.[4]

Thus, inclusion of the proximity parameter into the cognitive notion of possession is not in conflict with the diverse typology of these constructions – this parameter may be the criterion by which the various cognitive templates are chosen for the expression of possession. In addition, in some conceptualizations the parameter of c-control may have greater prominence than the parameter of proximity.

2.1.2   Predicative possession in Russian

Russian is the language of investigation in this thesis. The main means of expressing predicative possession in Russian is the *be*-possessive that belongs to the locational possessive strategy, as illustrated in (18):

(18)   U menja jest'   mašin-a.
        at I.GEN be.PRS car.F-NOM.SG

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[3]This understanding of possession does not rule out cases where non-contact verbs may be the transitive source for a *have*-verb. Such cases are indeed found, e.g. in Ewe (Kwa, Niger-Congo) where the verb meaning 'see' is employed to express 'have' and 'find' (Heine 1997: 43). My guess is that languages are flexible with regard to the expanse of the area they conceptualize as proximal.

[4]It should be mentioned that such use of the proximity component is not part of Heine's (1992) analysis: the author states that the various event schemas exhibit contrasting conceptual properties, in particular, 'notions such as action and location do not seem to have any salient properties in common' (Heine 1997: 74).

'I have a car.'

The possessor argument in (18) is expressed by the prepositional phrase consisting of the preposition *u* and a Genitive noun phrase. The possessum argument takes the form of a Nominative noun phrase; the construction makes use of the verb *byt'* 'be'. *Be*-sentences are overall a widely used structural frame in Russian: according to Arutjunova and Širyaev (1983: 6), they are nearly the most popular sentence type in the language, with a big system of variants and a huge semantic potential. The properties of the *be*-possessive are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 where I show that there are, in fact, several construction types that are disguised under this name.

According to Heine (1997) and Stassen (2009), employment of several possessive strategies is a common phenomenon cross-linguistically, and Russian is no exception – besides the locational possessive strategy, the language also makes use of transitive strategy:

(19) Ja   ime-ju   mašin-u.
      I.NOM have-1SG car.F-ACC.SG
      'I have a car.'

The *have*-possessive employs the verb *imet'* 'have', a Nominative possessor and an Accusative possessum. The *have*-possessive is a minor strategy in Russian, dispreferred in a range of semantic contexts; it is, however, favored in non-finite syntactic environments – mainly due to the Nominative form of the possessor. Furthermore, there is a predicative possession construction in Russian that makes use of the reflexive form of *imet'* 'have' and the *u*-possessor. Following Dyakonova (2007), I refer to it as the *anticausative* possessive:

(20) U menja ime-et-sja   mašin-a.
      at I.GEN have-3SG-REFL car.F-NOM.SG
      'I have a car.'

The anticausative possessive is more restricted syntactically in comparison to the *have*-possessive – this is partially due to the formal characteristics of the prominent argument, the possessor. In addition, the predicative possessive use of the construction may be a recent development.

An analysis of the predicative possession field in Russian should be able to include the three current possessive constructions. My discussion of these constructions is spread over several chapters: in Chapter 3 I present *be*-possessives and other constructions that have been classified as such, Chapter 4 discusses existing

analyses of *be*-possessives and in Chapter 5 I offer my own analysis of these constructions, the *have*-possessives are discussed separately in Chapter 6.

The *be*-possessive and the *have*-possessive are Modern Russian's heritage from at least as far back as Proto-Slavic, according to McAnallen (2011). Observe the following examples from Old Church Slavic:

(21) a. ašte biste   iměli   věro   ěko zrŭno
          if   COND.2PL have-PTCP.PL faith-ACC.SG as grain.ACC.SG
          gorjušeno. . .
          mustard.ACC.SG
          'if ye had faith as a grain of mustard seed'
      b. ašte bodetŭ   ou eter-a   člověk-a   100 oveci̯. . .
          if   be.fut.3sg at certain-gen.sg person-gen.sg 100 sheep.gen.pl
          'if a man have a hundred sheep'   McAnallen (2011: 156)

McAnallen observes that the Old Church Slavic data disprove assumptions of such scholars as Veenker (1967) that the *be*-possessive developed in Russian or East Slavic: this predicative possession strategy was used in Old Czech, Old Serbian and Croatian and Middle Bulgarian. Meanwhile, Russian is the only modern Slavic language that retained the *be*-possessive. The *have*-possessive had a more widespread use in early East Slavic texts, but gradually lost its ground to the *be*-possessive; McAnallen (to app.) proposes that this has been conditioned by language contact, and namely by the influence of the Balto-Finnic substratum.

In addition to the two possessive constructions in (21), Old Church Slavic also displays examples of the Dative possessive (a subtype of the locational strategy, according to Stassen 2009), illustrated in (22):

(22) ašte bodetŭ   eter-u   člověk-u   100 oveci̯. . .
      if   be.FUT.3SG certain-DAT.SG person-DAT.SG 100 sheep.GEN.PL
      'if a man have a hundred sheep. . . '   McAnallen (2011: 156)

No Slavic language has preserved the Dative possessive as the major predicative possession strategy nowadays; Russian has retained some traces of the construction. In particular, Chvany (1975: 110) classifies (23-a) as a subtype of possessive sentences in Russian and includes it into the range of constructions to be accounted for; (22-b) and (22-c) represent other instances of the Dative construction.

(23) a. Ivan-u   21 god.
          Ivan-DAT 21 year.NOM.SG

'Ivan is 21 years old.'   Chvany (1975: 107)

   b.   Problem-am   net   čisl-a.
         problem.F-DAT.PL NEG.BE.PRS number.N-GEN.SG
         'The problems are countless.'

   c.   Emu   net   del-a   do drugix   l'ud-ej.
         he.DAT NEG.BE.PRS business.N-GEN.SG to other-GEN.PL people-GEN
         'He doesn't care about other people.'

If constructions in (23) have any possessive meaning whatsoever, it may only be counted as idiomatic. In contrast to what is observed in the Old Church Slavic example in (22), the Dative construction cannot be used for the expression of alienable possession:

(24)   a.   *Emu   (jest') mašin-a.
           he.DAT be.PRS car.F-NOM.SG
           'He has a car.'

    b.   *Emu   net   mašin-y.
           he.DAT NEG.be.PRS car.F-GEN.SG
           'He doesn't have a car.'

I do not include the Dative construction into the field of predicative possessives in Russian and do not present an account for it in my analysis.

2.1.3   Related constructions

When constructing an analysis for one phenomenon, one should be aware of its possible implications for other parts of grammar. Apart from predicative possessives I also discuss constructions that have been claimed to be related to *be*-possessives due to the employment of a possessive-like *u*-PP. These constructions are illustrated in (25):

(25)   a.   On   byl   v gost'-ax   u Volod-i.
           he.NOM be.PST:M.SG in guest.M-LOC.PL at Volodya-GEN
           'He was at Volodya's place.'

    b.   Syn   u menja uč-it-sja   v Prag-e.
           son:NOM.SG at I.GEN study:PRS-3SG-REFL in Prague-LOC
           'My son is studying in Prague.'

    c.   U sil'n-ogo   vsegda bessil'n-yj   vinovat.
           at strong-M.GEN.SG always weak-M.NOM.SG guilty:M.SG
           'The strong one always holds the weak one as guilty.'   Mrázek and
           Brym (1962, 101), cited from Cienki (1995)

d. U Maš-i   jest'   čto   počita-t'.
   at Maša-GEN be.PRS what.ACC read-INF
   'Maša has something to read.'   Livitz (to appear: 1)

Mrázek and Brym (1962: 101) define the general meaning of the preposition *u* as
expressing a "relation of a very close participation of something in something".
Rephrasing Mrázek and Brym, Isačenko (1974: 46) refers to this general meaning
as "a relation of concern or implication". A unified analysis for the first three
constructions in (25) is proposed in the cognitive analysis of Cienki (1995): the
u-PP serves as a reference point, in the sense of Langacker (1993). Also
Iordanskaja and Mel'čuk (1995: 168) state that in all of the constructions with the
possessive *u*-PP the possessum expresses an entity included into the personal
sphere of the possessor, and in all of these constructions the possessor has a
special salience.

Some of these constructions surface in the generative analyses of predicative
possession in Russian. For instance, Dyakonova (2007) suggests that locative
constructions in (25-a) provide a base structure for all three of the Modern
Russian predicative possessives. Jung (2011) extends her PP structure to modal
possessive constructions in (25-d). In this thesis I in some way or another include
all of the constructions in (25) into my analysis.

2.2   The dynamic approach to syntax

This section describes the dynamic approach to syntax as opposed to the
cartographic approach that currently prevails in the Minimalist framework.
Cartography is a research program aiming at drawing maps of syntactic
configurations. It originated in the Principles and Parameters framework:
Shlonsky (2010: 419) ascribes the laying of the foundation of cartographic research
to Pollock (1989) who argued for a splitting of the Infl head. According to
Shlonsky, this spawned endeavors 'to discover new functional heads and study
their hierarchical organization'. Rizzi (1997) is the first explicitly cartographic
study of the left periphery of the clause – the complementizer space. On an
extreme cartographic approach, the full hierarchy of projections is present in every
clause, with some of the projections inactive; as observed in Rizzi (2011),
significant global complexity is the price the theory has to pay to achieve the
simplicity of structure-building. Current minimalist practice, though mostly
making use of abbreviated representations, subscribes to the cartographic
approach to syntax.

The dynamic syntax approach envisions syntactic relations as a product of local environments, the most local being the sisterhood configuration created by the structure-building operation Merge. According to Zwart (2007), the dynamic syntax approach is more in the spirit of the Minimalist Program than the widely practiced cartographic vision of syntax: relations defined over local environments with no global considerations lead to a more economical model of language.

One of the early dynamic syntax works is Epstein (1995) who defines syntactic relations as a property of Merge (concatenation). The c-command relation is assumed to be a primitive derivational construct and is established between two phrases automatically as soon as Merge turns them into sisters; Epstein proposes the following definition of c-command:

(26)   X c-commands all and only the terms of the category Y with which X was
         paired by Merge or by Move in the course of the derivation.
         Epstein (1995: 17)

The definition in (26) captures the asymmetry in syntactic structures: a phrase does not c-command its 'aunt' (the sister of its 'mother' phrase) because these two phrases have never been merged together. As a derivational construct, c-command does not need a representational definition – this circumstance, according to Epstein, eliminates massive redundancy from the theory of grammar.

The dynamic syntax approach becomes more relevant in the light of Hauser et al. (2002) who claim that the human language is uniquely defined by the capacity of recursion. Ideally, syntactic operations must be defined by the local properties of Merge, and not driven by global considerations. Zwart (2006, 2007, 2009) emphasizes the role of the sisterhood configuration in the analysis of such linguistic phenomena as syntactic position, word order, agreement, case, binding – all of these phenomena are attributed to the dependency relation that is automatically created between two sister phrases at the point of Merge.

Zwart (2007) discusses the notion of syntactic position, a very cartographic notion as suggested by its name. In cartography, an element moving to the left periphery, moves to a fixed *position*: topic movement targets SpecTopP, focus movement – SpecFocP, and so on. Zwart (2007) bases his critique of the cartographic approach on word order transitivity failures, among other things. For instance, with regard to the left periperhy of the clause, Van Craenenbroeck (2006) observes that the distribution of Topic elements in Venetian violates Rizzi's (1997) ordering of functional projections; Van Craenenbroeck proposes that Topic elements cannot remain inside a focus-marked domain and thus must be externalized – a

consequence of this analysis is that elements in the Venetian left periphery do not have a fixed site, which means that the cartographic approach cannot be maintained in view of the Venetian data. In dynamic syntax a syntactic position is created due to a need of the local structural environment: movement (re-merge) of a topic element results from the need of the comment domain to externalise an offending topic-marked element, a *wh*-element is externalized from a 'ground'-domain.

The subject requirement also receives a novel interpretation in dynamic syntax: the need of a verbal event for a centering element motivates the merging of a subject, which yields a proposition – a centered event. A verbal event, according to Zwart (2007: 68), is a lexical domain with tense/aspect features that anchor the event in time – hence the cross-linguistic association of subjects with the Tense projection (SpecTP). In this context the Extended Projection Principle (EPP) can be understood as a requirement for an event to be centered. Note that in the cartographic approach the EPP remains an unexplained feature stipulated on T (Chomsky 2001). (26) thus presents a derivational interpretation of the notion 'subject' and gives meaning to the EPP.

Furthermore, Zwart (2006b) offers an interesting analysis of subject-predicate agreement which is interpreted as a morphological realization of a more contentful dependency relation between two sister phrases: the subject phrase and its sister phrase containing the predicate. As represented in (27-b), the subject marks the predicate YP as its dependent upon merge – the dependency is then morphologically expressed on one of the predicate's constituents:

(27) a. She work-s at the hospital.
      b.

(27) illustrates a case of subject-verb agreement, but subject agreement can be realized also on other constituents of the predicate phrase, not only on verbs. For example, Swahili displays multiple target agreement where several members of the predicate phrase agree with the subject in gender:

(28) *Swahili*

Juma a-li-kuwa   a-ngali a-ki-fanya   kazi.
Juma$_1$ SU$_1$-PST-BE SU$_1$-still SU$_1$-PROG-do work

'Juma was still working.'   Carstens (2003)

a.

```
              XP
           /      \
      subject ———→ YP
                  /  \
                aux   \
                 φ   adv   V   work
                      φ    φ
```

Zwart (2006) analyzes this pattern as multiple spell-out of the dependency between the subject and its sister phrase, as illustrated in (28-b). Multiple target agreement of the Swahili type is problematic for the recent generative agreement models, such as spec-head and Agree. In the Agree model the agreeing elements in (28) would have to be somehow associated with T to be able to host agreement markers, or there would have to be more functional heads associated with the agreeing elements and carrying uninterpretable ϕ-features. It is not clear how the spec-head analysis would deal with the data: either the agreeing elements would have to adjoin to Agr_S, or multiple copies of Agr would have to affix-hop onto the agreeing elements.

Another interesting agreement pattern is presented by Coahuilteco where subject agreement is spelled out on the object, which is expected to be possible in Zwart (2006), as the object is part of the predicate phrase.

(29)   *Coahuilteco*

   a.   Dios tupoˑ-**n**   naxo-xt'eˑwal wakoˑ
        god DEM-1AGRS 1PL:SU-annoy CAUS
        'We annoyed god.'

   b.   Dios tupoˑ-**m**   xa-kaˑwa xo   e?
        god DEM-2AGRS 2SU-love AUX Q
        'Do you love god?'

   c.   na-pa-xaˑma-p-saˑ apaˑ-m   ux^{w}aˑl' tukweˑ-m   xaˑ-pa-čuˑ
        1SG-soul   DEM-2AGRS sky   DEM-2AGRS 2SU-SUB-carry
        san.
        FUT
        '(that) you will carry my soul to heaven.'   Zwart (2006b)

In (29-a) and (29-b) the demonstrative *tupoˑ-* of the object *dios* 'god' agrees with the subject which is expressed by a clitic on the verb. As shown in (29-c), the agreement can be expressed more than once, on different nouns, which suggests that the markers are not simply subject pronominals cliticizing to the preceding phrase. Agreement on the object is expected in Zwart's analysis because an object

is part of the predicate phrase. In the dependency analysis of agreement spell-out of the subject's ϕ-features is a possibility freely presented by the structure, the reason why the Coahuilteco pattern does not occur more often cross-linguistically may be due to the different settings languages have on the choice of terms that can spell out agreement. Zwart hypothesizes that an element most suitable to be a host of alien ϕ-features would be one that does not own any ϕ-features of its own: that is why verbs would be more frequent ϕ-hosts than objects.

The dynamic syntax approach has covered a wide range of linguistic phenomena since the 1990's. My objective in this work is to provide an analysis of the possession data that is compatible with the dynamic syntax approach and at the same time fares better than the existing cartographic analyses in accounting for the data.

2.2.1   The relation between structure and meaning

Meaning-to-structure mapping is a prominent topic in this thesis: I am primarily concerned with the argument structure of *be*-possessives and the (presumably) related constructions.

The realization of semantic relations has been a topic where the cartographic approach has been most influential, due to the general assumption that argument structure is universal. This concerns, in particular, the Uniformity of Theta-Assignment Hypothesis that maps a conceptual representation of an event onto a syntactic representation:

(30)   *The Uniformity of Theta-Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH)*
         Identical thematic relationships between items are represented by
         identical structural relationships between those items at the level of
         D-structure.   Baker (1988: 46)

According to (30), the tight concept-to-syntax mapping is universal and thus considerably constrains the grammar; surface differences are attributed to non-trivial syntactic derivations or different conceptualizations of an event. Baker (1997) notes that the 'identical' part of the UTAH may be too strong and should be understood as 'equivalent'. An example is presented by the positions of the agent role in the active and in the passive that are equivalent in the sense that they are both external to the VP: the specifier of IP in active sentences and the head of I containing the morpheme -*en* in passive sentences (Baker 1997: 74). Note that with the VP-internal subject hypothesis this example is no longer relevant and one can go back to the strict interpretation of 'identical' in (30).

The UTAH prompted a hoard of analyses that aspire to provide one underlying argument structure for a variety of constructions in the languages of the world. The possessive research is an instantiation of this phenomenon, as the reader will witness in Chapter 4: a tacit (and sometimes explicit) assumption is made that inasmuch as there is such a thematic role as Possessor, it should be projected in the same syntactic position cross-linguistically, irrespective of the encoding strategy.

A dedicated follower of the UTAH should remember, however, that the hypothesis was stated only for the 'core' thematic roles such as agent/causer, patient/theme, path/location and was lax about oblique arguments: their thematic roles are expressed directly by adpositions and case markers. Baker (1997) also allows the possibility that various PPs differ in their syntactic positions. Furthermore, the UTAH allows for different conceptualizations of an event, as evident from the experiencer-debate presented in Baker (1997). The debate concerns English psych-verbs such as *fear* and *frighten*:

(31)   a.   Peter fears dogs.
        b.   John likes long novels.
        c.   Mary worries about the ozone layer.

(32)   a.   Dogs frighten Peter.
        b.   Long novels please John.
        c.   The ozone layer worries Mary.

The examples in (31) and (32) seem to refute the UTAH, as the two thematic roles – Experiencer and Theme – are projected differently: with *fear*-verbs the Experiencer is the external argument, and with *frighten*-verbs it is the Theme. A range of scholars, such as Belletti and Rizzi (1988), have attempted to posit one order as the basic one and derive the second from it. Baker (1997) proposes that the correct treatment is provided by Pesetsky (1987, 1995) and Dowty (1991): namely, the roles observed in (31) and (32) are the same, but are distributed differently. In (31) the experiencer argument is a sentient being and is therefore more like a canonical agent – it is thus mapped into an external argument position. In (32), although the experiencer role is also involved, the other argument (e.g. *dogs*) is more agent-like in that it causes an emotion (and is not necessarily the target of this emotion).[5] Baker's conclusion is thus that the projection of the Agent and Theme roles happens in the same way in (31) and

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[5]Examples in (32) are also different from (31) in that the former involve a meaning of inchoativity.

(32)– the differences are due to different conceptualizations of the events.

So there seems to be room in the UTAH for different conceptualizations of an event, when it comes to such non-macro-roles as experiencers. It is then conspicuous that Possessors are not granted the same conceptualization freedom in generative research, even though the idea has been proposed elsewhere. Earlier in the chapter I introduced Heine's (1997) concept of event schemas that present different conceptualization possibilities for the relation of possession. The transitive *have*-strategy, for instance, stems from an Action schema where the possessor argument is conceptualized as an agent. In the Location schema the possessor is conceptualized as the location, and in the *with*-possessive the possessum is conceptualized as a companion. The UTAH will apply within a given conceptual frame.[6]

In view of Heine's cognitive and typological observations and Baker's own solution for the problem of experiencers, a cartographic analysis can posit different underlying structures for different possessive constructions and keep the UTAH intact.

In the dynamic syntax approach a construct such as the UTAH is not a natural addition to the theory if it is interpreted as requiring a universal map of structural positions in which arguments are introduced cross-linguistically.[7] However, once one allows for a certain freedom in conceptualization possibilities as described above, the UTAH becomes a more dynamic concept; a further necessary condition is strict locality. The locality of θ-assignment is already assumed in current Minimalism, as each θ-role is introduced by its own predicate: an agent argument is projected together with an agentive v, a goal argument is introduced by an applicative head, various adpositions serve as predicates introducing the necessary θ-roles. As long as an 'identical' position in (30) is understood to be the local environment of an identical predicate, no additional adjustments are necessary to include the predictions of the UTAH into dynamic syntax. The attested hierarchy of thematic roles is yielded automatically by the few ways in which various predicates can be merged: e.g. the restrictions on combinatory possibilities of an

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[6]It is thinkable that not only possessors may be introduced by different predicates in different conceptual frames – Agents may also do so: this may be the difference between Agents in Nominative-Accusative and Ergative-Absolutive languages.

[7]One of the early dynamic approaches to thematic structure is represented by Hale and Keyser (1993) who try to derive the basic thematic relations from the two structural relations: specifier and complement. Hale and Keyser propose four structural types of lexical argument structure that have differing specifications about whether they can take a specifier and/or a complement; the derivation of argument structure proceeds according to the principles of Bare Phrase Structure (Chomsky 1995).

agentive v and V would yield the order Agent > Theme. In Chapter 5 I propose an analysis of *be*-possessives where the possessor role is assigned by a predicate responsible for possessor semantics. I claim that there is no fixed point in the derivation where this predicate is merged – the predicate can be merged at a variety of points; I demonstrate the various merging possibilities in the range of *be*-possessives in Russian, as well as other constructions that employ prepositional possessors. The notion of 'possessum' is thus determined dynamically – it is the sister phrase of the possessor predicate.

So far in this section we have considered two approaches to the meaning-to-structure mapping both of which referred to the UTAH. First, I discussed the traditional approach and pointed out that it makes room for different conceptualization possibilities. Furthermore, there is a more dynamic, strictly local interpretation of the UTAH that defines identity of positions over role-assigning predicates. In this thesis I subscribe to the latter approach. There is also a third possibility that I would like to discuss here.

A construct like the UTAH is namely not indispensable – the same work can presumably be done by cognitive primitives, such as the already mentioned Event schemas of Heine (1997): 'a set of structural templates that are available to human beings for the expression of more abstract concepts' (Heine 1997: 224). Event schemas refer to basic situations, such as what one does, where one is, who one is accompanied by, what exists, etc. (Heine 1997: 45). It seems that event schemas can provide an interpretation for a syntactic structure and as cognitive primitives they are preferable with regard to the economy of the system than an independently stated principle of grammar.

Event schemas may also be sufficient where Baker (1997) means the UTAH has no theoretical contestants – the syntax of one-place predicates. The context for this claim is the comparison of two versions of the UTAH: the absolute version of Baker (1988) that refers to exact syntactic positions, and the relativized version of Larson (1988) that only refers to the relative hierarchy of two arguments.[8] Baker states that while both versions of the UTAH make largely similar predictions, the absolute version fares better with regard to unaccusatives and unergatives.

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[8]The relativized version of the UTAH in (i-a) is not a formal syntactic principle, but rather follows the Thematic Hierarchy of Carrier-Duncan (1985) in (i-b):

(i)   a.   Identical thematic relationships are represented by identical relative hierarchical relations between items at D-Structure.

           b.   Agent > Theme > Goal > Obliques (manner, location, time)

Because the Relativized version of the UTAH operates on oppositions of two arguments, it presumably does not care about one-place predicates, and can wrongly allow the generation of an agent argument as the direct complement to the verb. The absolute UTAH, on the other hand, imposes an exact syntactic position on the sole argument and can thus derive the syntactic behavior of one-place predicates – this means that the theory needs a principle that operates with exact syntactic positions.

I suggest that a cognitive primitive such as an Event schema can do the job of the UTAH with regard to the projection of arguments of one-place predicates. An Event schema determines whether an entity carries out or undergoes an event, and this can determine the dependency relation between a predicate and an argument. When an entity undergoes an event, the predicate takes the entity as its dependent, as in (33):

(33) a. The river froze.
      b. Predicate → DP

When an entity carries out an action, it has a more prominent status and takes the predicate as the dependent, as in (34):

(34) a. John laughed.
      b. DP → Predicate

If it can be shown that the job of the UTAH can be done by a cognitive primitive, we will be one step closer to a system without unnecessary assumptions. A derivation can proceed in a relatively unconstrained manner, restricted only by the properties of Merge and the requirements of the local configuration – the grammaticality status of the result can be determined by independent cognitive primitives. It is not necessary to assume that cognitive primitives directly participate in derivations – instead, they can be given the status of conditions that the language faculty is designed to satisfy in some optimal way, as e.g. proposed in Frampton and Gutmann (2002).[9]

2.3 Chapter summary

In this chapter I prepare the ground for the upcoming discussion. The chapter demarcates the empirical area that I deal with in this thesis: predicative

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[9]Note that Frampton and Gutmann assume the θ-criterion to be one of those conditions; I do not.

possessives and related constructions in Russian. Before an appropriate syntactic analysis can be proposed, a profound understanding of the notion of possession is necessary. I discuss various dimensions in which the notion of possession can be dissected, such as modes, semantic types and encoding strategies. The discussion of the typology of predicative possession is an important contribution of this chapter; generative linguistics must internalize the typological findings on the true diversity of predicative possessives. Furthermore, I emphasize that although proximity is perhaps a universal component of the cognitive notion of possession this does not mean that location should be directly involved in the construal of possessive expressions – proximity can be achieved by other event types.

The formal conceptual part of this chapter consists in the presentation of the dynamic approach to syntax, as opposed to the predominant cartographic view. I point out that although the universality of argument structure is taken for granted in the cartographic research program, there is no theory-internal motivation for this state of affairs. The UTAH, in particular, allows a certain degree of variation in syntactic structures attributed to different conceptualizations – a circumstance that often seems to be overlooked in generative research. The dynamic approach to meaning-to-structure mapping allows for a UTAH-like principle only if conceptualization flexibility is combined with the strict locality of θ-role assignment; in the following chapters I construct an analysis of possession in the Russian clause that follows these requirements.

Chapter 3

The Russian *be*-possessives

This chapter is dedicated to the main means of expressing predicative possession in Russian – the *be*-possessive. The chapter is to a large degree descriptive and is written for the reader's orientation in the field of *be*-possessives: main construction types, basic properties and related theoretical issues. My presentation of the data is undoubtedly influenced to some extent by the analysis I develop, but I do attempt to remain as analysis-neutral as possible. In the first part of the chapter I discuss the term '*be*-possessive' and the range of constructions it encompasses. The *be*-possessives are presented with regard to two dimensions: structural frame and semantic type. The second part of the chapter is concerned with two topics that have been prominent in the discussion of the existential *be*-possessive: Genitive of Negation and subjecthood. It should become clear from this chapter that the range of *be*-possessive constructions in Russian is diverse and a proper analysis should have room for this diversity.

3.1   The basic properties

The descriptive term '*be*-possessive' refers to a construction that involves three basic ingredients: the verb *byt'* 'be', a prepositional *u*-phrase (possessor), and a Nominative DP (possessum). As will be illustrated shortly the term in fact refers to a variety of constructions with different semantic and structural specifications. In this thesis I assume that in order for a construction to qualify for the descriptive title of '*be*-possessive', a possession relation must take place between the *u*-PP and the Nominative noun phrase. (1) presents some examples:

(1)   a.   U menja jest'   mašin-a.
           at I.GEN be.PRS car.F-NOM.SG
           'I have a car.'

      b.   Vaš-e   pis'm-o   u sekretar'-a.
           your-N.NOM.SG letter.N-NOM.SG at secretary.M-GEN.SG
           'The secretary has your letter.'

      c.   U Kol-i   byl-i   gusty-je   volos-y.
           at Kolya-GEN be.PST-PL thick-NOM.PL hair-NOM.PL
           'Kolya had thick hair.'

In (1-a) the relation of possession is asserted, the sentence is an instance of
permanent possession. In (1-b) the referent of the *u*-PP is a temporary possessor
of the Nominative *vaše pis'mo* 'your letter'. In (1-c) *Kolya* is the inalienable
possessor of *volosy* 'hair'. The possession relation requirement should be used to
sift out irrelevant constructions from the discussion. Observe the examples in (2):

(2)   a.   Margarit-a   v èt-o   vrem'-a   byl-a   uže
           Margarita-NOM in this-N.NOM.SG time.N-NOM.SG be.PST-F.SG already
           u dver-ej   kvartir-y   nomer 50.
           by door.F-GEN.PL flat.F-GEN.SG number 50
           'Margarita at this time was already by the door of flat nr 50.'   M.
           Bulgakov, 'The Master and Margarita'

      b.   Kol'-a   byl   u sestr-y.
           Kolya-NOM be.PST:M.SG at sister.F-GEN.SG
           'Kolya was at his sister's place.'   Jung (2008: 116)

The sentences in (2) involve a Nominative noun phrase, the verb *byt'* 'be' and an
u-PP; there is, however, no possessive relation between the noun phrases and the
u-PPs. The sentences are locative: the referent of the Nominative DP is situated
at a location designated by the *u*-PP, directly or indirectly. The *u*-PP in (2-a) is
unambiguously locative and is translated as 'near the door' – the sentence can be
unproblematically set aside as a non-possessive construction. (2-b), on the other
hand, represents constructions that the reader should be wary of: e.g.
Kondrashova (1996) categorizes examples like (2-b) as locative-possessive (on a
par with temporary possessive sentences as in (1-b)). However, though the *u*-PP
here is possessive, the possessum is not *Kolya*, but rather the unexpressed
location, 'sister's *place*'; the *u*-PP *u sestry* 'at sister's' as a whole refers to a
location and the relation between the Nominative DP *Kolya* and the *u*-PP is that
of location.[1] An analysis of *be*-possessives may or may not include the examples in

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[1]Cf. Chvany (1975) who analyzes the *u*-PP in (2-b) as a modifier of a silent adverbial.

(2) into the core of constructions to be accounted for – it is still important to be
aware of the differences. Note that although the preposition *u* has a locative
meaning as clearly demonstrated in (2-a), with human-denoting complements the
interpretation is never that of pure location, such as 'near':

(3)   M'ač   u Kol-i.
        ball.M:NOM.SG at Kolya-GEN
        'Kolya has the ball (at the moment).', *'The ball is near Kolya.'

The configuration in (3) favors a locative interpretation, however, the sentence
does not mean that the ball is situated in the proximity of Kolya, but rather that
the ball is in Kolya's temporary possession during a game or at Kolya's place.
The closest an *u*-PP containing a human DP comes to a locative interpretation is
the meaning in (2-b).

When it comes to the formal characteristics, the *be*-possessives can be roughly
divided into two groups: existential and copular. In the existential *be*-possessive
the relation of possession constitutes the main assertion of the clause, such that
the possessum is unpresupposed. In copular *be*-possessives the possession relation
is presupposed. The two main differences between the existential and the copular
frame are the form of the verb *byt'* 'be' in the present tense and the case of the
possessum under negation.

In the existential *be*-possessive the verb *byt'* 'be' is spelled out as *jest'* in the
affirmative present-tense sentences, as shown in (4-a). Under negation the case of
the possessum in existential possessives is Genitive and the verb has a
non-agreeing 3Sg form (4-b). In negated present-tense sentences the form *net* is
used – this is a historical conflation of the negation particle and the verb *byt'* (4-c).

(4)   a.   U menja jest'   den'g-i.
              at I.GEN BE.PRS money.PL-NOM
              'I have money.'
        b.   U nego   ne   bud-et   problem.
              at he.GEN NEG will.be-3.SG problem.F:GEN.PL
              'He won't have problems.'
        c.   U menja net   mašin-y.
              at I.GEN NEG.BE.PRS car.F-GEN.SG
              'I don't have a car.'

The properties of *byt'* 'be' described for example set (4) are observed in other
existential *be*-sentences:

(5)   a.   Bog   jest'.
                 god.M:NOM.SG be.PRS
                 'There is God.'

        b.   V sel-e   net   doktor-a.
                 in village.M-LOC.SG NEG.be.PRS doctor.M:GEN.SG
                 'There is no doctor in the village.'

The bare existential construction in (5-a) displays the form *jest'*, similarly to the possessive in (4-a); the locational existential in (5-b) contains the conflated *net*-form and the Genitive of Negation on the Theme *doktora* 'doctor'.

The sentences in (6) represent copular *be*-possessives: (6-a) expresses inalienable possession and (6-b) illustrates the temporary possession semantic type.

(6)   a.   U nee   (*jest') sini-je   glaz-a.
                 at she.GEN be.PRS blue-NOM.PL eye.M-NOM.PL
                 'She has blue eyes.'

        b.   Mašin-a/-*y   ne u Ann-y.
                 car.F-NOM.SG/GEN.SG NEG at Anna-GEN
                 'It is not Anna who has the car (at the moment).'

Copular *byt'* 'be' is null in the present tense, as (6-a) illustrates. (6-b) shows that the case of the possessum under negation remains Nominative (and negation is expressed as *ne*). These characteristics are displayed in copular *be*-sentences with adjectival and nominal predicates:

(7)   a.   Maš-a   (*jest') krasiv-aja.
                 Maša-NOM BE.PRS beautiful-F.NOM.SG
                 'Maša is beautiful.'

        b.   On   ne   durak.
                 he.NOM NEG fool.M:NOM.SG
                 'He is not a fool.'

Copular and existential *be*-sentences can thus be distinguished in the present tense (both affirmative and negated) and in the past and future negated forms. When it comes to the affirmative past and future tenses the form of the verb *byt'* 'be' is the same across the existential/copular distinction:

(8)   a.   U menja byl-i/bud-ut   den'gi.
                 at I.GEN be.PST-PL/be.FUT-PL money.PL-NOM
                 'I had/will have money.'

        b.   U rebyonk-a   byl-i/bud-ut   sini-je   glaz-a.
                 at child.M-GEN.SG be.PST-PL/be.FUT-PL blue-NOM.PL eye.M-NOM.PL

'The child had/will have blue eyes.'

The verb agrees with the possessum both in the existential permanent possessive in (8-a) and in the copular inalienable possessive in (8-b). This is where the existential and copular varieties of *be*-possessives may be formally indistinguishable.

A useful tool in exploring the structural variants of existential and copular *be*-possessives are Heine's (1997) semantic types of possession: permanent, physical, inalienable, abstract and temporary. (9) gives examples of these possession types in the existential frame:

(9)   a.   U menja jest'   mašin-a.
            at I.GEN be.PRS car.F-NOM.SG
            'I have a car.'

       b.   U vas   bilet   jest'   (s   soboj)?
            at you.GEN ticket.M:NOM.SG be.PRS with REFL
            'Do you have a/your ticket (with you)?'

       c.   Ot roždeni-ja   Matron-a   byl-a   ne   prosto
            from birth.N-GEN.SG Matrona-NOM be.PST-F.SG NEG simply
            slep-oj,   u nee   sovsem ne   byl-o   glaz.
            blind-F.INST.SG at she.GEN at.all   NEG be.PST-N.SG eye.M:GEN.PL
            From birth Matrona was not simply blind, she did not have eyes at all.

       d.   U tebja   bud-ut   problem-y.
            at you.GEN will.be-3PL problem.F-NOM.PL
            'You will have problems.'

       e.   U menja jest'   mašin-a   na dann-yj   moment,
            at I.GEN be.PRS car.F-NOM.SG on this-M.ACC.SG moment.M:ACC.SG
            no ona   Petin-a.
            but she.NOM Petya's-F.NOM.SG
            'I have a car at the moment, but it belongs to Petya.'

The sentences in (9) have the same basic word order: the *u*-possessor, the verb and the possessum; it seems that all instances of existential *be*-possessives can be grouped into one construction type. For copular *be*-possessives, Heine's semantic types of possession are illustrated in (10):

(10)   a.   U nego   ogromn-yj   dom.
            at he.GEN huge-M.NOM.SG house.M:NOM.SG
            'He has a huge house.'

       b.   U Maš-i   krasiv-oje   plat'-je.
            at Maša-GEN beautiful-N.NOM.SG dress.N-NOM.SG
            'Maša has (is wearing) a beautiful dress.'

     c.   U Kol-i   byl-i   gusty-je   volos-y.
         at Kolya-GEN be.PST-PL thick-NOM.PL hair-NOM.PL
         'Kolya had thick hair.'

     d.   U IT-specialist-ov   plox-aja   reputaci-ja.
         at IT-specialist.M-GEN.PL bad-F.NOM.SG reputation.F-NOM.SG
         'IT specialists have a bad reputation.'

     e.   M'ač   u Aršavin-a.
         ball.M:NOM.SG at Aršavin-GEN
         'Aršavin has the ball.'

The sentences in (10) do not display the same word order: the temporary possession type in (10-e) stands apart in that the possessum stands in the sentence-initial position. The copular *be*-possessives seem to be divided into at least two different structural types. On the whole, *be*-possessives can so far be roughly grouped into three construction types represented in (11):

(11)   a.   *u* Possessor BE\ex Possessum.
        b.   *u* Possessor BE\cop (Adj) Possessum.
        c.   Possessum BE\cop *u* Possessor.

I will refer to these general construction types as the existential *be*-possessive, the copular property *be*-possessive and the copular temporary *be*-possessive.[2] In the existing analyses it is the existential *be*-possessive that stands in the limelight. The theoretical issues related to *be*-possessives that have been discussed at great length in the literature are the Genitive of Negation and subjecthood.

3.2 The Genitive of Negation

The Genitive of Negation (GenNeg) is the case that a range of structural-cased (Nominative and Accusative) noun phrases acquire under sentential negation. In existential possessives the possessum obligatorily changes its case from Nominative to Genitive:

(12)   a.   U Ivan-a   net   mašin-y/-*a.
         at Ivan-GEN NEG.BE.PRS car.F-GEN.SG/NOM.SG
         Ivan doesn't have a car.'

     b.   *U nego   ne bud-ut   nikak-ije   problem-y.
         at he.GEN NEG be.FUT-3SG any-NOM.PL problem.F-NOM.PL

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[2]The 'property'-part in the term 'copular property *be*-possessives' reflects the analysis I assume for these possessives further on in the thesis: the possessum noun is assumed to be of the {e, t}-type.

        'He won't have any problems.'

    c.   U nego   ne bud-et   nikak-ix   problem.
        at he.GEN NEG be.FUT-3SG any-GEN.PL problem.F:GEN.PL
        'He won't have any problems.'

(12-a) illustrates a negated permanent existential possessive in the present tense
where the Nominative ending is ungrammatical on the possessum. (12-b) shows
that the Nominative case on the possessum is ungrammatical even when the
predicate agrees with it; (12-c) is the grammatical variant. As stated at the
beginning of the chapter, copular possessives do not display GenNeg – in addition
to the example in (6-b), (13) presents some more examples:

(13)   a.   U nego   ne sin-ije   glaz-a   / *sin-ix
           at he.GEN NEG blue-NOM.PL eye.M-NOM.PL   blue-GEN.PL
           glaz.
           eye.M-GEN.PL
           'He doesn't have blue eyes.'

    b.   [Vaš-e   pis'm-o   / *vaš-ego   pis'm-a]
           your-N.NOM.SG letter.N-NOM.SG   your-N.GEN.SG letter.N-GEN.SG
           ne   u sekretar'-a.
           NEG at secretary.M-GEN.SG
           'The secretary does not have your letter.'

Both the copular property *be*-possessive in (13-a) and the copular temporary
be-possessive in (13-b) require a Nominative case on the possessum when negated.
There is a huge body of literature containing various approaches to GenNeg; I
limit the present discussion to two approaches: the well-known Unaccusativity
hypothesis of Pesetsky (1982), and the recent property-type analysis of Partee and
Borschev (2004) – my position is the integration of the two analyses.
A popular approach to GenNeg in generative linguistics has been Pesetsky (1982)
who analyzes it as a case that occurs under negation on un-presupposed Themes:
direct objects, subjects of passives and subjects of unaccusatives.

(14)   a.   Ja   ne poluč-il   pis'm-a/-o.
           I.NOM NEG receive-PST:M.SG letter.N-GEN.SG/-ACC.SG
           'I didn't receive any/the letter'.

    b.   Ni odn-oj/-a   gazet-y/-a   ne
           not one-F.GEN.SG/F.NOM.SG newspaper.F-GEN.SG/NOM.SG NEG
           byl-o/-a   poluč-en-o/-a.
           be.PST-N.SG/F.SG receive-PART-N.SG/F.SG
           'No newspapers have been received.'

c. Otvet/-a ne priš-el/-lo.
answer.M:NOM.SG/-GEN.SG NEG come-PST.M.SG/PST.N.SG
'No answer came.' Pesetsky (1982)

In all of the examples in (14) the Nominative/Accusative cases on the Theme arguments represent presupposed Themes; the Genitive case marks no presupposition of existence. For example, the Accusative form *pis'mo* 'letter' in (14-a) refers to a specific presupposed letter that the speaker denies having received; the Genitive *pis'ma* carries no such presupposition, the letter may or may not exist. Pesetsky's Theme-requirement reflects the fact that subjects of unergatives do not display GenNeg:

(15) *Nikak-ix student-ov ne pel-o.
any-GEN.PL student.m-gen.pl NEG sing.PST-N.SG
'No students sang.'

To derive the necessary configurational requirement, Pesetsky (1982) proposes a mechanism where negation licenses a null (quantificational) Q head that assigns GenNeg to structural-cased NPs in its scope.

Partee and Borschev (2004) propose an alternative analysis of GenNeg. They argue, following Babby (1980), that all of Nominative-to-GenNeg substitution cases (the authors call it Subject GenNeg) happen in existential environments. Besides the existential *be*-sentence in (5-b) and the existential *be*-possessives in (12), this also applies to the passive and the unaccusative construction in (14). Constructions with perception predicates allowing GenNeg are also analyzed as a subtype of existential sentences, where the failure to perceive an entity in some location is equated to its inexistence in that location:

(16) Moroz-a ne čuvstvova-l-o-s'.
frost.M-GEN.SG NEG feel-PST-N.SG-REFL
'No frost was felt.' Partee and Borschev (2004)

Partee and Borschev distinguish Subject GenNeg from the Genitive substituting the Accusative case, which the authors refer to as Object GenNeg and consider to be a phenomenon without semantic uniformity. In the criticism of the Unaccusativity hypothesis Partee and Borschev start from the observation that the Theme requirement makes incorrect predictions about the occurrence of GenNeg in passive sentences and in transitive clauses. With regard to passives, the Unaccusativity hypothesis predicts that if a verb allows GenNeg on its object, the subject of the corresponding passive sentence should also be able to occur in

the Genitive. This prediction is borne out for sentence-pairs like (17), where the Theme argument of the verb *polučit'* 'receive' is marked Genitive both in the active and in the passive sentence, but the same cannot be stated for (18):

(17)   a.   On   ne   poluči-l   pis'm-a.
            he.NOM NEG receive-PST:M.SG letter.N-GEN.SG
            'He didn't receive any letter'.

       b.   Pis'm-a   ne   byl-o   polučen-o.
            letter.N-GEN.SG NEG be.PST-N.SG receive.PRT-N.SG
            'No letter was received.'   Partee and Borschev (2004)

(18)   a.   Ja   ne   čita-l   èt-oj   knig-i.
            I.NOM NEG read-PST:M.SG this-F.GEN.SG book.F-GEN.SG
            'I didn't read this book.'

       b.   *Èt-oj   knig-i   ne   byl-o   pročit-an-o.
            this-F.GEN.SG book.F-GEN.SG NEG be.PST-N.SG read-PRT-N.SG
            'This book wasn't read.'   Partee and Borschev (2004)

Both sentences in (18) involve the verb *čitat'* 'read' (presumably the difference in aspects should not have a bearing on the data). The NP *kniga* 'book', despite its Theme status and the possibility of GenNeg in (18-a), is ungrammatical in the Genitive in (18-b). Partee and Borschev hypothesize that the crucial condition for a passive subject to receive GenNeg is that the sentence be interpreted existentially, not that the subject originate as the Theme. A lexical predicate can undergo semantic bleaching to become an existential predicate depending on the presupposition status of its argument: in (17-b) the predicate *polučeno* does not presuppose the existence of its Theme argument and can thus be bleached to an existential predicate; the predicate *pročitano* in (18-b), however, does presuppose the existence of its Theme, hence it cannot be bleached and GenNeg is not allowed. Partee and Borschev emphasize the importance of the existential interpretation by demonstrating that even the Theme requirement can be lifted once a predicate is interpreted existentially – observe the unergative predicate in (19):

(19)   Ne   bele-l-o   parus-ov   na gorizont-e.
       NEG shine.white-PST-N.SG sail.M-GEN.PL on horizon.M-LOC.SG
       'No sail shone white on the horizon.'   Partee and Borschev (2004)

Belet' 'shine white' is an unergative predicate; however, once 'shine white' is considered equivalent to the perceived presence of a sail (sails are generally white), the sentence can be interpreted as existential, hence GenNeg in (19).

The second incorrect prediction that Partee and Borschev attribute to the Unaccusativity hypothesis concerns transitive verbs: it is assumed that all negated transitive verbs in Russian allow their Themes to be Genitive. However, as observed in Borschev et al. (2008, 58), Object GenNeg is 'verb-sensitive and not semantically uniform'. Object GenNeg can most frequently be observed with verbs of creation and perception:

(20) a. Oni   ne   postroi-l-i   gostinic-u/-y.
          they.NOM NEG build-PST-PL hotel.F-ACC.SG/GEN.SG
          'They didn't build the/a hotel.'
      b. Ne   viž-u   Maš-u/-i.
          NEG see:PRS-1SG Maša-ACC/GEN
          'I don't see Maša.'   Borschev et al. (2008, 58-59)

The Genitive form of the object in (20-a) emphasizes its non-specificity – no hotel was built; if the Accusative form is used, we can be referring to a specific (planned) hotel. Verbs of perception prioritize the observed presence of the object; even proper names can take GenNeg in these environments. The Accusative case in (20-b) gives the object a presupposed status, assuming that the person was present but not visible, whereas the Genitive case does not carry the presupposition of the person's presence, simply referring to the person's invisibility. As soon as we leave the area of creation and perception verbs, GenNeg becomes more rare and its meaning changes, too. GenNeg is rare with verbs that take human objects (Accusative is preferred here) – when GenNeg does occur, a property reading of the object is emphasized:

(21) On   ne   pooščrja-l   gord-uju/-oj
      he.NOM NEG encourage-PST:M.SG proud-F.ACC.SG/-F.GEN.SG
      knjažn-u/-y.
      duchess.F-ACC.SG/-GEN.SG
      'He didn't encourage the proud duchess.'   Borschev et al. (2008, 60)

The Accusative case makes the proud duchess the object of disencouragement; the Genitive case, however, suggests that the disencouragement is directed at some property of the duchess, according to Borschev et al. The property-type reading is partly pragmatically conditioned. Verbs of incremental accomplishment bring yet another twist to the meaning of GenNeg – in (22) it is the quantity of the pages that is emphasized:

(22) Ja   ne   pročita-l   dv-ux   stranic.
      I.NOM NEG read-PST:M.SG two-F.GEN.PL page.F:GEN.PL

'I didn't read (even) two pages.'   Borschev et al. (2008, 55)

Thus, Partee and Borschev (2004) and Borschev et al. (2008) show that Object GenNeg is unevenly distributed among the transitive verbs and carries slightly different meanings. The Unaccusativity approach, according to Partee and others, cannot fully account for the distribution of Subject and Object GenNeg. The alternative hypothesis that the authors propose is a diathesis-shift/property-type analysis of GenNeg. The common denominator for the Subject and Object GenNeg is the decreased referentiality of NPs. In terms of diathesis shift, an NP is demoted from a 'first-class' subject/object position. In terms of semantic types, the decreased referentiality of GenNeg NPs can be captured by assigning them an {e, t}-type, as opposed to the {e}-type of 'first-class' arguments (that receive Nominative and Accusative cases). Partee and Borschev hypothesize that the type-shift of an NP argument can be correlated by a shift in the meaning of the verb as well, the primary cause being the presence of higher operators (Negation or modals). The property-type hypothesis allows Partee and others to unify GenNeg with the Genitive NPs occurring in intensional and subjunctive contexts. The authors do not develop a syntactic analysis for their semantic treatment of GenNeg, but give some analysis-compatibility indications. For instance, Bailyn (2004b) proposes that the high Neg head selects for a VP shell with the quantification [q] feature of which GenNeg is the uninterpretable spell-out.

In this thesis my position is that GenNeg is a case that occurs on an {e, t}-type Theme when the predicate of that Theme is negated (what is also called sentential negation): this applies to both Subject GenNeg and Object GenNeg. Lexical predicates differ in whether they can have {e, t}-type arguments. When it comes to examples like (19) where seemingly non-Theme arguments may display GenNeg in an existential context, I assume that the structure is re-analyzed when the predicate is 'bleached' into an existential, such that the argument in question is, in fact, a Theme. For existential *be*-sentences I assume the presence of the lexical existential predicate ∃ that takes a Theme argument, see Chapter 5.

3.3   On *jest'* and *net*

This section renders a closer look at the nature of *jest'* and *net* – the present-tense forms of the verb *byt'* 'be' that have been used actively in Russian linguistics as copular/existential diagnostics. I discuss conditions that license the occurrence of *jest'* in copular environments and also clarify my position on affirmative-negative pairings among *be*-sentences.

I begin with providing the reader with some historical perspective. The form *jest'* is a non-inflecting 3rd person singular remainder of the suppletive present-tense paradigm of *byt'* 'be' of Old East Slavic (before the 14th century):

	Sg	Pl
1	jesm'	jesm
2	jesi	jeste
3	jest'	sut'

Table 3.1: Old East Slavic, *byt'* 'be', present tense

In Old East Slavic the verb *byt'* was more conspicuous in the system of the language, used as an auxiliary in, for instance, the past tense (as opposed to the sole '*l*-participle' form in modern Russian) and spelled out in the present tense also in the copular uses. The forms in Table 3.1 represent both copular and existential uses of *byt'*. Consider the following copular constructions:

(23)   a.   az   jesm'   al'fa i   omega...
            I.NOM BE.PRS.1SG alpha and omega
            'I am the Alpha and the Omega...'

       b.   a   az   věde   ož   u   vas   jeste
            and I.NOM know:PRS.1SG EMPH   at you.PL.GEN   BE.PRS.3SG
            tovar   ol'sk-yn...a   pravite im   tovaro.
            merchandise.M:NOM.SG   Oleska-POSS.ADJ so   send.2PL they.DAT

            merchandise.ACC
            'But I know that you have Oleska's merchandise. So give the
            merchandise to them.'   Birch bark No.548, (period 1180-1200)[3]

(23-a) illustrates a predicational *be*-sentence where the verb displays agreement in person and number with the subject *az* 'I'. (23-b) is an example of a temporary possessive, presumably with a focused possessor; from the definiteness of the possessum (Oleskas merchandise) I conclude that the construction is copular.[4]

The form *net* is a historical conflation of the negation particle *ne* and the verbal form *jest'*. The conflation used to follow the paradigm presented in Table 3.1, (24) illustrates the copular uses of the suppletive conflations:

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[3] The glosses are mine, constructed with the help of Zaliznjak (2004).

[4] Although the form of the verb in this sentence is *jeste* that in Table 3.1 is glossed as 2nd person Plural, Zaliznjak (2004:715) analyzes it as 3rd person singular; the form *jeste* is used with the 3Sg interpretation in several birch-bark letters.

(24)   a.   Gospodi, sogreš-ix i   nesm'   dostoin   pomilovani-ja.
           lord   sin-PST   and NEG.BE.PRS.1SG worthy:M.SG mercy.N-GEN
           'Lord, I have sinned and am not worthy of mercy.'   (Radiščev, 1790)

   b.   Neste   pod zakon-om,   no pod blagodati-ju.
       NEG.BE.PRS.2PL under law.M-LOC.SG but under grace.F-LOC
       'You are not under law, but under grace.'   (Archbishop Platon, 1765)

The archaic form *nest'* is preserved in modern Russian in some near-idiomatic phrases such as *nest čisla*, *nest konca*:

(25)   a.   Avtomobil'-am nest'   čisl-a.
           car.M-DAT.PL   NEG.BE.PRS.3SG number.N-GEN.SG
           'There is a throng of cars./The cars have an uncountable number.'

   b.   I   nest'   konc-a   mučeni-jam.
       and NEG.BE.PRS.3SG end.M-GEN.SG torment.N-DAT.PL
       'And there is no end to the torment./And the torments have no end.'

The constructions in (25) are the remaining traces of the Russian Dative possessive construction mentioned in Chapter 2. Note that the use of *nest'* in (25) is existential (as can be seen by the occurrence of GenNeg); copular uses of *nest'* or other NEG+BE.PRS conflations are not observed in modern Russian.

At the current stage of the language's development the present-tense form *jest'* is commonly regarded as a diagnostic for existential *byt'*. However, one should be aware of the fact that under certain circumstances *jest'* can represent copular *byt'* – these circumstances include at least the following:

(26)   a.   formal definitional sentences
   b.   rhetorical identity sentences
   c.   following the emphatic particle *i*
   d.   tense coordination.

The occurrence of *jest'* in definitional sentences was noted already in Chvany (1975); in the normal speech register the linking function is usually carried out by the deictic element *èto* (in the written language an em dash can be used instead). For more eloquence *jest'* can be used:

(27)   a.   Lingvistik-a   èto / jest'   nauk-a   o
           linguistics.F-NOM.SG it   / BE.PRS science.F-NOM.SG about
           jazyk-e.
           language.M-LOC.SG
           'Linguistics is a science about language.'

    b.   Sčast'-e   jest'   udovol'stvi-e   bez   raskajani-ja.
           happiness.N-NOM BE.PRS pleasure.N-NOM without regret.N-GEN
           'Happiness is pleasure without regret.'   (Tolstoy L.N.)

Furthermore, there are rhetorical identity sentences where the same DP is used on both sides of *jest'*:

(28)   a.   Zakon   jest'   zakon.
            law.M:NOM.SG be.PRS law.M:NOM.SG
            'The law is the law.'

       b.   Moroz   jest'   moroz,   i   sux-oj   i
            frost.M:NOM.SG be.PRS frost.M:NOM.SG, and dry-M.NOM.SG and
            mokr-yj.
            humid-M.NOM.SG
            'Frost is frost, be it dry or humid.'

The construction with *jest'* seems to be the only way to formulate rhetorical identity sentences: *èto* that alternates with *jest'* in definitional sentences in (27), is not available here.

Chvany (1975, 50) observes that *jest'* in definitional sentences is not syntactically active – for instance, it does not participate in question-formation:

(29)   a.   Jest'   (li) v derevn-e   doktor?
            BE.PRS Q   in village.F-LOC.SG doctor.M:NOM.SG
            'Is there a doctor in the village?'

       b.   *Jest'   (li) lingvistik-a   nauk-a o   jazyk-e?
            BE.PRS Q   linguistics.F-NOM science about language.M-LOC.SG
            'Is linguistics a science about language?'   Chvany (1975)

In contrast to the existential *be*-sentence in (29-a) where *jest'* may move to the beginning of the sentence, a definitional sentence with *jest'* cannot be transformed into a question as illustrated in (29-b). Chvany also observes that, when negated, a definitional sentence displays the forms *ne jest*, instead of the existential *net*:[5]

(30)   a.   Zapominani-je   ne   jest'/*net   znani-je.
            memorization.N-NOM NEG BE.PRS/NEG.BE.PRS knowledge.N-NOM.SG
            'Memorization is not knowledge.'

       b.   *Zapominani-je   net   znani-ja.
            memorization.N-NOM NEG.BE.PRS knowledge.N-GEN.SG

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[5]Chvany calls the negation in definitional sentences 'external': such sentences should rather be translated as 'it is not the case that ...'; negated definitional sentences presuppose, i.e. are uttered in response to, a corresponding affirmative sentence.

(30-b) is given here to show that *net* in a definitional sentence is not salvaged by GenNeg. Rhetorical identity sentences differ from definitional sentences in that they cannot be negated or questioned – they are frozen in their affirmative form.

Definitional and rhetorical identity sentences stand out in that *jest'* can occur here on its own, without licensing elements. In other copular *be*-sentences, *jest'* can be 'licensed' by emphatic *i* 'and' and in tense coordination. The emphatic particle *i* 'and' in combination with *jest'* in copular sentences insists on the relation (predication, specification, identity) between two previously mentioned elements – observe the predicational *be*-sentences in (31):

(31) a. Do čego   že   ty   stal-a
          till what.GEN EMPH you.SG become.PST-F.SG
          mnitel'n-a,   prjamo kak bol'n-aja.   – A   ja
          hypochondriac.ADJ-F.SG just   like sick-F.NOM.SG – INTERJ I.NOM
          i   jest' bol'n-aja.
          and be.PRS sick-F.NOM.SG
          'So hypochondriac you have become, just like a sick person. – But I
          am sick.'

     b. Invalid   sčita-jet-sja,   ...a mord-oj
          invalid.M:NOM.SG consider:PRS-3SG-REFL but mug.F-INST.SG
          urk-a.   – Urk-a   on   i   jest',
          criminal-NOM.SG – criminal-NOM.SG he.NOM and be.PRS
          stat'-ja   ugolovn-aja.
          conviction.F-NOM.SG criminal-F.NOM.SG
          'Considered to be an invalid, but his mug is criminal. – Well, he is a
          criminal, he was convicted as such.'

The elements in the complex *i jest'* are mutually dependent, and cannot be dropped separately without causing ungrammaticality in a copular environment. The other licensing condition for *jest'* in copular *be*-sentences mentioned in (26) is *tense coordination* – a coordination of different tense forms of the same verb of the type 'VPAST, VPRESENT and VFUTURE'. Consider the following examples:

(32) a. Centrist-y   kritik-ova-l-i,   kritik-ujut   i
          center.party-NOM.PL criticize-IMPF-PST-PL criticize-PRS.3PL and
          bud-ut kritikova-t' pravitel'stv-o   tam, gde   ono
          will-3PL criticize-INF government.N-ACC.SG there where it.NOM
          nedorabatyva-jet...
          not.work.enough-PRS.3SG
          'The Center party criticized, is criticizing and will criticize the
          government for the areas where it doesn't do enough...'

b. Neboskr'ob-y   stroi-l-i,   stro-jat   i   bud-ut
    skyscraper.M-NOM.PL build-PST-PL build-PRS.3PL and will-3PL
    stroi-t'.
    build-INF
    'Skyscrapers were built, are being built and will be built.'

c. Rossi-ja   byl-a,   jest' i   bud-et   velik-oj
    Russia-NOM be.PST-F.SG be.PRS and be.FUT-3SG great-F.INST.SG
    stran-oj.
    country.F-INST.SG
    'Russia has been, is and will be a great country.'

I assume that tense coordination involves either coordination of the T head (in which case the verb would have to overtly raise to T) or coordination of TPs with ellipsis of identical parts.[6] For predicational sentences examples are to some degree restricted – presumably due to possible conflicts in the case form of the predicate noun: in the present tense the noun should be in the Nominative, whereas in the past and future tenses the predicate noun is in the Instrumental. The most frequent examples are thus when *jest'* is enframed by the past and future forms of *byt'*, as in (32), such that the present-tense requirement for Nominative is not that blatant. Examples like (33) are rare and sound less grammatical:

(33) a. ?Arktik-a   jest' i   bud-et   čast'-ju   Rossi-i.
          Arctic.F-NOM be.PRS and be.FUT-3SG part.F-INST.SG Russia-GEN
          'The Arctic is and will be a part of Russia.'   A. Grešnevikov (2002)

      b. ?Kto   byl   i   jest' ix   avtor-om?
          who.NOM be.PST:M.SG and be.PRS their author.M-INST.SG
          'Who was and is their author?'   V. Agranovskij (1976-1999)

The sentences in (33) feel awkward because *jest'* here occurs on the edge of the tense coordination – the need for the Nominative case on the post-copular NP-predicate is perceived as more prominent, which leads to a more distinct conflict with the Instrumental-imposing *byl/budet*.[7]

In view of examples of *jest'* in copular sentences one may claim that the credibility of *jest'* as an existential diagnostic is weakened – but we must remember that we need special conditions to bring about *jest'* in copular environments. Moreover, the existential-like behavior of these constructions does

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[6] I do not investigate this phenomenon further, but am inclined to the second alternative, assuming that tense morphology on a verb is realization of a dependency between the tense head and its sister phrase, without movement of the verb.

[7] By this description I refer only to grammaticality judgments, not to the actual grammatical processes.

not extend beyond the affirmative field: in negated sentences we do not observe *net* in the same copular environments where *jest'* is possible. (34) presents negated predicational sentences with emphatic *i* and tense coordination:

(34)   a.   Čto   ty   raspryga-l-as', slovno ne   bol'n-aja.   – A ja i
             what you.NOM jump-F.SG   as.if   NEG sick-F.NOM.SG
             *net/*ne jest'/ne bol'n-aja.

             'What are you jumping so much for, as if you were not sick. – I am
             not sick.'
       b.   On   nikogda ne   byl   (*net/*ne   jest'/*ne)
             he.NOM never   NEG be.PST:M.SG (NEG.be.PRS/NEG be.PRS/NEG)
             i   ne   bud-et   predatel-em.
             and NEG be.FUT-3SG traitor.M-INST.SG
             'He has never been and never will be a traitor.'

In (34-a), neither *net* (that is used in negated existentials) nor *ne jest'* (that we have seen in negated definitional sentences) can follow the emphatic *i* – the sentence has to make do with the bare negation particle *ne* usual for copular sentences. In tense coordination under negation the present-tense form is simply excluded, with neither option being satisfactory, as shown in (34-b).

Copular *be*-possessives differ with regard to whether they allow *jest'* under the conditions described above: for example, copular temporary *be*-possessives only allow *jest'* after the emphatic *i*, while copular property *be*-possessives allow *jest'* in tense coordination. For the data and analysis see Chapter 5. I have thus far discussed cases of *jest'* being used in present-tense copular environments under certain conditions. When occurring alone, without any assisting elements like emphatic *i* and tense coordination, *jest'* can still be regarded as an existential diagnostic in *be*-possessives. In general, however, we have seen that the *net*-diagnostic turns out to be more reliable. One could thus state that whenever *net* is used in a *be*-sentence, that sentence is existential. This statement, however, has been disputed in Chvany (1975) and Harves (2003), among others. Here we come to the question that Partee and Borschev (2008: 160) identify as 'What is the negation of what'.

Chvany (1975) and Harves (2003) namely assume that the negated counterparts of locative and temporary possessive *be*-sentences involve *net* and the Genitive of Negation, namely that the (b)-sentences in (35) and (36) are the negated counterparts of the (a)-sentences:

(35)   a.   Doktor   v gorod-e.
              doctor:NOM.SG in town.M-LOC.SG
              'The doctor is in town.'

        b.   Doktor-a   net   v gorod-e.
              doctor-GEN.SG NEG.be.PRS in town.M-LOC.SG
              'There is no doctor in town.'   Chvany (1975: 47)

(36)   a.   Vaš-e   pis'm-o   u sekretar'-a.
              your-N.NOM.SG letter.N-NOM.SG at secretary.M-GEN.SG
              'The secretary has your letter.'

        b.   Vaš-ego   pis'm-a   net   u sekretar'-a.
              your.N-GEN.SG letter.N-GEN.SG NEG.be.PRS at secretary.M-GEN.SG
              'The secretary does not have your letter.'   Harves (2003: 167)

If one assumes that (35) and (36) contain affirmative-negative counterparts, then the occurrence of *net* in the (b)-sentences suggests that *net* can also appear in copular environments; this assumption has far-reaching theoretical consequences. Harves (2003), for instance, concludes that all *be*-sentences with PP predicates display *net* and GenNeg; see also the discussion of the significance of examples in (35) for Chvany's analysis in Chapter 4. Partee and Borschev (2008) question the pairing of the type in (35) and (36). The authors propose that not every sentence has a perfect sentential negation counterpart, and (35-a) and (36-a) are such sentences. When the need for negation arises, a speaker has a choice between two 'functional approximations': a negated existential sentence (the (b)-examples above) or constituent negation, illustrated in (37).

(37)   a.   Doktor   ne v gorod-e.
              doctor:NOM.SG NEG in town.M-LOC.SG
              'The doctor is not in town.'

        b.   Vaš-e   pis'm-o   ne u sekretar'-a.
              your-N.NOM.SG letter.N-NOM.SG NEG at secretary.M-GEN.SG
              'The secretary does not have your letter.'

The role of constituent negation in Russian should not be downplayed. Partee and Borschev (2008, 171) refer to Padučeva (1974) for an empirical observation that Russian makes more use of constituent negation for the expression of 'general negation' ('it is not the case that. . . ') than e.g. English: this is supposedly due to the fact that 'the Slavic languages generally prefer to position the negative morpheme immediately before the Rheme' (Padučeva 1974). Constituent negation may thus often prove to be the best functional choice for a sentence. It is therefore possible that the constructions with constituent negation in (37) are a

better match for the (a)-sentences in (35-a) and (36-a). Giving the (b)-examples in (35) and (36) the status of approximate negation counterparts means that we are not making any claims about the presence of the existential predicate in the (a)-sentences. Consequently, the occurrence of *net* can still be considered a reliable existential diagnostic in Russian *be*-sentences. I follow Partee and Borschev and assume that the pairs of sentences in (35) and (36) are not affirmative-negated variants of the same derivations.

In this section I discuss the origins of *jest'* and *net*, providing some examples from the earlier stages of the language's development. I also make the reader aware of the non-existential environments that license the use of *jest'* in modern Russian. As for *net*, my position in this thesis is that this form is a reliable existential diagnostic – with regard to its non-occurrence in non-existential environments displaying *jest'* and with regard to the proposal of Partee and Borschev (2008) concerning the negations of locative and temporary possessive *be*-sentences.

3.4   The issue of subjecthood

The question of which argument is the subject in the *be*-possessive has been discussed in various works: Chvany (1975), Freeze (1992), Bailyn (2004a), Dyakonova (2007), Jung (2008), McAnallen (to app.). In the discussion of the subjecthood issue most scholars do not distinguish between different types of *be*-possessives. An observation made for one type (e.g. the existential *be*-possessive) is presumed to be extendable to the other types. In this section I discuss a range of subjecthood diagnostics and register the behavior of the *be*-possessives according to type; the focus is on the existential *be*-possessive that has received the most attention in the literature.

When it comes to the existential *be*-possessive, the general consensus is that the prepositional possessor is the more subject-like element in the construction, even though the possessum bears Nominative case and imposes agreement on the verb – Nominative case and predicate agreement are generally taken to signal subjecthood in languages with a Nominative-Accusative case system. The most quoted subject properties of the PP possessor include sentence-initial position and reflexive binding.

Sentence-initial position was listed in Keenan (1976) as a frequent subjecthood characteristic cross-linguistically, in Russian it is considered to be one of the properties of canonical subjects. The tendency of the possessor to occupy the sentence-initial position can be observed in the existential *be*-possessive in (9) and in copular property *be*-possessives; in the copular temporary *be*-possessive it is the

possessum that 'wins' the subject test with regard to sentence-position.

Reflexive binding is considered to be a subjecthood property in many languages (Keenan 1976). In the existential *be*-possessive the *u*-PP can bind reflexives in the clause, including the possessum, whereas the possessum does not have binding powers. In (38-a) the *u*-PP 'u Ivana' binds the reflexive *s soboj* 'with himself'; in (38-b) the *u*-PP possessor binds the possessive reflexive *svoja* inside the possessum.

(38)   a.   U Ivan-a   byl-i   den'g-i   s   sob-oj.
            at Ivan-GEN be.PST-PL money.PL-NOM with REFL-INST
            'Ivan had money on him.'

       b.   U Ivan-a   jest'   svo-ja   mašin-a.
            at Ivan-GEN be.PRS POSS.REFL-F.NOM.SG car.F-NOM.SG
            'Ivan has his own car.'   Chvany (1975: 99-100)

An interesting detail of the binding configuration in (38) is that the possessor DP *Ivana* does not c-command the reflexive, but rather binds *out* of the PP. This detail is commented on in Bailyn (2004a), who resorts to the distinction between functional and lexical prepositions, in the spirit of Yadroff (1999). Bailyn states that the preposition *u* is a functional preposition and does not create an opaque domain: as a consequence, the *u*-phrase, though morphologically a PP, behaves as a DP for the purposes of c-command. The possessum cannot bind reflexives inside the *u*-possessor, and it is difficult to find or construct examples of existential *be*-possessives where the *u*-possessor is expressed by the reflexive *sebja*, although the Russian corpus does yield one example:

(39)   prinos-jat   ej,   nu, čto   možno, čto   v
       bring:PRS-PL she.DAT well what.ACC possible what.ACC in
       sil-ax   čelovek   sdela-t', kogda u sebja   net
       power.F-LOC.PL man.M:NOM.SG do-INF   when at REFL.GEN NEG.BE.PRS
       ničego.
       nothing.GEN
       'they bring her, well, what one can, what can you do when you yourself
       don't have anything.'   Remizov A.M. (1926)

(39) seems at first glance to be an exception to the general binding pattern in existential possessives – however, the reflexive possessor is not bound by the possessum *ničego* 'nothing' or any other element in that clause. The reflexive *sebja* in (39) has the arbitrary 'one' reading (and bears contrastive focus, as I

indicate in the translation).[8] It thus seems that the *u*-PP in the existential *be*-possessive cannot contain a genuine reflexive that is bound by some other element in the clause.

Copular *be*-possessives may differ with regard to the binding possibilities. In the copular temporary possessive the possessum seems to be the more prominent element:

(40)   ?Mašin-a   u svo-jego   zakonn-ogo   vladel'ts-a.
       car.F-NOM.SG at POSS.REFL-M.GEN.SG lawful-M.GEN.SG owner.M-GEN.SG
       'Its$_i$ lawful owner has the car$_i$.'

The utterance in (40) may refer to a situation where the car has not been at the disposal of its owner for the whole time (it is frequently borrowed or it had been stolen), but at the moment it is; here the possessum binds the possessive reflexive *svojego* within the possessor phrase. In copular property possessives there is no direction in which a binding relation can be established:

(41)   a. *U nego   byl-i   svo-i   sery-je   glaz-a.
           at he.GEN be.PST-PL POSS.REFL-NOM.PL gray-NOM.PL eye.M-NOM.PL
           '#He had his own gray eyes./His own eyes were gray.'
       b. *U svo-jego   vladel'c-a   ogromn-yj
           at POSS.REFL-M.GEN.SG owner.M-GEN.SG huge-M.NOM.SG
           dom.
           house.M:NOM.SG
           '#Its owner has a huge house./#Its owner's house is huge.'

In (41) I attempt to construct a configuration where either the possessum or the possessor contains a reflexive. None of the utterances are grammatical.

So far, with regard to the two frequently mentioned properties (sentence-position and reflexive binding), the different *be*-possessives behave differently. In what follows I discuss two more subjecthood diagnostics: presupposition of reference and substitution by PRO.

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[8]The arbitrary use of the *sebja*-reflexive in (39) seems to belong to the same class of examples as (i) where the reflexive *svoj* is observed in the subject position in constructions other than the *be*-possessive:

(i)   Svo-ja   rubašk-a   bliže k tel-u.
       POSS.REFL-F.NOM.SG shirt.F-NOM.SG closer to body.N-DAT.SG
       'One's own shirt is closer to one's body.'

(i) is a proverb stating that one's own well-being is more important than that of others.

3.4.1 Presupposed reference

Presupposition of reference is cited by Keenan (1976) as another typical subject property. Keenan (1976) suggests that while the reference of "normally referential" NPs can be suspended under certain operations (such as negation, questioning, conditionalization), the reference of a subject is generally harder to suspend:

(42)   a.   De Gaulle wasn't the king of France.
         b.   The king of France wasn't de Gaulle.

(43)   a.   Was de Gaulle the king of France?
         b.   Was the king of France de Gaulle?

(44)   a.   If the coup had succeeded de Gaulle would have been the king of France.
         b.   If the coup had succeeded the king of France would have been de Gaulle.

According to Keenan, the (a) examples in (42)-(44) do not imply existence of 'the king of France', while the (b) examples do: the difference is presumably due to the fact that 'the king of France' is in the subject position in the (b) sentences, but in the predicate position in the (a) sentences.

We can apply Keenan's presupposed reference test to *be*-possessives to see which of the elements (possessor or possessum) resists reference suspension better. In the existential possessive the possessor has a more stable reference than the possessum. The negation test is presented in (45) and (46): under negation, the reference of the *u*-possessor remains, whereas the reference of the possessum is suspended.

(45)   a.   U menja net   sobstvenn-oj   fe-i.
              at I.GEN is.not own-F.GEN.SG fairy.F-GEN.SG.
              'I do not have a personal fairy.'
         b.   Fe-j   ne   suščestvu-et.
              fairy-GEN.PL NEG exist-3.SG
              'Fairies do not exist.'

In (45-a) *feja* 'fairy' is in the position of the possessum and it is possible to continue (45-a) with (45-b) denying existence of fairies. When *feja* 'fairy' expresses the possessor argument as in (46-a), it is infelicitous to continue with the general denial of the existence of fairies in (46-b): the unnaturalness of (46-b)

as a continuation for (46-a) suggests that the reference of the possessor *fei* 'fairy' is presupposed.

(46)   a.   U fe-i   net   xvost-a.
             at fairy.F-GEN.SG is.not tail.M-GEN.SG.
             'A fairy doesn't have a tail.

       b. #Fej   ne   suščestvu-et.
             fairy-GEN.PL NEG exist-3.SG
             'Fairies do not exist.'

Under questioning, the reference of the possessor is again harder to suspend than the reference of the possessum. The reference of the dragon is presupposed only in (47-a), where the dragon is encoded as the possessor:

(47)   a.   U kogo-nibud' jest' drakon?
             at anybody.GEN is   dragon.M-NOM.SG
             'Does anybody have a dragon?'

       b.   Net, potomu čto drakon-ov   ne   suščestvu-et.
             no   because   dragon-GEN.PL NEG exist-3SG
             'No, because dragons do not exist.'

(48)   a.   Jest' li u drakon-a   soprotivljaemost' k magi-i?
             is   Q at dragon.M-GEN.SG immunity   to magic.F-DAT
             'Is a dragon immune to magic?'

       b. #Net, potomu čto drakon-ov   ne   suščestvu-et.
             no   because   dragon-GEN.PL NEG exist-3SG
             'No, because dragons do not exist.'

(48-b) is not in itself a logically invalid reply to (48-a): if dragons do not exist, they may by implication be considered to lack immunity to magic, but pragmatically it is a weird reply, because it does not answer the posed question, but instead denies the inquirer's implicit presupposition of dragons' existence.

The presupposition of reference continues to correlate with the possessor role in the conditional sentences in (49):

(49)   a.   Esli by   my žil-i   v skazk-e,   u menja by
             if   SBJV we live.SBJV-PL in fairy.tale.F-LOC.SG at I.GEN SBJV
             byl   kover-samolet.
             be.SBJV:M.SG carpet.M:NOM.SG-plane.M:NOM.SG
             'If we lived in a fairy-tale, I would have a flying carpet.'

       b.   Esli by   my žil-i   v skazk-e,   u
             if   SBJV we live.SBJV-PL in fairy.tale.F-LOC.SG at

kovr-a–samolet-a byl-a by korobk-a
carpet.M-GEN.SG-plane.M-GEN.SG be.SBJV-F.SG SBJV gears
peredač.

'If we lived in a fairy-tale, a flying carpet would have gears.'

(49-a) states that a flying carpet would have existed in someone's possession given the condition of living in a fairy-tale world, but since this is no fairy tale, there are possibly no flying carpets at all. (49-b) makes a statement about a flying carpet that could possess certain characteristics – the fact that the speaker does not live in a fairy tale, does not cancel the presupposition of existence of a flying carpet: the way (49-b) is built, flying carpets do exist in the speaker's world, only without gears.

To recapitulate, the data in (45)-(49) suggest that it is more difficult to suspend the reference of the possessor – from this one can conclude that the *u*-possessor in the existential *be*-possessive behaves more subject-like with regard to the presupposed reference test.

When it comes to the copular possessives, both the possessor and the possessum have a presupposed reference that resists suspension. (50-a) presents a negated copular temporary possessive where both the possessor and the possessum arguments are entities that do not exist in the real world – still, negation *ne* does not suspend the reference of either argument: neither (50-b) nor (50-c) are accepted in the context of (50-a).

(50)   a.   Kovyor-samolyot ne u fe-i.
            carpet.M:NOM.SG-plane.M:NOM.SG NEG at fairy.F-GEN.SG
            'The fairy doesn't have the flying carpet (at the moment).'

        b. #Fej ne byv-ajet.
            fairy.F:GEN.PL NEG be.IMPF-3SG
            'Fairies don't exist.'

        c. #Kovr-ov-samolyot-ov ne byv-ajet.
            carpet.M:GEN.PL-plane.M:GEN.PL NEG be.IMPF-3SG
            'There are no flying carpets.'

(51-a) presents a negated copular property possessive:

(51)   a.   U fe-i ne zelyon-yj xvost.
            at fairy.F-GEN.SG NEG green-M.NOM.SG tail.M:NOM.SG
            'The fairy doesn't have a green tail.'

        b. #Fej ne byv-ajet.
            fairy.F:GEN.PL NEG be.IMPF-3SG

'Fairies don't exist.'

c. #U nee   net   xvost-a.
   at she.GEN NEG.BE.PRS tail.M-GEN.SG
   'She doesn't have a tail.'

As in (50), the negation in (51-a) is not enough to suspend the reference of either argument. (51-b) denies the existence of fairies and is infelicitous in the context of (51-a), which means that the possessor in (51-a) is presupposed; the infelicity of (51-c) shows the same for the possessum *xvost* 'tail' in (51-a). Thus, both types of copular *be*-possessives retain the presupposition of reference for both of the arguments and differ in this regard from the existential *be*-possessive: according to this test, the possessor argument in the existential *be*-possessive comes out as more subject-like, whereas in the copular possessives no argument is favored in a similar fashion.

3.4.2   PRO-diagnostics: inconclusive evidence

In this section I discuss two subjecthood diagnostics that have been mentioned in connection with *be*-possessives and that I in this thesis hold as either irrelevant or inconclusive – both of them happen to deal with PRO.

The first diagnostic is control of PRO in adverbial participles (gerunds) that is sometimes mentioned in the literature. McAnallen (to app.) cites the following example from Rappaport (1980: 279):

(52)   U menja xoroš-ije   perspektiv-y,   živ-ja   v Boston-e.
       at I.GEN good-NOM.PL prospect.F-NOM.PL live-PRS.PRT in Boston-LOC
       'I have good prospects living in Boston.'/'My prospects are good, living in Boston.'

In the abstract copular property possessive in (52) the *u*-PP seems to control the reference of the adverbial PRO. According to Rappaport, the PRO of 'non-detached' adverbial participles can be controlled only by subjects – the fact that the *u*-PP in (52) can provide a reference for the PRO, thus makes it more subject-like. Personally, I find these sentences ungrammatical, but they do appear in the corpus and both Slavic and western scholars thus keep referring to this diagnostic (McAnallen 2011, Rappaport 1980, Testelec 2001, among others). Note, however, that a gerundival PRO may find a controller in some disconcerting configurations, such as in (53):

(53) U nas   jest'   real'n-yj   opyt   [zaščit-y
      at we.GEN BE.PRS real-M.NOM.SG experience.M:NOM defence.F-GEN
      nacional'n-yx interes-ov   Ross-ii, ne skat-yva-jas' k
      national-GEN.PL interest.M-GEN.PL Russia-GEN NEG degrade-PRS.PRT to
      agressivn-ym   metod-am   i   konfrontac-ii].
      aggressive-DAT.PL method.M-DAT.PL and confrontation.F-DAT
      'We have a real experience in the matter of defence of Russia's national
      interests, without degrading to aggressive methods and confrontation.'
      (Lavrov, 2004)

This is uttered by Sergej Lavrov, a high-ranking Russian politician (Minister of
Foreign Affairs) – his speech, if not directly literary, is supposed to have some
standard. It is not clear what is supposed to be the controller of the gerundival
PRO in (53): the *u*-PP *u nas* or the understood agent of the nominal *zaščity*
'defence' (both of these refer to one entity). Whatever is claimed to be the
controller – no syntactic relation of control, no matter whose analysis of the
phenomenon of control one follows, can be argued to take place in (53). Control of
gerundival PROs may thus be an unreliable test when it comes to subjecthood in
Russian.

Another PRO-related test that turns out to be inconclusive in our discussion is
mentioned in Arylova (2010). Substitution by PRO is a classic subjecthood test:
according to Keenan (1976), subjects should be able to undergo *Equi-NP deletion*
which in the current generative literature is referred to as *control* – a dependency
between the understood subject of an infinitival complement (PRO) and an
argument of the matrix predicate. Substitution by PRO has remained a sturdy
subjecthood test through the years: a noun that in a finite clause has claims for
the subjecthood status, should be substitutable by PRO in a control infinitive.
(54) illustrates two control predicates in Russian: the subject-control predicate
mečtat' 'dream' and the object-control predicate *razrešit'* 'allow'.

(54) a. Ja$_i$ mečta-ju [PRO$_i$ vyigra-t' v lotere-ju].
          I.NOM dream-1SG   win-INF in lottery.F-ACC.SG
          'I dream about winning a lottery.'
      b. Ja   razreši-l   Van-je$_i$ [PRO$_i$ poj-ti na večerink-u].
          I.NOM allow-PST:M.SG Vanja-DAT   go-INF on party.F-ACC.SG
          'I allowed Vanja to go to the party.'

Russian has a case condition on the control configuration: only Nominative DPs
can be substituted by PRO. The restriction can be formulated in the following
way: PRO can be projected in the subject position of a control infinitival if that

position, were the clause finite, would be filled by a Nominative DP. The case-requirement on PRO precludes us from using the test on the prepositional possessor in *be*-possessives, but we can apply the control test to the Nominative possessum. As the following examples illustrate, an existential *be*-possessive cannot be embedded under control predicates:

(55) a. *Sobak-a$_i$ mečta-et   [PRO$_i$ byt' u   menja].
          dog.F-NOM.SG dream-3SG be.INF at I.GEN
          #'The dog dreams about me having it.'

      b. *Putin   razreš-il   zamestitel-ju   by-t' u
          Putin:NOM allow-PST:M.SG deputy.M-DAT.SG be-INF at
          každ-ogo   ministr-a.
          each-M.GEN.SG minister.M-GEN.SG
          #'Putin allowed a deputy to be had by each minister.'

In (55) a *be*-possessive is expressed as an infinitival complement; the possessum argument is assumed to be PRO that is controlled by an argument in the matrix clause – both subject and object control constructions in (55) are ungrammatical. This ungrammaticality may be attributed to a variety of factors; in Arylova (2010) I interpret the PRO-test as yet another indication that the possessum is not the subject. It is more probable, however, that the inapplicability of the PRO-substitution test to *be*-possessives is due to other factors, such as the association of control predicates with certain volition, ability to experience feelings.[9] Predicational *be*-sentences can be embedded under control predicates, as illustrated in (56), where *be*-sentences with AP/NP predicates are found in subject and object control configurations:

(56) a. Ja   prosto xoč-u   byt'   sčastliv-ym.
          I.NOM simply want:PRS-1SG be.INF happy-INST.M.SG
          'I simply want to be happy.'

      b. Georgij,   sud-ja   po vsem-u, namereva-l-sja
          Georgij:NOM judge-PRS.PRT on all-DAT intend-PST:M.SG-REFL
          byt'   ili, po krajn-ej   mer-e,   kaza-t'-sja
          be.INF or on extreme-DAT.SG measure.F-DAT.SG seem-INF-REFL
          stojk-im   nesoprotivlenc-em.
          persistent-M.INST.SG non-resistant.M-INST.SG
          'Georgij, to all appearances, intended to be or, at least, to seem a persistent non-resistant.'

      c. On   predloži-l   mne byt'   režissyor-om   i
          he.NOM offer-PST:M.SG I.DAT be.INF director.M-INST.SG and

---

[9]See, for instance, Landau's (2000) semantic classification of control predicates.

> veduš č-im   vs-ej   programm-y.
> anchorman.M-INST.SG whole-F.GEN.SG program.F-GEN.SG
> 'He offered me to be the director and the anchorman of the whole
> program.'

The controllers and the PROs in the infinitival *be*-sentences refer to animate
entities, which enables a control configuration. Possessums fail to display volition;
this conflict between what control predicates require and what possessums can do
may take different forms in the different *be*-possessive types. In (55), the infinitival
be-possessive asserts existence of an entity, the possessum, which trivially means
that the existence of the possessum is not presupposed; the control predicate in
the matrix clause, however, requires an argument whose existence is presupposed:
only an existing entity can be claimed to have some hopes and aspirations. Given
that the controller and the PRO refer to one entity, the conflict of existential
presuppositions cause ungrammaticality. In copular temporary possessives,
however, possessums are presupposed so we might expect to find a control
configuration there. However, here the volition requirement of control predicates
finds another obstacle: possessums in temporary possessives are inanimate and are
thus unable to display volition. It would make no sense to combine, for instance, a
desiderative control predicate with an inanimate entity, as in (57-b), which is a
control variant of the temporary copular *be*-possessive in (57-a):

(57)   a.   Vaš-e   pis'm-o   u sekretar'-a.
            your-N.NOM.SG letter.N-NOM.SG at secretary.M-GEN.SG
            'The secretary has your letter.'
       b.   *Vaš-e   pis'm-o   planiru-jet byt'   u
            your-N.NOM.SG letter.N-NOM.SG plan-3SG   be.INF at
            sekretar'-a.
            secretary.M-GEN.SG
            '#Your letter plans to be had by the secretary.'

Copular property *be*-possessives resist a control configuration even more, to the
degree where it is very hard to construct a hypothetical ungrammatical example:

(58)   a.   U nego   byl   bol'š-oj   dom.
            at he.GEN be.PST:M.SG big-NOM.SG house.F:NOM.SG
            'He had a big house.'
       b.   *Bol'š-oj   dom   nade-jet-sja   byt' u nego.
            big-NOM.SG house.F:NOM.SG hope:PRS-3SG-REFL be.INF at he.GEN
            '#The big house hopes to be had by him.'

    c. *Ja razreži-l   bol'š-omu   dom-u   byt'   u nego.
        I   allow-PST:M.SG big-M.DAT.SG house.M-DAT.SG be.INF at he.GEN
        '#I allowed a big house to be had by him.'

There is a feeling that the impossibility of control in (58) should be attributed to some special causes, different from the ones at play in the other *be*-possessives. In my analysis of the structure of *be*-possessives in Chapter 5 I propose that the possessum in copular property *be*-possessives is an {e,t}-NP which does not comply with the {e}-DP requirements of a control configuration (both for the controller argument and for PRO).

The PRO-diagnostics discussed in this section may be interpreted to indicate that the prepositional possessor is the more subject-like element; however, there may be other forces involved and PRO-evidence should be referred to with caution.

3.4.3 Summary of subject properties

With regard to subjecthood diagnostics the three types of *be*-possessives fare in the following way. The possessum element in all *be*-possessives bears morphological properties that are attributed to subjects in Russian: Nominative case and predicate agreement. With regard to the other tests, the *be*-possessives vary as to which argument comes out as more subject-like. Table 3.2 presents a summary of the distribution of subject properties:

	existential	cop.temp	cop.prop
Sentence-initial	*u*-PP	Possm	*u*-PP
Reflexive binding	*u*-PP	Possm	neither
Presupposed reference	*u*-PP	both	both
Substitution by PRO	neither	neither	neither

Table 3.2: Subjecthood diagnostics in *be*-possessives

As you can see, the subject status in the existential *be*-possessive can be assigned to the possessor argument with regard to the first three tests given in Table 3.2. The copular temporary possessive favors the possessum argument, whereas the copular property possessive does not display an unambiguous favoring of an argument. In Chapter 5 I present an explanation for the results displayed in Table 3.2.

3.5 Chapter summary

In this chapter I present an overview of constructions that have been referred to as *be*-possessives in Russian – this is the main means of expressing predicative possession in the language. I demonstrate that what is assumed to be one construction and is referred to by one term is in fact a motley group of constructions with different properties. Dissecting this group with regard to semantic types of possession and formal frames allows one to gain a better insight into the properties of these constructions. I single out three types of *be*-possessives: existential, copular property and copular temporary. I further touch upon three issues that have been prominent in the discussion on *be*-possessives: the Genitive of Negation, the form of the verb *byt'* 'be' in the present tense, and the issue of subjecthood. My position with regard to the phenomenon of GenNeg in Russian is that it is a case that occurs on {e,t}-type Themes under negation; this is a combination of the views presented by Pesetsky (1982) and Partee and Borschev (2004). The section on the present-tense form of *byt'* identifies conditions under which *jest'*, which is commonly held to be an existential diagnostic, can occur in copular *be*-sentences. I also observe that *net* seems to be a more stable indication of the existential nature of a *be*-sentence; an important point that is presented in this section is the clarification of the issue of affirmative-negated counterparts that involves both *net* and GenNeg. In the section on subjecthood I show that although it is generally assumed that the *u*-PP in *be*-possessives in general behaves like a subject, the three types of *be*-possessives in fact behave differently with regard to subjecthood diagnostics. The general message of this chapter is that the field of *be*-possessives is diverse. Before an analysis proposed for *be*-possessives can be extended to any other areas of grammar, a proper understanding and awareness of the differences is necessary. My stance is that a viable analysis of *be*-possessives must comply with two minimal requirements:

(59) a. it must accommodate the diversity of *be*-possessive constructions.
      b. it must be compatible with the dynamic syntax approach.

In Chapter 4 I review the existing analyses of *be*-possessives and claim that neither of them satisfy both of the requirements in (59)– I propose an analysis that does in Chapter 5.

Chapter 4

Existing analyses of *be*-possessives

This chapter offers a representative selection of the analyses of *be*-possessives. I begin the discussion from the monumental work of Chvany (1975), a transformational grammar account that offers significant insight into the nature of these constructions. I then go on to consider the cartographic analyses that have all been inspired by the influential work of Freeze (1992). The analyses of Harves (2003), Dyakonova (2007) and Jung (2011) are, like mine, couched within the Minimalist framework, but are only compatible with the cartographic approach to syntax due to the degree of and motivation for the structural unification.

In the review of the various treatments of *be*-possessives I also comment on the authors' proposals for other constructions that they deem to be related to *be*-possessives (such as the *have*-possessive, the modal existential construction) – this discussion becomes relevant in Chapters 6 and 7.

4.1   Chvany 1975

Chvany (1975), an extensive monograph on the syntax of Russian *be*-sentences, is the earliest generative analysis of *be*-possessives known to me. Chvany develops what may be called a dyadic unaccusative analysis of *be*-possessives: the possessor and the possessum are realized as two internal arguments of the lexical verb *byt'* 'be'.

(1)   a.   U Ivan-a   jest'   samovar.
          at Ivan-GEN be.PRS samovar.M:NOM.SG
          'Ivan has a samovar.'

   b.

The possessum in (1) is the 'Direct Object' of the verb – Chvany motivates this argument status by the occurrence of GenNeg, that is observed in negated transitive constructions (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the phenomenon). The *u*-PP originates as an 'Indirect Object', as it is semantically close to the Dative Goal argument in a *give*-construction – minus 'some feature such as [+directional] or [+motional]'. Chvany (1975: 103) treats the *u*-possessor as an NP and suggests that the *u*-phrase is a morphological form possibly diachronically connected to the Dative marker: the form *u* is 'the allomorph of the dative case morpheme in the least marked declension type'. As an Indirect Object, the possessor is higher than the possessum (Direct Object) on the Favored Subject hierarchy and can thus move to the subject position. The subjecthood properties of the prepositional possessor discussed by Chvany (1975) include sentence-initial position and reflexive-binding.

As for the treatment of the verb *byt'* 'be', Chvany distinguishes between two types: the lexical verb ($\exists$) and the copula. Copular *byt'* carries syntactic features and may also carry contrastive or emphatic stress; the copula is used e.g. in *be*-sentences with NP/AP predicates and in passive constructions.[1] The lexical verb $\exists$ comes in two varieties: a one-argument version that yields an existential construction and a two-argument version that is involved in the *be*-possessive. The relevant diagnostics are first of all the different negated forms of *byt'* in the present tense (existential conflation *net* as opposed to the bare negation *ne* in copular sentences) and GenNeg (according to Chvany's observation, existential *byt'* behaves as a lexical verb in allowing GenNeg on its Direct Object).[2]

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[1]The structure that Chvany provides for copular *be*-sentences with NP predicates may look unaccusative to the contemporary linguist – this is, for instance, the interpretation in Harves (2003: 201). However, Chvany's discussion of copular sentences on p.69 and p.114 suggests a small-clause interpretation.

[2]See the detailed discussion of the two properties in Chapter 3.

Furthermore, Chvany observes that existential *byt'* has lexical derivatives, such as the ones in (2):

(2)   *bytije* 'existence', *sobytije* 'event', *sbyt'sja* 'come to pass', *byt* 'daily life', *jestestvennyj* 'natural'.

As for the copula, it does not have lexical derivatives that can be semantically related to what Chvany defines as copular senses of *byt'*: class inclusion, class membership and identity.

The *have*-possessive is also analyzed as an underlyingly dyadic unaccusative in Chvany (1975), here the Nominative possessor and the Accusative possessum are internal arguments of another lexical predicate, *imet'* 'have':

(3)   a.   Ivan   ime-et   samovar.
              Ivan:NOM have:PRS-3SG samovar.M:ACC.SG
              'Ivan has a samovar.'

        b.   S   Chvany (1975: 103)

The possessor *Ivan* in the *have*-possessive originates in the Indirect Object position – as in the *be*-possessive. The Nominative case of the possessor in (3) is due to the verb *imet'* 'have' which, in contrast to the verb *byt'* 'be', neutralizes case on its subject. Another difference is that the structure of the *have*-possessive does not have an optional locative element. Chvany postulates this distinction in order to account for the contrast in (4):

(4)   a.   Ivan   ime-et   svo-ju   mašin-u   (*u
              Ivan:NOM have:PRS-3SG REFL-F.ACC.SG car.F-ACC.SG at
              roditel-ej)   (*v garaž-e).
              parents-GEN in   garage.M-LOC.SG
              'Ivan has his own car at his parents' garage.'

        b.   U Ivan-a   jest'   svo-ja   mašin-a   u
              at Ivan-GEN be.PRS REFL-F.NOM.SG car.F-NOM.SG at
              roditel-ej   (v garaž-e).
              parent.M-GEN.PL in garage.M-LOC.SG
              'Ivan has a car of his own at his parents' (in the garage).'

According to Chvany (1975: 100), the *have*-possessive cannot have a locative modifier, in contrast to the *be*-possessive. Chvany's analysis seems simple and has a solid empirical ground. There are, however, some complications, one of which regards the distribution of the negated existential form *net* (and the other tense forms *ne bylo*, and *ne budet*). Chvany namely assumes that (5-b) is the negation of (5-a), as mentioned in section 3.3:

(5)   a.   Doktor   v gorod-e.
                 doctor:NOM.SG in town.M-LOC.SG
                 'The doctor is in town.'

        b.   Doktor-a   net   v gorod-e.
                 doctor-GEN.SG NEG.be.PRS in town.M-LOC.SG
                 'The doctor is not in town.'   Chvany (1975: 47)

The form *net* is identified by Chvany as a solid diagnostic for lexical *byt'* and the author therefore assumes that the affirmative (5-a) contains a lexical *byt'*.[3] Positing lexical *byt'* in (5-a) becomes a liability for Chvany as she has to account for why *jest'* does not appear there – this forces her to resort to the rule of ∃-deletion that applies when the 'existent' (the Theme) is presupposed. As for the negated form *net*, it appears in (5-b) because the rule of Contraction to NET applies before the rule of ∃-deletion. Such susceptibility of lexical *byt'* to presupposition in Chvany's analysis attracts criticism from Harves (2003: 219) who points out that if existential *byt'* were a lexical predicate, 'then it would be the only verb in the language that is morphologically sensitive to the definiteness of the subject NP'. In Chapter 3 I discuss the pairings of sentences like (5)– I follow Partee and Borschev (2008) in not treating the sentences in (5) as the affirmative-negative pair.

Another complication for Chvany's analysis is that *u*-possessors are claimed to be underlying Indirect Objects in all contexts (Chvany 1975: 102), and the role of an Indirect Object can only be received from a verb – this imposes lexical *byt'* on structures where its presence would otherwise be unmotivated. This includes cases when an *u*-PP has the meaning 'at someone's place' and also (what I in this thesis describe as) copular *be*-possessives. Chvany analyzes phrases of the type 'at X's (place)' as containing a silent adverbial; however, because the *u*-PP in this adverbial phrase has possessive semantics, she has to assume that the phrase also contains a (silent) verb. Consider the structure in (6-b):

---

[3] I suppose that it is sentences like (5) that forced Chvany to add *naxodit'sja* 'be situated' to the range of lexical synonyms of existential *byt'* (the other synonyms are *imet'sja* and *suščestvovat'* 'exist', pp. 47-48).

(6)   Chvany (1975: 106)

    a.   U Ivan-a   jest'   samovar.
          at Ivan-GEN be.PRS samovar.M:NOM.SG
          'There is a samovar at Ivan's.'

    b.

There are two lexical verbs in the structure in (6-b). The higher verb is the one that is spelled out as *jest'*. The lower verb, embedded in the adverbial phrase, is silent and its sole purpose is to provide the Indirect Object role to the *u*-PP – the locative adverbial phrase is in essence a relative clause and is interpreted literally as 'at the place that Ivan has' (Chvany 1975: 105).

In the same manner, the Indirect Object origin of *u*-possessors imposes lexical *byt'* on the inalienable possessive in (7-a), with the structure in (7-b):

(7)   a.   U Ivan-a   krasiv-yje   glaz-a.
          at Ivan-GEN beautiful-NOM.PL eye.M-NOM.PL
          'Ivan has beautiful eyes.'   Chvany (1975: 146-147)

b.

```
                    S
                   / \
                  /   \
                  \    VP
                   \   /|\
                    \ / | \
                    /  |  \
                   V  NP₁  NP₂
                   |  / \   / \
                   ∃ NPᵢ  S  u  Ivana
                      |  / \
                    glaza NPᵢ VP
                          |   |
                        glaza krasiv-
```

The presupposed status of the possessum in (7) is supposed to motivate
∃-deletion, which accounts for the absence of *jest'* (if the sentence is to be
interpreted as inalienable possession). Note, however, that a negation of (7-a)
does not involve the form *net*, as it does in (5-b) – remember that Chvany
assumes a rule of Contraction to NET before presuppositionally conditioned
∃-deletion, such that *net* is still expected to appear in (8). In endnote 4-24
Chvany (1975: 268) provides the following examples:

(8)   a. #U Ivan-a   net   krasiv-yx   glaz.
          at Ivan-gen neg.be.prs beautiful-gen.pl eye.m:gen.pl
          'Ivan doesn't have any beautiful eyes.'

       b. U Ivan-a   nekrasiv-yje glaz-a.
          at Ivan-GEN ugly-NOM.PL eye.M-NOM.PL
          'Ivan has ugly eyes.'

       c. U Ivan-a   ne   očen' krasiv-yje   glaz-a.
          at Ivan-GEN NEG very pretty-NOM.PL eye.M-NOM.PL
          'Ivan hasn't very pretty eyes.'

The only interpretation for (8-a) is alienable possession where Ivan is a manager
of an eye bank, and there are currently no beautiful eyes in this bank (Chvany's
proposal). A proper negation for (7-a) would be (8-b); in order to illustrate that
the particle *ne* is not merely a part of the word with the meaning 'ugly', Chvany
introduces the adverb *očen'* 'very' in (8-c) and shows that the adverb occurs
between the negation particle and the negated constituent. The sentences in (7)
and (8) contain neither *jest'* nor *net* (or GenNeg, for that matter), but Chvany
still has to assume the presence of the verb ∃ in these constructions, because her
analysis ties the possessor semantics of the *u*-PP to this predicate. The constant

association of possessive *u*-PPs with existential *byt'* is one of the points where I depart from Chvany's standpoint. I follow Chvany (1975) in the assumption of the lexical existential predicate in Russian and also in the structural differentiation of the *be*-possessive and the *have*-possessive.

4.2 The cartographic minimalist analyses

At present, the discussion of the structure of *be*-possessives is heavily influenced by such works as Benveniste (1966), Freeze (1992), Kayne (1993) and Den Dikken (1998), who all have been concerned with cross-linguistic and language-specific patterns of *have/be* alternation and their formalization.

Freeze (1992) unifies locatives, existentials and 'have'-predications (possessives) in one locative paradigm, based on his observation that these three kinds of predications display a restricted and highly predictable range of formal differences cross-linguistically. Here is Freeze's illustration for Russian:

(9)   a.   Knig-a   byl-a   na stol-e.
          book.F-NOM.SG be.PST-F.SG on table.M-LOC.SG
          'The book was on the table.'

      b.   Na stol-e   byl-a   knig-a.
          on table.M-LOC.SG be.PST-F.SG book.F-NOM.SG
          'There was a book on the table.'

      c.   U menja byl-a   sestr-a.
          at I.GEN be.PST-F.SG sister-NOM.SG
          'I had a sister'.   Freeze (1992, 553-554)

This set of examples contains a locative in (9-a), an existential in (9-b) and a possessive sentence in (9-c). Driven by the reductionist excitement of the Government and Binding era, Freeze proposes that all predications in the locative paradigm are derived from one underlying structure where the location/possessor and the locatum/possessum are projected in a PP small clause:

(10)

```
        IP
       /  \
          I′
         /  \
        I    PP
            /  \
          NP    P′
        kniga  /  \
        sestra P    NP
               na   |
                    stole
               u    menja
```

The P head in (10) selects its arguments, a Theme and a Location. Whether the sentence comes out as existential/possessive or locative depends on which element moves to the subject position in SpecIP due to definiteness: movement of the Theme NP yields a locative, whereas movement of the P′-phrase yields either an existential or a possessive. In addition, possessors are different from locations in that they have a [+human] feature; in Russian the effect of the [+human] feature is visible on the choice of the special preposition *u*.

A feature of Freeze's analysis that has proven very popular in subsequent works is the derivation of the verb 'have'. Freeze namely suggests that in *have*-possessives P incorporates into BE and this head complex is spelled out as 'have'; the possessor/location NP is stripped of its lexical-case assigner (P) and becomes Nominative.

Note that Freeze (1992), like so many other scholars, overgeneralizes in presenting predicative possessive constructions as taking the form of either *have*-constructions or locative *be*-sentences. In Chapter 2 we have seen Stassen's (2009) typology of predicative possessives that includes other types such as topic possessives, *with*-possessives and Genitive possessives, among others. Freeze's typological motivation of his theoretical model is thus weakened when faced with the real typology of possessives.

Apart from the typological objection, several details of Freeze's analysis have been subject to criticism. Harves (2003:174) points out that the movement of the P′-layer in (10) is problematic in view of the Structure Preservation Hypothesis of Emonds (1976) and Chomsky (1986) that only allows movement of heads and maximal projections.[4] Błaszczak (2008) provides a whole range of critical comments. With regard to locative and existential constructions, Błaszczak points out that it is not clear what governs the distribution of the Genitive of Negation,

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[4]See also a related discussion in section 4.2.3.

if these constructions are assumed to have the same underlying structure: Freeze's analysis namely predicts that Theme NPs in locative constructions should also be marked Genitive under negation. Furthermore, with regard to the fact that existees can be definite (as in (11-b), where the Genitive of Negation signals an existential sentence), Freeze's proposal that the existential interpretation is derived by the [-definite] feature on Theme is invalidated.

(11)   *Polish*

    a.   Jan   nie był   na przyjveciu.
        Jan.NOM NEG be.PST:3SG.M at party
        'John was not at the party.'

    b.   Jan-a   nie był-o   na przyjveciu.
        Jan-GEN NEG be.PST-3SG.N at party
        'John was not at the party.'   Błaszczak (2008: 35)

Błaszczak also criticizes Freeze's P-to-BE incorporation analysis of HAVE – see section 6.1 for a detailed discussion.

The recent analyses of the *be*-possessive that will be discussed shortly can all be called descendants of Freeze (1992) via two routes: Kayne (1993) or Den Dikken (1998). I abstain from the discussion of Kayne (1993) and Den Dikken (1998) as these works are sufficiently well-known and are amply preserved in the Russian-specific analyses that are discussed in detail in this chapter. Before proceeding to the discussion of the Russian-specific analyses, I should mention Kondrashova's (1996) classification of Russian *be*-sentences that is often referred to by generative Slavicists: in the present selection of analyses in particular, Harves (2003) and Jung (2011) make use of this classification.

Kondrashova's (1996) classification roughly corresponds to Graham's (1959) classification of copula functions and contains seven *be*-sentences whose labels are based on the interpretation of the lexical components, Kondrashova (1996: 38-40):

(12)   *Equative*

    a.   Naš   učitel'   (*jest') Kol-ya.
        our:M.NOM.SG teacher.M:NOM.SG be.PRS Kolya-NOM
        'Our teacher is Kolya.'

    b.   Kol-ya   (*jest') von   t-ot   čelovek   s
        Kolya-NOM be.PRS over.there that-M.NOM.SG person.M:NOM.SG with
        buket-om.
        bouquet.M-INST.SG
        'Kolya is that person with a bouquet.'

(13)   *Predicative*

    a.   Kolya   (*jest') durak.
        Kolya-NOM be.PRS fool.M:NOM.SG
        'Kolya is a fool.'

    b.   Maša   (*jest') pjan-aja.
        Maša-NOM be.PRS drunk-F.NOM.SG
        'Maša is drunk.'

(14)   *Generic/Definitive*

    Sobak-a   (*jest') drug   čelovek-a.
    dog.F-NOM.SG be.PRS friend.M:NOM.SG man.M-GEN.SG
    'A dog is a friend of man.'

(15)   *Locative*

    a.   Kol-ya   (*jest') v Moskv-e.
        Kolya-NOM be.PRS in Moscow-LOC
        'Kolya is in Moscow.'

    b.   Naš-a   mašin-a   (*jest') na stojank-e.
        our-F.NOM.SG car.F-NOM.SG be.PRS on parking.lot.F-LOC.SG
        'Our car is in the parking lot.'

(16)   *Locative-possessive*

    a.   Vaš-e   pis'm-o   (*jest') u sekretar'-a.
        your-N.NOM.SG letter.N-NOM.SG be.PRS at secretary.M-GEN.SG
        'The secretary has your letter.'

    b.   Kolya   (*jest') u sestr-y.
        Kolya-NOM be.PRS at sister-GEN.SG
        'Kolya is at (his) sister's place.'

(17)   *Existential*

    a.   V Moskv-e   jest'   tramva-i.
        in Moscow-LOC be.PRS street.car.M-NOM.PL
        'There are street cars in Moscow.'

    b.   V kvartir-e   (*jest') požar.
        in apartment.f-loc.sg be.PRS fire.M:NOM.SG
        'The apartment is on fire.'

(18)   *Possessive*

    a.   U Kol-i   jest'   mašin-a.
        at Kolya-GEN be.PRS car.F-NOM.SG
        'Kolya has a car.'

    b.   U Kol-i   jest'   bilet   v kino.
        at Kolya-GEN be.PRS ticket.M:NOM.SG to movies.N
        'Kolya has a ticket to go to the movies.'

    c.   U Maši   (*jest') sini-je   glaz-a.
          at Maša-GEN be.PRS blue-NOM.PL eye.M-NOM.PL
          'Maša has blue eyes.'

    d.   U Maši   (*jest') xoroš-eje   nastrojeni-je.
          at Maša-GEN be.PRS good-N.NOM.SG mood.N-NOM.SG
          'Maša is in a good mood.'

The 'possessive' constructions in these examples are represented by (16) and (18). In Chapter 3 I identify several types of possessive *be*-sentences, in Kondrashova's classification these construction-types have been collapsed into two groups. The 'Possessive' group in (18) contains sentences with the sentence-initial *u*-PP, both copular and existential varieties. Scholars that adhere to Kondrashova's classification should be aware of the fact that the constructions grouped together under one heading in (18) behave differently with regard to a range of factors: the verb *byt'* 'be', (Genitive of) negation, the possession relation, as described in Chapter 3. The two examples in the 'Locative-possessive' group in (16) are also of different types. While (16-a) can be argued to be possessive in some sense (temporary possession), (16-b) is a purely locative sentence – see my discussion of example (2-b) on p.28.

The analyses reviewed in this section all have the same characteristic that I consider to be a theoretical drawback: namely, they all strive for a complete unification at the level of argument structure. I show in this thesis that structural unification is not supported by the data – within Russian and cross-linguistically; it is also fundamentally incompatible with the dynamic syntax approach. In the review of the analyses I also discuss points that are problematic for them – though of minor theoretical significance (most analyses have inconsistencies), the problematic points also deplete from the credibility of the analyses.

4.2.1 Harves 2003

Harves (2003) investigates the syntax of unaccusativity in Russian and sets out to prove that the various unaccusative phenomena, such as the Genitive of Negation and First Conjunct Agreement, can be attributed to the featural make-up of the constructions. Harves argues that GenNeg on DP arguments is due to the defective nature of the lexical and functional heads selecting those DPs as arguments. In transitive and unaccusative constructions the negated verb is defective in that it lacks an object agreement feature and thus cannot value Accusative case on the object. This view of GenNeg has consequences for the analysis of the *be*-sentences that display this phenomenon. Harves claims that all

and only those *be*-sentences that involve PP predicates display GenNeg; examples
in (19)-(25) are what Harves assumes to be the negated counterparts of
Kondrashova's (1996) paradigm of *be*-sentences in (12)-(18):

(19)   *Equative*
       Naš   učitel'   ne   Kolya.
       our:M.NOM.SG teacher.M:NOM.SG NEG Kolya-NOM
       'Our teacher is not Kolya.'

(20)   *Predicative*
       Maš-a   ne   pjan-aja.
       Maša-NOM NEG drunk-F.NOM.SG
       'Maša is not drunk.'

(21)   *Generic*
       Sobak-a   ne   drug   čelovek-a.
       dog.F-NOM.SG NEG friend.M:NOM.SG man.M-GEN.SG
       'The dog is not man's friend.'

(22)   *Locative*
       Kol-i   net   v Moskv-e.
       Kolya-gen NEG.be.PRS in Moscow-LOC
       'Kolya is not in Moscow.'

(23)   *Locative-possessive*
       Vaš-ego   pis'm-a   net   u sekretar'-a.
       your.N-GEN.SG letter.N-GEN.SG NEG.be.PRS at secretary.M-GEN.SG
       'The secretary does not have your letter.'

(24)   *Existential*
       V xolodil'nik-e   net   ed-y.
       in fridge.M-LOC.SG NEG.be.PRS food.F-GEN
       'There is no food in the fridge.'

(25)   *Possessive*
       U Kol-i   net   mašin-y.
       at Kolya-GEN NEG.be.PRS car.F-GEN.SG
       'Kolya doesn't have a car.'

Harves states that GenNeg appears only in (22)-(25), and the common trait for
these sentences is the PP predicate. I already commented on examples like (22)
and (23) in section 3.3, where I follow Partee and Borschev (2008) in assuming
that sentences like (22) and (23) are not the negated counterparts of (15-a) and
(16-a). Harves's analysis seems to be fundamentally incompatible with Partee and
Borschev's (2008) proposal: the PP-GenNeg correspondence is the cornerstone of

Harves's theory and deviations from the correspondence would mean that not all PPs are unaccusative predicates.

In order to account for the occurrence of GenNeg in (22)-(25), Harves proposes the following basic underlying structure where PPs are constructed as unaccusative predicates:

(26)

```
                        TP
                   ┌─────┴─────┐
                   T          AspP
                         ┌──────┴──────┐
                       Asp           PredP
                        │        ┌─────┴─────┐
                  φ-incomplete  Subject    Pred′
                    defective           ┌───┴───┐
                                       Pred    PP
```

In (26) the PP takes the 'subject' DP as its internal argument. Harves assumes that PPs are like VPs in that they need a functional head to compositionally assign their θ-role (p.220) – Pred is such a functional head in (26) and it must be defective and ϕ-incomplete (to comply with Harves's analysis of GenNeg). Predicates of equative, predicative and generic *be*-sentences (DP-, NP- and AP-predicates) are classified by Harves as unergative, i.e. they are 'ϕ-complete'. One consequence of the ϕ-completeness of these predicates is that GenNeg is not possible in these sentences:

(27)   a.   Kol-ya   durak.
                Kolya-NOM fool.M:NOM.SG
                'Kolya is a fool.'

          b.   Kol-ya   ne   durak/-*a.
                Kolya-NOM NEG fool.M:NOM.SG/-GEN.SG
                'Kolya is not a fool.'

c.

```
                    TP
                   /  \
                  T    AspP
                      /    \
                 Subject    Asp'
                           /    \
                        Asp      PredP
                         |       /    \
                     φ-complete Pred  DP/NP/AP
                     ±defective
```

Coming back to PP-predicates, the derivation in (26) proceeds differently depending on whether the sentence is existential/possessive, or locative(-possessive). In locative(-possessive)s the subject DP raises overtly to SpecTP, valuing Nominative case (Harves 2003, 215):

(28)   a.   Kol-ya   na urok-e.
              Kolya-NOM on lesson.M-LOC.SG
              'Kolya is in class now.'
        b.

```
                   TP
                  /  \
                DP    T'
                     /  \
                    T    AspP
                        /    \
                     Asp      PredP
                      |       /    \
                  φ-incomplete t_i   Pred'
                   defective         /    \
                                  Pred    PP
```

The verb *byt'* 'be' in Harves (2002: 214) is devoid of any semantic content and is merely 'the morphological spell-out of a functional predicational head, Pred' that raises overtly to T. When Tense or Aspect features are specified – in past and future tenses – Pred raises to T, which results in the spell-out of the past and future forms of the copula. In the present tense, Harves argues, T bears no tense specification; if T is unspecified for tense, there is no motivation for Pred to raise – that is why the copula is not spelled out in the present tense, as in (28-a). Note that in Harves's system a T that is unspecified for tense still has a Case feature to dispatch (i.e. it is not defective with regard to agreement), thus Nominative case is available in present tense as well.

In existential and possessive sentences different processes take place. According to Harves, the conspicuous spell-out of *jest'* in present-tense existential sentences is due to exceptional Pred-raising which is motivated by the derivation of the existential interpretation. Harves follows Heycock (1994) in assuming that in order for the subject of a small clause to receive an existential interpretation, the nuclear scope must be 'closed off' by a feature of Asp – in Russian this is achieved by feature-matching of the PP-predicate in SpecAspP. In existential sentences, Asp probes the features of Pred and the PP predicate simultaneously; this results in the movement of Pred to Asp, and of PP to SpecAspP.[5] From SpecAspP the PP constitutes a closer goal for the probing T such that movement to SpecTP can take place. The final structure of the derivation of an existential *be*-possessive is in (29):

(29)

```
                      TP
               _____/_____
              /              \
          PP_i               T'
                        ____/\____
                       /          \
                      T           AspP
                 ___/\___      __/\____
                /        \    /        \
             Asp_m        T  t_i       Asp'
           __/\__                   __/\__
          /      \                 /      \
       Pred_j    Asp             t_m      PredP
                                        __/\__
                                       /      \
                                   Subject    Pred'
                                            __/\__
                                           /      \
                                          t_j     t_i
```

As illustrated in (29), Pred does not stop in Asp – the head complex raises further to T even in present tense, where such movement is featurally unmotivated. Harves needs this movement to take place in order to account for the derivation of negated sentences (see example (32)). The complex of heads Pred+Asp+T is spelled out as *jest'* in present tense (and as agreeing forms of *byt'* in past and future tenses).

The derivation becomes more complicated in negated *be*-sentences. Harves's position is that negated *be*-sentences with PP predicates all involve non-agreeing *byt'*-forms: *net* 'is not', *ne bylo* 'was not', *ne budet* 'will not be'. Following Babyonyshev's (1996) idea of a defective T and Hale and Keyser's (1993) notion of

---

[5]The movement of Pred extends the domain for the movement of PP, in the manner of Chomsky (1993) and Den Dikken (1995).

head-incorporation in the lexicon, Harves claims that the non-agreeing negated *byt'*-forms are a spell-out of a pre-syntactic incorporation of Neg into T. The defective nature of Pred makes it possible for T to be defective (lack agreement features). (30-b) presents the structure for the negated 'locative' in (30-a):

(30) a. Kol-i   net   na urok-e.
          Kolya-GEN NEG.be.PRS on lesson.M-LOC.SG
          'Kolya is not in class.'

    b.   (Neg)TP   Harves (2003: 247)

The definite DP raises to Spec(Neg)TP due to the matching with the [+Topic] feature (on which the EPP feature is parasitic) on the T head – simultaneously, the DP receives Genitive case from the Neg head. Harves assumes that there is no mismatch between the [+NQP] feature on Neg (a feature that requires a non-referential DP) and the [+REF] feature on the DP, because it is enough for at least one feature to be checked in the Neg+T complex. This derivation allows Harves to claim to have accounted for what she calls the Existential Paradox: why GenNeg is not subject to the Definiteness Effect in *be*-sentences, in contrast to other unaccusatives and transitive constructions.

Harves's 'at least one' feature-checking in the Neg+T complex means that one feature is left hanging in the derivation unchecked – however, it looks suspicious that it is always the [+NQP] feature of Neg that is left unchecked. Harves tries to show that both the [+Topic] feature of T and the [+NQP] feature of Neg can be left unchecked by providing the example in (31):

(31) Nikogo   doma ne   byl-o.
      nobody.GEN home NEG be.PST-N.SG
      'Nobody was home.'   Harves (2003: 249)

The NPI element in the subject position in (31) shows, according to Harves, that Neg can match its scope feature with the DP in Spec(Neg)TP. However, the

interpretation of (31) is such that the NPI element *nikogo* 'nobody' can be argued to be [+Topic] as well. Namely, *nikogo* refers to people whose identity is given from the previous discourse. Thus, it seems that the [+Topic] feature of T must be checked. This leaves the [+NQP] feature on Neg as anomalous in that it does not need checking.

The derivation of a negated possessive sentence in Harves's analysis is more complex than (30-b) and proceeds in the following way:[6]

(32) a. U menja net   mašin-y.
          at I.GEN NEG.be.PRS car.F-GEN.SG
          'I don't have a car.'
      b.

Up to the level of AspP we observe the derivation of an existential/possessive sentence already discussed above. The derivation related to the Neg+T complex is the same as in (30-b). Because Asp is syntactically active in these sentences (it is featurally responsible for the existential interpretation), it has to raise to T, dragging Pred along. Note that Harves has to assume that Pred+Asp raises to T – otherwise her analysis predicts a sequence of the type *net jest'* (see Harves, p.250). This results in a rather heavy incorporation complex – Pred+Asp+Neg+T, which is spelled out by non-agreeing negated forms of *byt'*: *net, ne bylo, ne budet*.[7]

A feature of Harves's analysis worth mentioning is the inconsistency in the treatment of the verb *byt'* 'be'. Harves argues insistently against the lexical status of the verb (its existential variant), in particular as proposed in Chvany (1975). It

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[6]Harves does not provide the structure, I constructed (32-b) from Harves's discussion and hope that I understood it correctly.

[7]In (32) GenNeg is valued on the possessum by Neg, presumably via AGREE; the [+NQP] is dispatched simultaneously with the Case feature, as far as I understand Harves's mechanism.

is then interesting to see how Harves deals with examples like (33) which involve a PP and no GenNeg:

(33) Otec   ne   byl   na mor-e.
      father.M:NOM.SG NEG be.PST:M.SG on sea.N-LOC.SG
      'Father was not at sea.'   Partee and Borschev (2002)

Here the negation cannot be written off as a constituent variety, since it precedes the verb. Harves sides with Chvany in treating the verb *byt'* as an unergative predicate similar to 'to go'; the unergativity (ϕ-completeness) of the predicate prevents it from being able to select for a defective T and GenNeg is thus ruled out, according to Harves's mechanism. I regard this explanation as somewhat inconsistent: having argued against the lexical nature of existential *byt'*, Harves allows for a lexical *byt'* with the meaning 'to go'.

Harves's analysis of unaccusativity presents an intricate featural story for *be*-possessives. The analysis is built on an empirical overgeneralization with regard to PP-GenNeg pattern. In addition, it is questionable what an analysis gains from refuting an existential predicate in favor of an Asp head that may be unspecified for any features but still be syntactically active in order to derive an existential interpretation.

4.2.2 Dyakonova 2007

Dyakonova (2007) is a work on the double object construction in Russian that also contains a proposal on the treatment of possessive constructions. The discussion of possessives constitutes just several pages in Dyakonova's paper – the fact that I direct so much attention (and critique) at Dyakonova's proposal should be considered as a tribute to its powerfulness.

In her analysis of the double object construction, Dyakonova, building on such works as McIntyre (2006) and Pylkkänen (2002), develops the notion of the applicative predicate VAPPL that introduces the Goal argument in (34):

(34) a. Ja   kupi-l-a   muž-u   podarok.
          I.NOM buy-PST-F.SG husband-DAT.SG present.M:ACC.SG
          'I bought my husband a present.'
      b. [$_{vP}$ Agent [v [$_{VapplP}$ Goal [VAPPL [$_{VP}$ Theme [V Complement]]]]]]

The properties of VAPPL are the following:

(35) a. it is a semantically contentful light verb;

      b.   it has the following meaning: HAVE (x spec, y compl) asserts of x that it stands in a possession relationship to y;

      c.   it can select either for an entity or an event. Dyakonova (2007: 18-19)

Possession in (35-b) is understood as an abstract notion, such that experiences and states can be viewed as possessums, along with concrete objects. Besides Goals, VAPPL introduces such arguments as Experiencers, Bene-/Malefactors, and also Possessors. Thus VAPPL appears in possessives as well. The Russian possessive constructions that Dyakonova includes in the range of her survey are illustrated in (36):

(36)   a.   U menja jest'   osnovani-ja   polaga-t'. . .
              at I.GEN be.PRS reason.N-NOM.PL think-INF
              'I have reasons to think that. . .'

       b.   U menja ime-jut-sja   osnovani-ja   polaga-t'. . .
              at I.GEN have:PRS-3PL-REFL reason.N-NOM.PL think-INF
              'I have reasons to think that. . .'

       c.   Ja   ime-ju   osnovani-ja   polaga-t'. . .
              I.NOM have:PRS-1SG reason.N-NOM.PL think-INF
              'I have reasons to think that. . .'   Dyakonova (2007)

These are the three constructions that are used for the expression of predicative possession in modern Russian, as discussed in Chapter 2. For her treatment of possessives, Dyakonova utilizes Den Dikken's (1998) analysis that derives double object constructions and possessives from one underlying structure, presented in (37):

(37)   Den Dikken (1998: 195)

In Den Dikken's analysis the possessor (and also the Goal argument in the double object construction) originates as the predicate of a small clause and subsequently

raises to a position c-commanding the possessum/Theme. Den Dikken makes use of domain-extending head-incorporations as a way to escape a violation of the Minimal Link Condition.

Dyakonova applies Den Dikken's model in (37) to the Russian data: in all of the possessives in (36) the two arguments are organized in a small clause configuration, where the *would-be* possessor is the predicate. The 'would-be' part is what distinguishes Dyakonova's analysis from Den Dikken's: at the level of the small clause the only relation that takes place between the two nominals is that of location. Here Dyakonova points to the locative use of *u*-PPs, such as the second interpretation in (38):

(38)   U menja (jest') mnogo jego knig.
        at I.GEN be.PRS many   his   book.F:GEN.PL
        'I have a lot of his books.'
        'There are a lot of his books at my place.'

Dyakonova proposes that possessive semantics is acquired by the locative PP in the specifier of VAPPLP. (39) presents Dyakonova's derivation of the *be*-possessive in (36-a) and the anticausative possessive in (36-b):

(39)

In (39) the DP *osnovanija* 'reasons' is the subject of the small clause, and the *u*-PP is its locative predicate. The head of the small clause, *Pred*, incorporates into VAPPL and thus extends the domain for the movement of the *u*-PP to SpecVAPPLP, in the manner of Den Dikken (1998). The *u*-PP picks up the possessor θ-role in SpecVAPPLP and then moves on to SpecTP, becoming the subject of the clause. The complex 'VAPPL + Pred' is spelled out either as *byt'* 'be' or *imet'sja* 'have-refl'.

The *have*-possessive in Dyakonova (2007) is derived in the following way:

(40)
```
                          TP
                 ┌────────┴────────┐
               PP_i            VAPPLP
              ┌─┴─┐         ┌─────┴─────┐
             t_l  Ya       t_i        VAPPL'
                                 ┌──────┴──────┐
                              VAPPL            SC
                            ┌───┴───┐      ┌────┴────┐
                         Pred_k   VAPPL  osnovanija  Pred'
                         ┌─┴─┐                      ┌─┴─┐
                         P  Pred                    t_k  t_i
```

The possessor in the *have*-construction also originates as the locative PP-complement of the small clause and then moves to SpecVAPPLP in order to receive the possessor θ-role. The distinctive feature of the *have*-possessive is that the P head is null and thus behaves as an affix that has to incorporate into the next higher head (Baker 1988). Incorporation of P into Pred leaves the DP inside the PP caseless, such that the DP is assigned the Nominative case by T. The 'P+Pred+VAPPL' complex is spelled out as *imet'* 'have'.

Dyakonova's analysis, though cleverly designed, encounters a series of problems. Some of the problems are noted by Dyakonova herself, such as the unconventional movement into a θ-position and the choice of spell-out as either *byt'* or *imet'sja* in (39). To deal with the first problem, Dyakonova refers to Lee-Schoenfeld (2006) where θ-motivated movement is defended from a minimalist standpoint. As for the spell-out of the Pred+VAPPL complex in the anticausative possessive, Dyakonova permits the possibility that, given the reflexive morphology on *imet'sja*, the derivation for this construction may be more complex than indicated in (39). Presumably, the derivation would have to employ two possessive PPs: a PP with a null P is necessary in order to derive the *imet'*-form (some kind of deletion of this PP would probably lead to the spell-out of the reflexive suffix -*sja*), and a PP with the overt *u*-P must enter the derivation at some point, perhaps base-generated in a second VAPPLP projection (or as a locative predicate traveling to this second VAPPLP). I abstain from attempting to construct this derivation here.

The dependence of the analysis on head-incorporation may turn out to be its weakness, especially when it comes to deriving temporary *be*-possessives. I presume that for Dyakonova, the subject position in the temporary possessive in

(41-a) will be taken up by the possessum DP, as illustrated in (41-b):

(41)   a.   M'ač   u Aršavin-a.
            ball.M:NOM.SG at Aršavin-GEN.SG
            'Aršavin has the ball.' / 'Aršavin is in the possession of the ball.'
            (football commentary)
       b.

However, in its movement to SpecTP from the subject position of the small clause the possessum DP crosses the u-PP in SpecV$_{\text{APPL}}$P, thus violating the Minimal Link Condition; the domain-extending incorporation of Pred into V$_{\text{APPL}}$ cannot be appealed to in this case, as this movement renders the u-PP and the possessum DP equidistant with regard to V$_{\text{APPL}}$, but not T. Of course, in (41-b) another head-incorporation is possible: incorporation of the Pred+V$_{\text{APPL}}$ complex into T would render the possessum and the u-PP equidistant to T. This solution brings about at least two potential problems which I merely indicate here. The first problem concerns the spell-out of the T+Pred+V$_{\text{APPL}}$ complex. Given that the Pred+V$_{\text{APPL}}$ complex is spelled out as *jest'* in the alienable possessive in Dyakonova's proposal, it is expected that the addition of the functional head T would not change the spell-out option – however, in the copular temporary *be*-possessive the occurrence of *jest'* causes ungrammaticality:

(42)   *M'ač   jest'   u Aršavin-a.
        ball.M:NOM.SG be.PRS at Aršavin-GEN.SG
        'Aršavin is in the possession of the ball.'

The second problem is the scale of the effect of head-incorporation: namely, it is questionable whether the incorporation of Pred+V$_{\text{APPL}}$ into T can facilitate the movement of the Theme DP out of the small clause, as the Theme DP might be

too embedded in the extended VAPPLP phase (on freezing effects of head-incorporation see Den Dikken (2006)).

4.2.3   Jung 2011

Jung (2011) develops an analysis of the argument structure of the Russian *be*-possessive with the intention of parameterizing the *have/be* alternation in "possessive and possessive-related" constructions. At the base of Jung's analysis is Kayne's (1993) model, augmented by the Low Focus projection of Belletti (2001) and Erechko (2002).

Jung follows Hazout (2004) and Borschev and Partee (2002) in assuming that the differences between locative and existential structures should be reflected in their syntax: in particular, in existentials and possessives the "location" must be construed as the external argument. Jung supports this standpoint by findings from Serbian and Polish existential constructions (Hartmann and Milićević (2008), Blaszczak (2007b)). She also presents an empirical argument of her own based on Moro's (1997) *wh*-extraction test that distinguishes between canonical and inverse copular structures: Jung shows that according to this test the predicate behavior in the Russian *be*-possessive is displayed by the possessum. The example sets in (43) and (44) present *wh*-extraction out of the arguments in *wh*-questions and relativization contexts. (43) contains extraction out of the possessor argument and the examples are sharply ungrammatical, according to Jung:

(43)   a.   *[Kak-ogo   fakul'tet-a]$_i$ èt-i   knig-i
             what-M.GEN.SG department.M-GEN.SG this-NOM.PL book.F-NOM.PL
             byl-i   [u student-ov   t$_i$]?
             be.PST-PL at student.M-GEN.PL
             'What department's students had these books?'

       b.   *Ej   ponravi-l-sja   t-ot   roman,
             she.DAT like-PST:M.SG-REFL that-M.NOM.SG novel.M:NOM.SG
             kotor-ogo$_i$ byl   kak-oj-to   vkus   [u
             which-M.GEN.SG be.PST:M.SG some-M.NOM.SG taste.M:NOM.SG at
             avtor-a   t$_i$].
             author.M-GEN.SG
             'She liked that novel, the author of which had some taste.'   Jung
             (2011, 78)

The sharp ungrammaticality of *wh*-extraction in (43) may be ascribed to either the subject status or the adjunct status of the possessor – here Jung refers to the reflexive-binding power of the possessor and concludes that it must be the subject

status. In contrast to (43), extraction out of the possessum is relatively acceptable:

(44) a. ??[Kak-ogo   avtor-a]$_i$ u vas   byl-i
          what-M.GEN.SG author.M-GEN.SG at you.GEN be.PST-PL
          [knig-i   t$_i$]
          book.F-NOM.PL
          'What author's books did you have?'

      b. ?Ej   ponravi-l-sja   t-ot   avtor,
          she.DAT like-PST:M.SG-REFL that-M.NOM.SG author.M:NOM.SG
          kotor-ogo$_i$ u nee   byl-i   [knig-i   t$_i$].
          which-M.GEN.SG at she.GEN be.PST-PL book.F-NOM.PL
          'She liked that author, books of whom she had.'   Jung (2011, 78)

Jung suggests that the acceptability of the examples in (44) indicates that the possessum is the predicate in the *be*-possessive.[8] Jung proposes that the possessor and the possessum are organized in an asymmetric small clause embedded under a semantically void functional predicate F ('have' or 'be'). In the choice of the form of the small clause Jung opts for Kayne's (1993) PP/DP model:

(45)

The possessor DP is the subject of the small clause nP and the possessum is the predicate. The possessor DP receives its Genitive case from the immediately c-commanding P/D – a semantically empty functional head; a [+Case] P in Russian is lexicalized as u 'at'.

In Kayne's original proposal (for the Hungarian data) the possessum NP must move to a higher projection in order to enable remnant movement of the PP/DP – such that the surface order is derived. In her critique of a Kayne-style analysis for Russian possessives, Harves (2003:178) points out that it is not clear what this higher functional projection harboring the possessum NP would be. Jung's solution to this problem is the LowFocus projection. Jung assumes that narrow focus in Russian is achieved by the movement of the corresponding element into the TP-internal Low Focus projection, as argued for in Erechko (2002). As the

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[8]For a full discussion of the *wh*-extraction test and more examples see Jung (2011: 74-81).

possessum NP in the Russian *be*-possessive usually constitutes new information, it can move to LowFocP. The derivation of the *be*-possessive in (46-a) would thus proceed as indicated in (46-b):

(46)   *Jung (2011, 92)*

    a.   U menja jest'   knig-a.
         at I.GEN be.PRS book.F-NOM.SG
         'I have a book.'

    b.

```
                            TP
              ┌──────────────┴──────────────┐
           PP_j                             T'
         ┌───┴───┐                  ┌────────┴────────┐
        P        nP              T_[Nom]             BEP
        │      ┌──┴──┐                          ┌─────┴─────┐
        u     DP    t_i                        BE          FocP
              │                                │         ┌───┴───┐
            menja                            -Case      n'_i    Foc'
                                             jest'    ┌──┴──┐  ┌──┴──┐
                                                      n   NP  Foc  t_j
                                                          │
                                                        mašina
```

The *n*'-level containing the possessum NP moves to the specifier of the TP-internal Low Focus projection. Because P is specified as [+Case] in (46-b), the derivation does not need a case assigner other than Tense – this is why the structure involves the [-Case] *be*-predicate. After the possessum vacates the PP/DP, the possessor must move to SpecTP to satisfy the EPP, but cannot do so on its own, because the prepositional complementizer P cannot be stranded. As a result the whole PP/DP is pied-piped to SpecTP.[9] In this way Jung accounts for the constituent behavior of the preposition and the possessor DP that in her structure do not make up a constituent.

One of the conspicuous features of Jung's analysis is that it relies on *n*'-movement. Jung (2011:48) mentions Harves's (2003) objection to P'-movement in Freeze (1992) and does not find it well-motivated in view of recent minimalist works that allow participation of X'-projections in syntactic operations. In particular, Mayr and Schmitt show in their (2008) GLOW talk that the C'-phrase may participate in coordination and possibly ellipsis and movement. I do not go into a discussion

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[9]Jung (2008: 186) allows a possibility that on its way to SpecTP the PP/DP may stop over in the IP-internal Low Topic phrase that immediately dominates LowFocusP.

of Mayr and Schmitt (2008), but will note the following: in the Agree framework, where movement is based on the checking of features, the XP-phrase does not have a feature-set distinct from that of the X'-level. Thus, there is no featural reason for XP to stay behind when the X'-level is moving. In footnote 18, Jung (2011:92) notes that it is also possible that only the NP level moves to SpecLowFocP. If I understood correctly, Jung opts for the *n'*-movement in (46-b) in order to make the structure more applicable to the deontic modal constructions and North-Russian perfective constructions where *X'*-movement is necessary if the surface structure is to be derived within Jung's analysis.

Jung applies her PP/XP structure to a variety of constructions resorting to varied featural specifications of heads. The *be*-possessive contains an overt P with a [+Case] feature responsible for the assignment of the Genitive case to the possessor DP. The *have*-possessive differs from the *be*-possessive in that it involves a null P with a [-Case] feature specification in a structure essentially identical to the one in (46-b):

(47)

As a consequence of the [-Case] feature specification of the P/D head, the [+Case] allomorph of predicate F is inserted – this is *imet'* 'have' (Jung 2011: 94). In the rest, the derivation of the *have*-possessive is similar to that of the *be*-possessive: the possessum raises to LowFocP and the PP/DP (with a null caseless P) remnant-moves to SpecTP. Jung (2011) does not seem to discuss the *imet'sja*-possessive, but it would not be problematic for her analysis, as the forms of *imet'* 'have' are not derived by P-incorporation (as they are in Dyakonova's (2007) analysis).[10]

Jung extends her analysis of possessives to what she calls deontic modal constructions illustrated in (48):[11]

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[10] See Jung's discussion of Polish and Serbian possessives with an overt P and a *have*-verb (Jung 2011: in passim).

[11] Jung also devotes significant attention to the perfect tense construction in North Russian

(48) a. A   začem mne byl-o   vstava-t'?
          and why   I.DAT be.PST-N.SG get.up-INF
          'And why did I have to get up?'   Jung (2011, p.98)

      b. Kuda   mne byl-o   uj-ti?
          where.DIR I.DAT be.PST-N.SG leave-INF
   'Where did I have to leave for?'   Jung (2011: 107)

The constructions in (48) contain a Dative argument, the verb *byt'* 'be' and an infinitival clause. Jung assumes that these constructions are bi-clausal. For one of the diagnostics Jung turns to Fleischer's (2006) data on the position of negation with regard to *byt'*.

(49) a. *Gruzovik-am   ne byl-o   proexa-t'.
          truck.M-DAT.PL NEG be.PST-N.SG pass.by-INF
          'It was not for trucks to pass by.'

      b. Gruzovika-m   byl-o   ne proexa-t'.
          truck.M-DAT.PL be.PST-N.SG NEG pass.by-INF
          'It was not for trucks to pass by.'   Jung (2011: 99)

      c. Gorod   ne byl   okružen   vrag-om.
          city:NOM.SG NEG be.PST:M.SG surrounded:M.SG enemy.M-INST.SG
          'The city was not surrounded by the enemy.'   Fleischer (2006)

Fleischer shows that in the modal construction negation follows *byt'*, in contrast to the passive construction in (49-c) with the auxiliary *byt'*. The negation data motivate the position of *byt'* as outside of the infinitival clause in the modal construction. The embedded clause, according to Jung, is a PP/CP-structure with a null [+Case] prepositional complementizer P/C that assigns Dative:

(50) *Jung 2011, 107*

      a. Kuda mne byl-o   ujti?
          where I.DAT be.PST-N.SG leave-INF
          'Where did I have to leave for?'

---

which I do not discuss here, limiting myself to Standard Russian.

b.

```
                        CP
                   /         \
                 wh           TP
                 |          /    \
               kuda       /       \
            /         \          T'
      PP/CP_i          T'     /      \
     /      \              T-BE_k       BEP
  t_w h     P/C'           |          /    \
          /    \          bylo      t_k     FocP
        P/C    TP                        /       \
             /    \                   T'_j        Foc'
          Subj    tj                /    \       /    \
           |                       T     vP    Foc    t_i
         mne_m                          /   \
                                      t_m    VP
                                           /    \
                                        t_wh    VP
                                                |
                                               ujti
```

The subject of the embedded clause *mne* 'me' raises from its external argument position in *v*P to SpecTP where it is assigned Dative case by the immediately c-commanding null P/C head. After this, the T'-level moves to the Low Focus projection of the main clause. Finally, the embedded PP/CP containing *mne* in SpecTP remnant-moves to the specifier of the main TP. Jung does not indicate the positions of the *wh*-element in the derivation, but it is interesting to track its route. With its final position in the specifier of the main CP, the *wh*-element *kuda* 'where' presumably originates in the embedded clause (e.g. as a VP adjunct). From here there are two routes for the *wh*-element in Jung's structure, both of which involve left-branch extraction. The first route is where the *wh*-element moves to the specifier of the embedded PP/CP. When the PP/CP remnant-moves to the specifier of the main TP, the *wh*-element is still trapped inside, as the main CP is not constructed yet. Thus, when the main CP is available, the movement of *kuda* to its specifier constitutes extraction out of a subject. The second route involves the *wh*-element 'waiting' in its base position in the embedded VP and piggy-backing on the T' when the latter moves to the specifier of the LowFocP in the main clause. Although here the *wh*-element is closer to the main CP, it is still trapped in a left branch (SpecLowFocP).

Coming back to *be*-possessives, Jung's analysis may have problems with copular

temporary possessives:

(51)　Vaš-e　　　　pis'm-o　　　　u sekretar'-a.
　　　your-N.NOM.SG letter.N-NOM.SG at secretary-GEN.SG
　　　'The secretary has your letter.'　　　　　　　　　Jung (2011: 39)

In order to be able to derive (51) from her structure, Jung must subscribe to a dissociation of definiteness from the presence of the DP-layer: the possessum noun must be expressed by an *n'*-phrase in the structure proposed by Jung. (52) is the structure I constructed in accordance to Jung's mechanism:

(52)

The surface order in (51) is derived by the movement of the possessum *n'*-phrase to SpecTP, either directly or through a Low Topic phrase. The PP/DP containing the preposition *u* and the possessor DP must remain in situ (even though it is focused) because there is no grammatical derivation that could transport the possessum to SpecTP and the remnant PP/DP to LowFocP. If the PP/DP moves to SpecLowFocP, the possessum cannot move out as that would constitute extraction from a specifier. The only possibility seems to be for the PP/DP to be "tucked into" the SpecLowFocP after the possessum has moved out – this option is acceptable for those who do not mind countercyclicity of syntactic operations. The non-constituency of the preposition and the possessor DP seems to be the main problem of Jung's analysis – it compels Jung to resort to such (Kayne-style) solutions as evacuation of the possessum and remnant movement, making the analysis complicated and more susceptible to error. The analysis is also to a certain degree dependent on the possibility of X'-movement.
Still, there are several points that attract me in Jung's analysis. First is that Jung distinguishes between locative and existential constructions. Second, Jung

constructs the possessum as the predicate – in Chapter 5 I claim this to be the case for some of the *be*-possessives. Finally, Jung, though allowing for the existential predicate, does not include it into the basic structure of possessives.

4.3   Discussion

All of the analyses presented in this chapter provide one underlying structure for all *be*-possessives – constructions that, as we have seen in Chapter 3, display quite diverse properties.

Constructed mainly to account for the existential *be*-possessive, the analyses struggle with copular possessives and need additional assumptions – that do not always work, such as the rule of ∃-deletion in Chvany (1975). In the three post-Freezian analyses additional challenges are presented by the dependence on re-ordering operations that are assumed to take place before the movement of the possessor phrase to the subject position (SpecTP). The re-ordering in Harves (2003) and Dyakonova (2007) is of Den Dikken's (1993, 1995) type, i.e. mainly aiming to avoid an MLC violation. The re-ordering in Jung's analysis is of the Kaynean type – striving to derive the constituent behavior of the non-constituent *u*-PP. These re-ordering operations complicate the derivation to the degree that some of the *be*-possessive constructions cannot be accounted for. Extension of the accounts to the *have*-possessive in post-Freezian analyses brings further problems, such as conflicting featural specifications of heads in Dyakonova (2007).

The assumption of one underlying structure for the *be*-possessives thus turns out to be a weakness of these analyses. For the Minimalist analyses the unification drive is generally determined by the cartographic enterprise. More specifically, the motivation for the unification seems to be the UTAH. First, the analyses strive to reduce the role of Possessor (independent of the encoding strategy) to one of the macro-roles that the UTAH operates on; then, bound by the UTAH, the analyses proceed to identify the universal structure for possessives: both for the locational *be*-possessive and for the transitive *have*-possessive. In Dyakonova's analysis a Possessor θ-role is acquired by a locative element in SpecVapplP, which itself has a fixed position in the clause. In Jung's analysis a possessor is basically an agent and is projected as the subject of a small clause. Even in Chvany (1975), a pre-Freezian/pre-UTAH analysis, a possessor is always projected as an "Indirect Object" (Goal). In Chapter 2 I have discussed in sufficient detail the issues of meaning-to-structure mapping in general and with regard to possessive constructions in particular. In the next chapter I develop an analysis of *be*-possessives in which the possessor element does not have to be introduced in

the same position in the clause: it must only be in a local relation with the predicate responsible for the possessor semantics.

4.4   Conclusion

In this chapter I reviewed the existing analyses of the Russian *be*-possessives that can be divided into two groups: the transformational account of Chvany (1975) and the post-Freezian analyses all couched in the minimalist framework (Harves 2003, Dyakonova 2007 and Jung 2011). In the review of these analyses one of the issues has been to what extent an analysis accommodates the diverse properties of the Russian *be*-possessives. I demonstrate that aspirations to derive all types of *be*-possessives from one underlying structure meet a reality of data that is quite unfriendly. The benefit of economy of representation that is achieved by having one underlying structure for a variety of *be*-possessives is diminished by the amount of operations (head-incorporations, remnant movements) that are necessary in order to derive the attested word orders. We need a more flexible analysis that does not run into the problems indicated in this chapter.

Chapter 5

The structure of *be*-possessives

In the previous chapter we have observed the need for an analysis of *be*-possessives that can accommodate the diverse properties of these constructions. Moreover, this analysis must be compatible with the dynamic syntax approach: priority must be given to local configurations, with no reference to global considerations. The proposal that I present in this chapter targets only the Russian *be*-possessives, and namely the three types identified in Chapter 3: the existential *be*-possessive, the copular property *be*-possessive and the copular temporary *be*-possessive. The analysis may be extended to other languages that employ the locational strategy for expressing predicative possession. I propose that *u*-possessors are introduced by a predicate that is responsible for possessor semantics. The different types of *be*-possessives are derived by the different merging places of this predicate phrase. In my syntactic analysis I tap into the observations from typological, cognitive and historical linguistics.

5.1   The nature of the *u*-PP: introducing AnchorP

How do we derive the meaning of possession in *be*-possessives? To tackle this question we need another quick glance at the general tendencies in the literature. There have been proposals that *be*-languages (languages that use a *be*-sentence for the expression of predicative possession) do not have a notion of possession: Isačenko (1974) describes the meaning of possessive *u*-PPs in Russian as "concern or implication". However, typologists like Heine (1997) and Stassen (2009) argue

that possession is a basic notion of human cognition, independent of culture and the stage of social development.

A popular view in various linguistic schools has been to equate possession with location; this localist tradition includes such scholars as Benveniste (1960), Lyons (1967), Clark (1978), Arutjunova and Širyaev (1983), Freeze (1992), Borschev and Partee (1998). In this approach possessors are minimally different from locations only with regard to some [+Human] feature, as in Freeze (1992); see also Arutjunova and Širyaev (1983) who describe possessors in Russian as 'personalized localizers' (*ličnostnyje lokalizatory*). We have seen, however, that more is needed than a [+Human] specification for a morphologically locative phrase to acquire a possessive meaning. For example, Freeze (1992) has to explain why not every locative PP-predicate may become a possessor and why [-Human] possessors are allowed:

(1) a. Vozle Miš-i / pod Miš-ej byl-a   knig-a   .
    near Miša-GEN under Miša-LOC be.PST-F.SG book.F-NOM.SG
    'There was a book near Miša/under Miša.'

  b. U èt-oj   zadač-i   net   rešeni-ja.
    at this-F.GEN.SG task.F-GEN.SG NEG.be.PRS solution.N-GEN.SG
    'This problem has no solution.'

  c. U stol-a   rezn-yje   nožk-i.
    at table.M-GEN.SG carved-NOM.PL leg.F-NOM.PL
    'The table has carved legs.'

Examples like (1-a) demonstrate that the use of animate nouns in PPs other than the *u*-PP does not yield a possessive interpretation; on the other hand, *u*-possessors may have inanimate referents, as shown in (1-b) and (1-c).

In Chapter 2 I discuss a composite understanding of the notion of possession where the two parameters involved are spatial unity and c-control.[1] This view is defended in such works as Seiler (1973, 1983), Hagège (1993), Heine (1997), Baron and Herslund (2001), Stassen (2009). In Chapter 2 I state that a composite understanding of possession yields more flexibility to an analysis that wishes to be compatible with the diverse typological picture of possession.

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[1]As discussed in Chapter 2, by *c-control* I refer to the cognitive notion of control, not to be confused with the syntactic notion. Evans (1995) gives the following description of c-control in possessive constructions:

(i) 'X [the possessor] can expect Y [the possessee] to be in the same place as X when X wants, and X can do with Y what X wants.'   Evans (1995, 146)

The intuition that possession is something more than just location can in fact be observed in several generative analyses. Dyakonova (2007), as discussed in Chapter 4, proposes that a Possessor role is acquired by a locative element in the specifier of VAPPLP, the projection that is also responsible for the assignment of such roles as Benefactor, Malefactor, Experiencer, Goal. Jung (2011), although including Freeze's (1992) typological claims into the foundation of her analysis, moves away from the Possessor-as-Location view and argues that the possessor should be projected as the external argument – in this way Jung stresses the association of possessors with the notions of agency and ergativity.

In cognitive linguistic research the prominent status of the possessor motivated another useful imagery – *reference points.* A reference point in Langacker (1993) is an entity that helps establish mental contact with another entity in the conceptual space; a reference point is thus the prominent element in its dominion, like a tower in a landscape. In the case of possessors the understanding of the dominion shifts from physical proximity to personal sphere: the dominion of the possessor is determined as its "abstract region of control", as stated in Cienki (1995: 83), who offers a cognitive analysis of possessive and locative PPs in Russian and Bulgarian. I take the mechanism of reference points to be the underlying base of the locational possessive strategy. The possessor acts as a locative anchor for an expression – it is a red pin that helps us locate an object/event/state on the map of the possible worlds.

The general tradition of meaning-to-structure mapping in generative linguistics motivates making the possessor element 'responsible' for the meaning of possession: if a structure contains a neutral argument and another argument that has a more specific meaning, it is the latter argument that is supposed to participate in some special syntactic configuration. For example, an Agent is introduced by an agentive *v*, a Goal argument in some analyses is introduced by an applicative predicate (Pylkkänen 2002). In the Russian *be*-possessive it is the possessor argument that is characterized by a morphologically conspicuous form.

I assume that possessors in a locational possessive strategy are introduced by a predicate that I refer to as Anchor. In the formulation of this predicate I refer to typological and cognitive research. (2-a-b) provide the content of the predicate, (2-c) gives a structural representation:

(2)   Predicate Anchor introduces an argument X that:
        a.   serves as a reference-point (an anchor) for its sister phrase;
        b.   exerts c-control over this phrase.

c.

```
              AnchorP
              /\
   u-PP ———————→
   /\        /\
  ...  Anchor   XP
              /\
             ...
```

The description of the Anchor predicate in (2) is supposed to derive the duality of prepositional possessors in locational possessive constructions such as the Russian *be*-possessive: the possessors are associated with location and at the same time exhibit c-control, which is a realization of the dependency (represented by the arrow) between the *u*-PP and its sister phrase. The Anchor predicate introducing *u*-possessors can take a variety of syntactic phrases as its complement. In what follows I show how the merging of AnchorP at various points of the derivation yields the observed types of *be*-possessives. I start the discussion from the existential *be*-possessive in section 5.2: the construction has been the object of much research and constitutes the prototypical type of predicative possession. Section 5.3 presents the analysis of copular *be*-possessives.

5.2 The existentials

The existential *be*-possessive is usually grouped together with existential constructions such as (3):

(3)   a.   Bog   jest'.
           god.M:NOM.SG be.PRS
           'There is God.'
      b.   V sel-e   net   doktor-a.
           in village.M-LOC.SG NEG.be.PRS doctor.M:GEN.SG
           'There is no doctor in the village.'

The common properties include the distribution and behavior of the verb *byt'* 'be' and the Genitive of Negation, discussed in Chapter 2. There are further commonalities regarding the characteristics of Themes that I discuss in section 5.2.2. In section 5.2.1 I present an analysis for Russian existential *be*-sentences and then go on to analyze the existential *be*-possessive as an existential construction enhanced by the Anchor phrase.

5.2.1 The existential construction

In my analysis of existential sentences in Russian I assume the existence of predicate V∃, following a range of scholars who postulate an existential element in Russian *be*-sentences in some disguise or other: lexical verb ∃ (Chvany 1975), existential operator (Kondrashova 1996), existential *byt'* 'be' (Pereltsvaig 2001). In Russian, the "purest" spell-out of the existential predicate, without any additional semantic flavors, is available in the form of the verb *byt'* 'be'. I do not argue for a lexical status of the verb *byt'* 'be' itself – at least not at this stage of the language's development. I hypothesize that *byt'* may have started out as a lexical predicate meaning 'exist', but later grammaticalized to functional usages and is now used to spell out a range of verbal heads: T, Asp, ∃ and probably Pred under certain circumstances. I subscribe to the following definition of predicate V∃:

(4)   Predicate V∃ is a lexical verb that states that an entity is instantiated in a larger domain.

I start unraveling the content of the predicate from the relation it establishes with the existee argument. In my understanding of the predicate's content I am drawn to the analyses of McNally (1998) and Padučeva (2000) who argue that the existential predicate holds of property-denoting expressions or non-particulars. Padučeva (2000) states that the predicate is a predicative quantifier and as such posits a non-referentiality restriction on its argument; definite nouns are thus generally excluded from existential constructions (the well-known 'Definiteness effect') due to their referentiality.[2] McNally (1998) ascribes the Definiteness effect to the linguistically conventionalized pragmatic condition on the predicate that its argument's referent be novel in the common ground of the conversation (definite NPs designate familiar referents). There are, however, contexts when definite nouns are allowed in existentials:

(5)   a.   What shall we dig up this year? – Well, there are the peonies.
               McNally (1998, 13)
        b.   V Moskv-e   jest'   Kol-ya.
               in Moscow-LOC be.PRS Kolya-NOM
               'In Moscow there is Kolya.'   Hartmann and Milićević (2008: 181)
        c.   V Moskve   jest'   Bol'š-oj   Teatr.
               in Moscow-LOC be.PRS Bolshoi-M.NOM.SG theater.M:NOM.SG

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[2]Padučeva singles out three abstract predicate-lexemes: EXIST, EXIST IN A WORLD, and THERE IS. I collapse these lexemes into one predicate.

'In Moscow there is the Bolshoi Theater.'   Kondrashova (1996, 275)

d. Ty   xoč-eš   otdoxnu-t'? Na verand-e   jest'
you.NOM want.PRS-2SG rest-INF   on veranda.F-LOC.SG be.PRS
kresl-o.
armchair.N-NOM.SG
'Do you want to rest? There is an armchair on the veranda.' Padučeva
(2000: 7)

McNally (1998) and Padučeva (2000) differ somewhat in their treatment of examples in (5), but the common point is the following: semantically, the post-verbal definite noun is a property, it denotes the class of objects that includes the referent whose identity is familiar in the present discourse. McNally emphasizes that the referent is not directly associated with the postverbal NP – the existence of a particular individual simply supports the truth of the existential claim. McNally and Padučeva do seem to be on the right track with regard to Russian data, as it seems that definite nouns are always re-introduced into the discourse in Russian existential sentences on the basis of their possible function, usefulness. This can be seen in the few examples presented above: in (5-b) *Kolya* is introduced into the discourse by virtue of the way he could be helpful to the speaker; in (5-c), the Bolshoi Theater is relevant with regard to its 'visitability'. That is, it is not the 'whole' definite noun that is introduced in a given statement, but some relevant property of this noun. A definite noun is not allowed in an existential construction where no property-relevance is presented by the context:

(6)   *Maš-a   jest'.
      Maša-NOM be.PRS
      'There is Maša.'

The property-type analyses of McNally (1998) and Padučeva (2000) also account for the interpretation of strong quantifiers in existential sentences. According to McNally, strong quantifiers that range over individuals (particulars) are ungrammatical in existential contexts because they do not satisfy the lexical restrictions of the existential predicate; on the other hand, strong quantifiers that range over non-particulars (kinds, sorts) are allowed. The existential sentence in (7-a) is grammatical only if *vse knigi* 'all books' is interpreted with regard to book-titles, not individual books; the interpretation of the strong quantifier phrase in (7-b) is likewise restricted to sorts.

(7) a. V mo-jom   magazin-e   jest' vs-e   knig-i   v
         in my-M.LOC.SG shop.M-LOC.SG be.PRS all-NOM book.F-NOM.PL in
         mir-e.
         world.M-LOC.SG
         'My shop has all the books in the world.'

     b. V Moskv-e   jest' vs-e   razvlečeni-ja.
         in Moscow-LOC be.PRS all-NOM entertainment.N-NOM.PL
   'Moscow has all sorts of entertainment.'

The property-type view of the existee is also highly relevant for the Russian data with regard to the Genitive of Negation – the case that appears on existees (among other things) under negation. In section 3.2 I discuss the analysis of Partee and Borschev (2004) and Borschev et al. (2008) who develop a property-type account of the Genitive of Negation; I assume the position that in Russian GenNeg appears under negation on property-type Themes. Thus, a negated existential sentence denies existence of an entity of the type denoted by the Genitive NP:

(8) a. V xolodil'nik-e   net   piv-a.
         in fridge.M-LOC.SG NEG.be.PRS beer.N-GEN.SG
         'There is no beer in the fridge.'   Partee and Borschev (2008)

     b. Povod-a   dlja isteri-i   net.
         reason.M-GEN.SG for hysteria.F-GEN.SG NEG.be.PRS
         'There is no reason for hysteria.'

     c. Van-i   net   doma.
         Vanja-GEN NEG.be.PRS home.ADV
         'Vanja is not at home.'

With definite DPs, as in (8-c), GenNeg is interpreted as 'no trace of x': no trace of Vanja is observed at home. Partee and Borschev observe that a common trait for all instances of GenNeg is the decreased referentiality of the noun, which the authors ascribe to the semantic type of the noun – {e, t}. Partee and Borschev are aware of the property-type analysis of existentials by McNally (1998) and Padučeva (2000), but they still allow a possibility of Nominative existees being of type {e}. As already stated, I follow McNally and Padučeva in assuming that existees in *be*-sentences are always of type {e, t}, independent of their morphological case: this may be why existees in *be*-sentences are *obligatorily* Genitive under negation, in contrast to transitive constructions where an NP can either change to Genitive or remain Accusative.

As for its syntactic representation, Levin and Rappaport-Hovav (1995: 153) have argued for a 'direct internal argument' status of the existee, and it has been

common in the literature to refer to the existee as the Theme, a tradition that I follow in this thesis. I furthermore assume that Themes in existentials are projected as NPs, i.e. I adhere to the conservative position of category-type correspondence, with {e, t}-type nouns represented in the syntax as NPs (and {e}-type nouns as DPs). Thus far we have established the following syntactic representation for an existential sentence:

(9)

$$\text{V}\exists\text{P}$$
$$\text{V}\exists \quad \text{NP}$$
$$|$$
$$\{\text{e,t}\}$$

(9) demonstrates a lexical predicate V∃ with the existee argument represented as its Theme; the Theme has an NP-structure and is of the {e,t}-type.

Furthermore, there is a view that if an entity exists it necessarily does so in some location – this statement is not only motivated theoretically, but is also based on the observation that cross-linguistically existential constructions tend to contain locative-like elements. The association of existence with location has a long tradition: Clark (1978), Kimball (1973), Lyons (1967), Arutyunova and Širjaev (1983), Freeze (1992), Partee and Borschev (2008). Location in these works is understood in an abstract way and includes such notions as e.g. state, spatio-temporal region, the speaker's/hearer's perceptual field, and also possessor (Partee and Borschev 2008). When location is not explicitly stated (and not motivated contextually), as in (10), "locativist" theories of existence assume an implicit locative in the structure, such as the actual world, the universe:

(10) a. Jedinorog-ov   ne   susčestv-ujet.
          unicorn.M-GEN.PL NEG exist:PRS-3SG
          'Unicorns do not exist.'   Partee and Borschev (2008)

      b. Istin-a   jest'.
          truth.F-NOM.SG be.PRS
   'There is truth.'

According to Partee and Borschev, (10-a) denies the existence of unicorns in the actual world – the same explanation would apply to (10-b). Arutyunova and Širjaev (1983) offer a more detailed interpretation of bare existential constructions. According to the authors, sentences like (10-b) (involving abstract 'existees') are encountered in contexts involving conflicting world-views: the Theme represents a notion that constitutes a part of the speaker's worldview, and the sentence may be uttered as an argument against a different worldview, a reminder or a behavior

directive (*ustanovka na povedenije*). In connection with the examples in (10) an objection may arise as to whether a syntactic representation of implicit locatives is licit. After all, all other kinds of predicates (such as 'read' or 'die') express events or states that take place in some location, but no location arguments are posited in the base structures of those predicates. One could thus take the sentences in (10) to be instantiations of bare existential structures, containing only the existential predicate and the Theme. The only half-formal test that I can think of at the moment is the behavior of abstract existees with regard to location expressions. Sentences like (10) can namely involve overt locations – and the only ones allowed seem to be locations with the meaning 'the whole world':

(11)   a.   Jest'   na svet-e   spravedlivost'.
            be.PRS on world.M-LOC justice.F:NOM
            'There is justice in the world.'

       b.   Na svet-e   ne suščestvu-jet problem,   jest'   tol'ko
            on world.M-LOC NEG exist:PRS-3SG problem.F:GEN.PL, be.PRS only
            situac-ii.
            situation.F-NOM.PL
            'There are no problems in the world, there are only situations.'

       c.   V mir-e   jest'   tol'ko dv-e beskonečnost-i:
            in world.M-LOC.SG be.PRS only   two-F infinity.F-GEN
            Vselenn-aja   i čelovečesk-aja   glupost'.
            universe.F-NOM and human-F.NOM.SG stupidity.F:NOM
            'There are only two infinities in the world: the Universe and human stupidity.' (paraphrase of Einstein's 'Only two things are infinite...')

I take this restriction to 'world'-locations to mean that the universe-location is present in the syntactic structures of the seemingly bare existential sentences, and is active. I follow the locativist tradition by assuming that existential statements contain a second component besides the existee – the location, which is best understood not as a physical place, but as an abstract *domain*.
Now that we have established that existential constructions involve a location argument besides the existee, the question is where and how to project it. Starting with Freeze (1992), the generative tradition has predominantly treated existential constructions as an instance of locative inversion. In this line of thinking the location argument is constructed as the locative predicate before inverting to a higher structural position:

(12)

```
        Theme   LOC
```

Note that in inversion-based analyses an existential predicate is unnecessary or ruled out. In the analyses reviewed in Chapter 4 a derivation of this type is attributed to existentials in Harves (2003).

On the other hand, a number of opinions has been expressed in the literature (Błaszczak 2008; Hartmann and Milićević 2008) arguing that existential and locative constructions involve different basic structures. One of the inspirational sources for these opinions can be found in the notion of Perspectival Structure developed by Partee and Borschev in a range of works (Borschev and Partee 2002, Partee and Borschev 2008). The authors state that the differences between locative and existential sentences stem from the choice of the *Perspectival Center* – the normally presupposed participant of the situation from whose point of departure the situation is structured (Partee and Borschev 2008: 156). The authors do not explicate the syntactic implementation of their proposal; their provisional hypothesis is that the choice of Perspectival Center follows from the choice of argument structure: a verb with two arguments, Theme and Location, can project its arguments in two different ways, similarly to *spray-load* and *give-send* verbs. This means that if the locative is chosen as the Perspectival Center in existential constructions, there should be a way in the syntax to project the locative in a prominent position, presumably without recourse to inversion. Błaszczak (2008) follows up on the proposals of Partee and Borschev and suggests that existentials, locatives and possessives each involve a different base structure. Błaszczak (2008, 38) assumes that existentials and possessives involve a stative lexical predicate that "describes (denies) the existence of an entity at a particular location". The predicate takes the existee as its internal argument, and the location/possessor as its (non-agentive) external argument, as illustrated in (13-b):

(13)   Błaszczak (2008: 34,36)

    a.   W samochodzie jest silnik.
          in car.LOC   is   motor.NOM
          'There is an engine in the car.'

    b.   *v*P
              ┌────┴────┐
           PP LOC   *v′*
                      ┌───┴───┐
                     v   VP
                          ┌────┴────┐
                          V   NP THEME

I follow the intuitions of Partee and Borschev (2002, 2007) and Błaszczak (2008) and assume that the location element of the existential predicate is projected in a position c-commanding the Theme.[3] In the process of writing I have considered two structural possibilities: one where both the location and the Theme are construed as arguments of the existential predicate (14-a), and the other where the existential statement is a composite structure containing two predicate layers (14-b).

(14)   a.
```
            V∃P
           /   \
         LOC    \
               /   \
              V∃   Theme
```
        b.
```
            LocP
           /    \
         LOC    V∃P
               /   \
              V∃   Theme
```

The dyadic unaccusative structure satisfies the location requirement in a straightforward way. The composite structure is also compatible with the location requirement: the need of the existential predicate for a larger domain is satisfied by the predicate introducing such a domain. The semantic analysis of McNally (1998) is probably compatible with both structures in (14): on the one hand, she develops a '1-place property of properties' analysis of the existential predicate, on the other hand, the existential predicate in her analysis is represented by 'there be' which she treats as an unanalyzed unit, partly in order to simplify the discussion. Note that Partee and Borschev (2007, 8), despite their 'Existence is relative' Principle, do not promote a dyadic unaccusative view of existential predicates – they state that rather than viewing Thing and Location as roles of the verb *byt'*, 'it is undoubtedly better to consider them roles of the *participants of the situation* (or *state*) of existing', which is compatible with the composite structure. The precise argument structure of the existential construction is not of principal importance in this thesis, as long as the location argument is constructed above the Theme. I do not pursue this issue further and adopt the structure in (14-b) for existential constructions.

5.2.2   The structure of the existential *be*-possessive

I assume that the structure that the existential *be*-possessive shares with an existential *be*-sentence is V∃P, containing the existential predicate and the Theme. The domain requirement of the existential predicate is satisfied by the Anchor phrase: all that a V∃ *needs* is a reference domain in the conceptual continuum to

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[3]For locative sentences I assume a small-clause structure, with the Theme projected as the subject and location as the predicate.

which it can be 'pinned', and the *u*-PP satisfies this need by providing a reference point. When an AnchorP introducing the *u*-PP merges to the V∃P, the result is the existential *be*-possessive:

(15) a. U menja jest' mašin-a.
           at I.GEN be.PRS car.F-NOM.SG
           'I have a car.'

      b.

In (15) predicate V∃ asserts the existence of an entity of the designated type – *mašina* 'car'. This state of existence takes place in the domain anchored and c-controlled by the referent of the *u*-PP, which is interpreted as the possessor of the Theme.

The V∃P-layer that the existential *be*-possessive has in common with the existential *be*-sentence is the structural source of the common properties that have been discussed in Chapter 3: the behavior of the verb *byt'* 'be', the negated forms of the predicate and the occurrence of GenNeg. Furthermore, Themes in the existential *be*-possessive have general existential characteristics with regard to the following properties: interpretation of strong quantifiers, qualitative modification and definiteness. Universal quantifiers like *vse* 'all' and deictic determiners like *ètot* 'this' are restricted to the type reading when occurring in the existential possessive:

(16) a. U menja jest' vs-e   *(jego) disk-i.
           at I.GEN be.PRS all-NOM his   disc.M-NOM.PL
           'I have all *(of his) CD-s.'

      b. U menja jest' èt-a   knig-a.
           at I.GEN be.PRS this-F.NOM.SG book.F-NOM.SG
           'I have this book (title).'

The pronoun *jego* 'his' in (16-a) facilitates a type-interpretation by designating the author of the CDs; without the pronoun a type-interpretation would be difficult to attain and the quantifier *vse* 'all' would be interpreted as a universal quantifier over individuals, causing ungrammaticality. The deictic phrase *èta*

kniga 'this book' refers to a book-title, not a particular book.

Qualitative modification of the Theme in the existential *be*-possessive implies a bigger set, as in existentials in general:

(17)   a.   U menja jest'   krasno-je   plat'-je.
              at I.GEN be.PRS red-N.NOM.SG dress.N-NOM.SG
              'I have a red dress.'

        b.   U nas   net   interesnyx   knig.
              at we.GEN NEG.be.PRS interesting-GEN.PL book.F:GEN.PL
              'We don't have interesting books.'/'Among our books there are no interesting ones.'

The use of a qualitatively modified Theme in combination with *jest'* in (17-a) creates a strong implication that the mentioned red dress is not the only dress in the speaker's possession. The same applies to (17-b), where the use of the adjectival modifier presupposes a larger set of books including also non-interesting ones.

Definite Themes, that were discussed earlier in the context of existential *be*-sentences, are also allowed in the existential possessive – the construction then has a meaning of availability, helpfulness:

(18)   a.   U tebja   že   jest'   Len-a.
              at you.GEN EMPH be.PRS Lena-NOM
              'But you have Lena!'   Arutjunova and Širjaev (1983, 24)

        b.   U nee   jest'   ty.
              at she.GEN be.PRS you.NOM
              'She has you.'

According to Arutjunova and Širyaev (1983: 151), names and pronouns in possessive contexts tend to be interpreted relationally: in terms of the role that the given referent plays in someone's microworld (spouse, family) and in terms of the ways this person could be of help to the referent of the *u*-PP. The examples in (18) are possessive parallels to the existential examples with definite nouns in (5). A possible interpretation of (18) is that the referent of the *u*-PP has some particular person to rely on, to love, etc. We have seen in the previous section in example set (5) how definite existees are re-introduced in existential constructions by virtue of a property that is relevant in a given context – the same seems to be happening in (18), where a familiar referent (expressed by the definite possessum) is re-introduced in the existential possessive on the basis of some relevant

property.[4] Note that the other two Russian predicative possessives (to be discussed in Chapter 6) cannot have definite Themes. (19-a) illustrates the *have*-possessive with a definite Theme; (19-b) is an example of the anticausative possessive:

(19) a. *Ja   ime-ju   Petyu.
          I.NOM have:PRS-1SG Petya-ACC.SG
          'I have Petya (to turn to).'
      b. *U menja ime-jet-sja   Petya.
          at I.GEN have:PRS-3SG-REFL Petya-NOM.SG

Whatever account one assumes for the definite Themes in (18), it has to be associated with existentiality, not possession on the whole.

A further argument in favor of assuming an existential statement in the base of the existential *be*-possessive comes from the fact that the verb *suščestvovat'* 'exist' can also occur with *u*-possessors:

(20) a. U aèroport-a   suščestvu-jet bol'š-aja   problem-a
          at airport.M-GEN.SG exist:PRS-3SG big-F.NOM.SG problem.F-NOM.SG
          s   zagruzk-oj   i   vygruzk-oj   passažir-ov.
          with loading.F-INST.SG and unloading.F-INST.SG passenger-GEN.PL
          'The airport has big problems with the loading and unloading of
          passengers.'   (BizavNews, 2007)
      b. U serdc-a   suščestvu-jet svo-j   ritm,
          at heart.N-GEN.SG exist:PRS-3SG REFL-M.NOM.SG rhythm.M:NOM.SG
          smen-a   vol',   svo-jego rod-a dialektik-a
          change.F-NOM.SG will.F:GEN.PL of.sorts   dialectic.F-NOM.SG
          l'ubv-i.
          love.F-GEN
          'A heart has its own rhythm, a change of wills, a love dialectic of
          sorts.'   (Kržižanovskij, 1927)
      c. Oni   xot'   i   živ-ut   v odn-om   dom-e,
          they.NOM although and live:PRS-PL in one-M.LOC.SG house.M-LOC.SG
          no u nego   suščestvu-jet drug-aja   ženščin-a.
          but at he.GEN exist:PRS-3SG another-F.NOM.SG woman-NOM.SG
          'Although they live in one house, he has another woman.' (Pisemskij,
          1877)

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[4]See also the discussion of definite possessums in the context of modal possessive constructions in Chapter 7.

Such examples are attested both in contemporary discourse and in older texts. I assume that the occurrence of the verb *suščestvovat'* with *u*-possessors supports the presence of predicate ∃ in the existential *be*-possessive.

There are also properties in which the existential *be*-possessive and the existential *be*-sentence differ – this is likewise captured by the structures proposed for these two constructions. There are namely at least two types of Themes that behave differently in the two constructions: concept Themes and relational Themes. Concept Themes may occur in existential be-sentences (either bare or with an overt locative argument) in a context of conflicting worldviews:

(21)   a.   Spravedlivost' jest'.
              justice.F:NOM be.PRS
              'There is justice./Justice exists.'

        b.   V mire   jest'   spravedlivost'.
              in world.M-LOC.SG be.PRS justice.F:NOM
              'There is justice in the world.'

        c.   *U menja jest'   spravedlivost'.
              at I.GEN be.PRS justice.F:NOM
              #'I have justice.'

As you can see in (21-c), however, the *be*-possessive does not allow such concept Themes. My explanation of the contrast in (21) is trivial: concept Themes must occur with an implicit or explicit domain argument that means 'the world, universe'. Such type of domains are not available in the possessive structure in (15-b), not even if one assumes a silent adverbial meaning 'the world' embedded in the Anchor phrase, because this *world*-domain would be modified by the *u*-PP and mean something like 'my world'.

Relational Themes have a distribution reverse to that of concept Themes – they cannot appear in bare/locational existential statements, but are grammatical in the possessive:

(22)   a.   U menja jest'   sestr-a.
              at I.GEN be.PRS sister-NOM.SG
              'I have a sister.'

        b.   *Sestra   jest'.
              sister-NOM.SG be.PRS
              'There is sister./Sister exists.'

        c.   *V Moskve   jest'   sestra.
              in Moscow-loc be.PRS sister-NOM.SG
   'There is a sister in Moscow.'

It has been argued that relational nouns like *sestra* 'sister' contain a possessor variable – Partee and Borschev (2001) refer to this variable as the relation variable R. In the existential possessive in (22-a) the possessor element provides an entity to bind the relational variable. Relational nouns introduced in an existential context do not have a contextually defined possessor, and so (22-b) and (22-c) are ungrammatical. The only grammatical interpretation for *sestra* 'sister' in (22-c) is the speaker's sister – the construction then has the same meaning of availability as with definite possessums; this contextually defined referent for the 'possessor' of the sister can be observed in all non-existential contexts where relational nouns are used.

Going further with the properties of the existential *be*-possessive, the base structure proposed in (15-b) is compatible with Jung's (2011) findings on *wh*-extraction possibilities, discussed in section 4.2.3. Recall namely that Jung demonstrates that *wh*-extraction out of the possessor argument is sharply ungrammatical, whereas extraction out of the possessum is relatively acceptable – this allowed Jung to conclude that the possessor must be the 'subject' and the possessum the predicate in the base structure. The structure in (15-b) is different from Jung's PP/DP-small-clause, but the main configuration is still compatible with the *wh*-extraction pattern.

Furthermore, in Chapter 3 we have seen how the existential *be*-possessive fares with regard to Keenan's (1976) presupposed reference test: the *u*-PP clearly comes out as the element with the more stable reference, whereas the reference of the Theme can be suspended under negation, questioning and conditionalization. Besides the structural implications about subjecthood, these results find an additional account in (15-b): the *u*-PP serves as the reference point for the rest of the structure and is thus endowed with a stable reference at the conceptual level. The reference of the Theme can be easily suspended due to its {e,t}-type, i.e. the fact that it does not refer to a specific entity. The *u*-PP in the existential *be*-possessive can undergo movement to the subject position (that in the traditional Minimalist view is SpecTP) and there is no need for a preliminary re-ordering of structure that some of the analyses reviewed in Chapter 4 have to resort to.

(23)

TP
├ (LowFocP)
│ ├ PP
│ │ └ *u menja*
│ └ AnchorP
│   ├ Anchor
│   └ V∃P
│   ├ V∃
│   └ NP
│   └ *mašina*

In the representation in (23) I also indicate that the proposed structure is compatible with the LowFocus projection of Erechko (2002), discussed in Jung (2011). Crucially, the derivation does not depend on the presence of this projection: remember that in Jung (2011) the possessum must move to LowFocP in order to enable remnant movement of the PP/DP to the subject position. In (23) the *u*-PP is a constituent to the exclusion of the Theme, such that no possessum-evacuation is necessary for the *u*-PP to be able to move to a higher position; both the possessor and the possessum may move to the Low Focus position on their own. The relation between the Tense head and its dependent is spelled out on the existential predicate that takes on different tense-forms of the verb *byt'* 'be'. In the negated *be*-possessive the derivation is minimally different from what is shown in (15-b), here the *u*-PP serves as a reference point for the negated existential statement:

(24)

TP
└ T'
   ├ T ──→ AnchorP
   └ AnchorP
      ├ PP
      │ └ *u menja*
      └ Anchor
         └ NegP
            ├ Neg ──→ V∃P
            └ V∃P
               ├ V∃
               └ NP
                  └ *mašina*

NegP in (24) acts as sentential negation and takes the V∃P as its dependent.[5] The dependency with Neg is spelled out on the predicate V∃ as a negated form of *byt'*. For the form *net* I assume a continuous spell-out of elements: the sequence Neg-V∃ is spelled out as *net*.[6] The dependency between Neg and its sister phrase also finds an expression on the Theme NP as GenNeg.

In Chapter 3 we have seen that the *u*-PP in the existential *be*-possessive binds reflexives within the possessum and in the rest of the clause. The structure proposed for the existential *be*-possessive is compatible with several theoretical models of binding. The position of the *u*-PP in SpecTP satisfies the mainstream subject-oriented model. According to the derivational model of binding represented by Williams (2006) and Bailyn (2009), the configuration relevant for Principle A must be established before *v*P – in the structure in (23) the relevant binding configuration is established at the level of AnchorP. Zwart (2006a) presents binding as a realization of the dependency between the controller and the dependent XPs: in (23) the *u*-PP is the controller of the phrase containing the possessum, at every stage of the derivation. The PP layer of the *u*-phrase does not form a barrier for c-command relations – this is an assumption made in all analyses of the *be*-possessive and that I also allow myself to resort to. Yadroff (1999) and Franks and Yadroff (2002) show that functional prepositions (that contain preposition *u* 'at' among their ranks) in general do not create opaque domains for the purposes of c-command.

In Chapter 3 I also discussed PRO-diagnostics applied to *be*-possessives – I observed that in none of the *be*-possessives can the Nominative possessum be substituted by PRO. For the existential *be*-possessive this may on the one hand be accounted for in terms of structure: the Nominative Theme never gets to raise to SpecTP, where PROs are supposed to be, according to some models of control (Landau 2000). On the other hand, substitution by PRO may also fail due to the category/type status of the Theme: PROs must be entities of type {e}, whereas in the existential *be*-possessive the Theme is of type {e,t}.

This concludes my proposal for the existential *be*-possessive. In the next section I extend the analysis to the copular (temporary) *be*-possessives.

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[5]I assume that constituent negation is also constructed with the help of NegP, the difference is the structural level at which the negation element is merged.

[6]I follow Šimík (2011) in this assumption; the continuity requirement on the spell-out of *net* becomes relevant in the context of modal existential constructions that are argued to include the existential predicate but do not display the *net*-form. The negation particle in these constructions seems to be encliticized to the *wh*-element. See Šimík (2011) for details.

5.3 Copular *be*-possessives

As described in Chapter 3, there is a subset of *be*-possessives that employ the copular frame. Copular possessives have not enjoyed as much attention as the existential possessive – as a result, less research has been done in this area, fewer properties registered, and the constructions have been lumped together into one group. In Chapter 3 we have seen that the copular *be*-possessives do not constitute a homogeneous group – there are at least two construction types:

(25) a. M'ač   u Aršavin-a.
          ball.M:NOM.SG at Aršavin-GEN.SG
          'Aršavin has the ball.' (football commentary)
      b. U Vani   krasiv-yje   glaz-a.
          at Vanja-gen beautiful-nom.pl eye.m-nom.pl
   'Vanja has beautiful eyes.'

I refer to (25-a) as the copular temporary *be*-possessive: here an object is claimed to be in someone's temporary possession and the neutral order of these constructions involves a definite sentence-initial possessum. (25-b) illustrates the copular property *be*-possessive, with a sentence-initial *u*-PP and a property-type possessum. These constructions share the following characteristics with copular *be*-sentences: the form of *byt'* 'be' in the present tense is null, and the Nominative argument does not participate in the GenNeg alternation under negation.

In Chapter 4 we have seen that copular possessives are problematic for the existing analyses that try to derive all types of *be*-possessives from one underlying structure. At the moment I cannot offer much insight into the nature of copular *be*-possessives, as they have not been in the center of my research for a long time (like many others before, I concentrated on the existential *be*-possessive). Still, I believe that the proposal put forth in this section has the potential of deriving the properties of the copular *be*-possessives. I discuss each type of the copular possessives in a separate section.

5.3.1 Copular temporary *be*-possessives

In this subsection I discuss copular temporary *be*-possessives for which I posit the structure in (26-b):

(26) a. M'ač   u Aršavin-a.
          ball.M:NOM.SG at Aršavin-GEN.SG
          'Aršavin has the ball.' (football commentary)

b.

```
                    TP
              ┌──────┴──────┐
            DP_i            T′
             │         ┌────┴────┐
           m'ač        T         SC
                             ┌────┴────┐
                            t_i       Pred′
                                 ┌─────┴─────┐
                               Pred       AnchorP
                                       ┌─────┴─────┐
                                      PP        Anchor
                                       │
                                      u A
```

The structure in (26) is a small-clause configuration, similar to what is assumed to be the structure for *be*-sentences with NP/AP predicates. The Anchor phrase introducing the *u*-PP is the predicate of the small clause. The subject of the small clause is a DP that receives the interpretation of a possessum. The possession relation is interpreted as temporary due to the low position of the Anchor phrase: it is presumably the failure of the *u*-PP to c-control the phrase containing the possessum that results in a non-canonical (in the typological sense) temporary possession interpretation.

I assume that the possessum in the copular temporary be-possessive is an {e}-type DP – this is supported by the absolute interpretation of strong quantifiers:

(27) a. Vs-e   den'g-i   u Ann-y.
          all-NOM money-NOM at Anna-GEN
          'Anna has all the money.'

      b. Èt-a   knig-a   u Ann-y.
          this-F.NOM.SG book.F.NOM.SG   at Anna-GEN
          'Anna has this book (at the moment).'

The Nominative noun phrases in (27) refer to particular entities, i.e. they receive an absolute interpretation. As discussed in section 5.2.1, McNally (1992) assumes that the absolute interpretation of universal quantifiers and determiners indicates the {e}-type of the argument – it is namely an individual or a particular, in McNally's terminology.[7] In keeping with my position on category-type correspondence, I claim that the {e}-type definite possessum in temporary copular possessives is a DP syntactically.

---

[7]Cf. (27) with the existential *be*-possessive in (16), where only a type reading of the Theme is allowed.

The head of the small clause Pred has a null form in the present tense, but is spelled out as the forms of *byt'* 'be' in the past and future tenses. In Chapter 3 I discuss certain conditions that license the occurrence of *jest'* in copular *be*-sentences, namely after emphatic *i* and in tense coordination. In the temporary *be*-possessive *jest'* seems to be possible following emphatic *i*, as illustrated in (28-b), which is uttered in response to (28-a):

(28)　　a.　Ja　　　duma-l,　　　čto　mašin-a　　　u　Pet-i.
　　　　　　　I.NOM　think-PST:M.SG　that　car.F-NOM.SG　at　Petya-GEN
　　　　　　　'I thought that Petya has the car.'

　　　　　b.　?Ona　　　i　　jest'　u　Pet-i.
　　　　　　　she.NOM　and　be.PRS　at　Petya-GEN
　　　　　　　'Petya does have it.'　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(my examples)

The possibility of *jest'* in the emphatic environment in (28) is in line with what happens in copular *be*-sentences (see example set (31) in Chapter 3). I do not provide a mechanism for the spell-out of *jest'* after the emphatic *i*, but simply assume that both in copular temporary *be*-possessives and predicational *be*-sentences it is Pred that can be spelled out as *jest'* when properly licensed. As is the case for copular *be*-sentences, the occurrence of *jest'* after emphatic *i* is not accompanied by the occurrence of *net* under similar circumstances:

(29)　　a.　?Mašina　　　segodnja　ne　dolžna　　byt'　　u　Peti.
　　　　　　　car.F-NOM.SG　today　　NEG　must-F.SG　be-INF　at　Petya-GEN
　　　　　　　'Petya should not have the car today. (It is not his turn.)'

　　　　　b.　*Ee　　　i　　net　　　u　Pet-i.
　　　　　　　she.GEN　and　NEG.be.PRS　at　Petya-GEN
　　　　　　　'Petya *doesn't* have it.'　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(my examples)

　　　　　c.　Ona　　　i　　ne　u　Pet-i.
　　　　　　　she.NOM　and　NEG　at　Petya-GEN
　　　　　　　'Petya *doesn't* have it.'

Given that *net* (in contrast to *jest'*) is only sensitive to the presence of V∃, the ungrammaticality of (29-b) is expected. Tense coordination with *jest'* does not seem to be possible with temporary possessives, in contrast to what is observed in copular *be*-sentences:

(30)　　a.　*Mašin-a　　　byl-a,　　　　　jest'　i　bud-et　　u
　　　　　　　car.F-NOM.SG　be.PST-F.NOM.SG　be.PRS　and　be.FUT-3SG　at
　　　　　　　Pet-i.
　　　　　　　Petya-GEN

'Petya had, has and will have the car.' (my example)

b. Rossi-ja   byl-a,   jest' i   bud-et   velik-oj
   Russia-NOM be.PST-F.SG be.PRS and be.FUT-3SG great-F.INST.SG
   stran-oj.
   country.F-INST.SG
   'Russia has been, is and will be a great country.'

I assume that the explanation lies in the meaning: namely, in (30-a) the meaning of temporary possession clashes with the intended meaning of tense coordination that emphasizes the enduring nature of a relation over time.

The possessum DP raises from its base position in the small clause to SpecTP to become the subject of the clause. Speaking in terms of Borschev and Partee (1998), the possessum in copular temporary possessives is constructed as the Perspectival Center, reflected by its prominent position in the base structure in (26-b). From its position in SpecTP, the possessum DP can to some degree bind possessive reflexives within the possessor phrase. Examples are not as readily available as with the existential *be*-possessive, but can be constructed:

(31)   a. ?Vaš-e   pis'm-o   u svo-jego
          your-N.NOM.SG letter.N-NOM.SG at POSS.REFL-M.GEN.SG
          adresat-a.
          addressee.M-GEN.SG
          'Your letter is in its adressee's possession.'

       b. ?Mašin-a   u svo-jego   vladel'c-a.
          car.F-NOM.SG at POSS.REFL-M.GEN.SG owner.M-GEN.SG
          'The car is in its owner's disposal.' (my examples)

The opposite binding relation, the *u*-PP binding into the possessum, is ungrammatical:

(32)   a. Mo-je/*svo-je   pis'm-o   u menja.
          my-N.NOM.SG/REFL-N.NOM.SG letter.N-NOM.SG at I.GEN
          'I have my letter.' (I have not yet posted it, or have repossessed it.)

       b. *Jego/*Svo-ja   mašin-a   u Ivan-a.
          REFL-F.NOM.SG car.F-NOM.SG at Ivan-GEN
          'His car is at Ivan's disposal./ Ivan has his car (at the moment).' (my examples)

(32-a) shows that a 1st person possessive pronominal is the preferred option, whereas the possessive reflexive *svoj* does not have the intended bound reading. In (32-b) neither the possessive pronominal nor the possessive reflexive are

grammatical; see Bailyn (2004a) for an analysis of examples like (32-b) as a Principle B violation. I do not go into the discussion of binding characteristics of possessive pronominals in Russian (1st/2nd person as opposed to 3rd person pronominals) – the examples with the possessive pronominals are presented merely for the reader's interest. What is relevant for our discussion at the moment is the contrast in grammaticality of the reflexive in (31) and (32) that supports the structure posited for this copular possessive in (26-b). Before we leave the area of reflexives, I would like to point to one peculiarity of examples in (31): in order for the reflexive to be possible, the possessor must be expressed by some relational term, such as 'adressee', 'owner'. A noun that cannot be immediately interpreted relationally (e.g. 'boy') would not be grammatical with a possessive reflexive:

(33)   *Pis'm-o   u svo-jego   mal'čik-a.
        letter.N-NOM.SG at POSS.REFL-GEN.SG boy-GEN.SG
        #'Its boy has the letter.'

I treat the contrast in (31) and (33) in the following way. The possessive reflexive *svoj* requires a possessor-possessum configuration opposite to the one in the copular temporary possessive: while in the temporary *be*-possessive the possessum c-commands the possessor, according to the structure in (26-b), the reflexive *svoj* is supposed to modify the possessum and be bound by a c-commanding (or arbitrary) possessor. So, in (33) the structure of the temporary *be*-possessive requires an interpretation where *pis'mo* 'letter' is the possessum and the boy is the possessor, whereas the possessive reflexive pushes for the opposite interpretation, which results in a clash. Relational nouns help to avoid the clash in some way, e.g. via the relation variable R – the semantic possessor argument that according to Partee and Borschev (2001) is present in relational nouns. In the structure in (34) there are two formal possession relations: one between the DP 'car' and the *u*-PP and the other between the variable R and the NP 'owner'. The possessive reflexive *svoj* participates in the second possession relation and is bound by the variable R.[8]

---

[8]The variable R, in its turn, is bound by the DP 'car'.

(34)

```
                    TP
                  /    \
         DP_i(Psm1)     SC
            |          /   \
           car       t_i   Pred'
                          /    \
                       Pred    AnchorP
                              /       \
                        PP(Psr1)      Anchor
                        /    \
                       u     DP
                            /   \
                      R(Psr2)    \
                          |    refl   Psm2
                                       |
                                     owner
```

Simple, non-relational nouns do not contain a relation variable and as a consequence cannot resort to the escape hatch proposed in (34).

The assumed {e}-type of the definite possessum in the copular temporary *be*-possessive is compatible with how the construction behaves with regard to the Genitive of Negation and the presupposed reference test. In Chapter 3 I assume that GenNeg is a case that occurs on {e, t}-type Themes under negation of the predicate. The Nominative possessum in this *be*-possessive is neither a Theme, nor of {e, t}-type, so GenNeg is not expected. As for the presupposition of reference, in Chapter 3 we have seen that the reference of both the possessum and the possessor in the copular temporary *be*-possessive is stable:

(35) a. Kovyor-samolyot   ne   u fe-i.
          carpet.M:NOM.SG-plane.M:NOM.SG NEG at fairy.F-GEN.SG
          'The fairy doesn't have the flying carpet (at the moment).'

      b. Kovyor-samolyot   u fe-i?
          carpet.M:NOM.SG-plane.M:NOM.SG at fairy.F-GEN.SG
          'Does the fairy have the flying carpet (at the moment).'

      c. #Fej   ne   byv-ajet.
          fairy.F:GEN.PL NEG be.IMPF-3SG
          'Fairies don't exist.'

      d. #Kovr-ov-samolyot-ov   ne   byv-ajet.
          carpet.M:GEN.PL-plane.M:GEN.PL NEG be.IMPF-3SG
          'There are no flying carpets.'

Negation in (35-a) and questioning in (35-b) cannot suspend the reference of either argument, as it is not possible to continue either of the sentences with either (35-c) or (35-d). This is presumably due to the fact that the possessum DP is of the {e}-type and is in the subject position; the *u*-possessor has a stable reference due to its role as the Anchor element.

While yielding more or less adequate results for GenNeg and presupposition of reference, the {e}-type and the subject status of the possessum predict substitution by PRO to be possible in the copular temporary possessive, contrary to what is observed:

(36) *Vaš-e   pis'm-o   planiru-jet byt'   u sekretar'-a.
      your-N.NOM.SG letter.N-NOM.SG plan-3SG   be.INF at secretary.M-GEN.SG
      '#Your letter plans to be had by the secretary.'

In Chapter 3 I ascribed the failure of the possessum in the copular temporary *be*-possessive to be substituted by PRO to the absence of volition on the part of the possessum. This seems to be the only relevant explanation, taking into account the fact that copular *be*-sentences with AP/NP predicates that are structurally similar to copular possessives, allow PRO-substitution and involve volitional subjects.[9] The configuration in (36) is ungrammatical because it imposes a characteristic of volition on an inanimate entity.

5.3.2   Copular property *be*-possessives

Copular property *be*-possessives receive an analysis different from the one presented in the previous subsection. I include the word 'property' into the name of these possessives because I assume the possessum to be of the {e, t}-type; the type of the possessum is established by the behavior of strong quantifiers:

(37) *U mal'čik-a   byl-i   sery-je   ob-a   glaz-a.
      at boy-GEN.SG be.PST-PL grey-NOM.PL both-M.NOM.PL eye.M-GEN.SG
      #'The boy had grey both eyes.'

I interpret the ungrammaticality of strong quantifiers in (37) as an indication of the {e, t}-type of the possessum *glaza* 'eyes'. On a more descriptive level, the possessum in these *be*-possessives can often be interpreted as characterizing a property of the referent of the *u*-PP: (38-a) says that the boy is grey-eyed. By category-type correspondence I adhere to in this thesis, an {e, t}-type nominal is

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[9]See the relevant examples of controlled *be*-sentences in section 3.4.2.

posited to be an NP. I propose the following structure for the copular property *be*-possessive:

(38) a. U mal'čik-a   byl-i   sery-je   glaz-a.
          at boy-GEN.SG be.PST-PL grey-NOM.PL eye.M-NOM.PL
          'The boy had grey eyes.'   Arutjunova and Širyaev (1983: 13)

    b.

```
              TP
             /  \
            T    AnchorP
                /    \
              PP      NP
              |      /  \
            u-PP   AP    NP
                   |     |
                 sery-je glaza
```

In (38-b) AnchorP is merged to an NP (the possessum) and the NP is a property that is predicated of the *u*-PP.[10] In Russian, bare nominal phrases can constitute the whole proposition, as illustrated in (39):

(39) a. Vesn-a.
          spring.F-NOM.SG
          'It is spring.'

    b. Na ulic-e   xoroš-aja   pogod-a.
          on street.F-LOC.SG good-F-NOM.SG weather.F-NOM.SG
          'It's good weather outside.'

The nominals can occur on their own, as in (39-a), or with a temporal/locative element, as in (39-b). The nominal can be bare, as in (39-a), or modified, as in (39-b). Given that a bare NP structure can be assumed for the propositions in (39), it is thinkable that this option would be available for *be*-possessives as well. A nominal proposition can be situated in time, thus it is expected that the Tense projection can be merged to the base structure in (38-b); the *u*-PP, as the highest element, would move to the subject SpecTP position. It is the Tense head that is spelled out by the future and past forms of *byt'* 'be'.

I can offer two pieces of indirect evidence to support the structure proposed in (38-b). Copular property *be*-possessives, in contrast to copular temporary possessives, do not allow *jest'* after emphatic *i* – observe (40-b) that is uttered in response to (40-a) and is supposed to provide a licensing environment for copular

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[10]The structure in (38-b) is reminiscent of what Jung (2011) proposes for all types of possessives: the *u*-PP and the NP are projected in a nominal small clause. (38-b) differs from Jung's structure with regard to the constituency of the *u*-PP that I assume in my analysis.

jest':

(40) a. Net, ja   xoč-u   kukl-u   s   sin-imi
          no, I.NOM want:PRS-1SG doll.F-ACC.SG with blue-INST.PL
          glaz-ami.
          eye.M-INST.PL
          'No, I want a doll with blue eyes.'

      b. *U nee   i   jest' sini-je   glaz-a.
          at she.GEN and be.PRS blue-NOM.PL eye.M-NOM.PL
          'Her eyes *are* blue.'   (my examples)

Earlier I assumed that emphatic *jest'* in copular environments is the spell-out of
the Pred head – according to the structure in (38-b), there is no Pred in copular
property possessives and a sentence like (40-a) is not expected to be grammatical.
On the other hand, copular property possessives allow *jest'* in tense coordination:

(41) a. U nee   byl-a   i   jest' bezošibočn-aja
          at she.GEN be.PST-F.SG and be.PRS flawless-F.NOM.SG
          intuici-ja   v tom,   čto   kasa-jet-sja
          intuition.F-NOM.SG in that.LOC what.NOM concern-PRS.3SG-REFL
          stil'-a.
          style.M-GEN.SG
          'She had and still has a flawless intuition about things concerning
          style.'

      b. U menja byl   (i   jest') absol'utno spokojn-yj
          at I.GEN be.PST:M.SG and be.PRS absolutely calm-M.NOM.SG
          reb'onok.
          child.M:NOM.SG
          'My child was (and is) absolutely calm.'

I assume that tense coordination is a coordination of TP-phrases (with ellipsis of
identical material) and that the verb *byt'* 'be' can spell out the T element. It is
then expected that tense coordination is possible in copular property possessives.
The second piece of indirect evidence comes from long and short adjectives. As
you can see in (42), only long adjectives are allowed in this possessive:

(42) U nee   gusty-je/*gust-y   volos-y.
      at she.GEN thick.L.ADJ-NOM.PL/thick.S.ADJ-PL hair-NOM.PL
      'She has thick hair.'

Babby (2010) argues that the two adjectival forms in Russian have different
syntactic structures: the short adjective is a small-clause predicate, whereas the

long adjective is an adjunct secondary predicate. I assume that the long adjective can occur in this possessive because it can be constructed as an attributive NP modifier. The short adjective, however, must be constructed as a small-clause predicate, and there is no place in the structure of (38-b) to accommodate this requirement.

The compact structure of the copular temporary *be*-possessive has consequences for binding patterns. In Chapter 3 we observed that this *be*-possessive does not display reflexive binding:

(43) *U nego   svo-i   sery-je   glaz-a.
        at he.GEN POSS.REFL-NOM.PL gray-NOM.PL eye.M-NOM.PL
        '#He has his own gray eyes./His own eyes are gray.'

Although (38-b) provides a necessary c-command configuration, the reflexive *svoi* in (43) is ungrammatical. I ascribe this ungrammaticality to the circumstance that the Anchor projection (together with the *u*-PP) competes with the possessive reflexive for the position, i.e. the two are in complementary distribution. Such direct dependence of the possessum NP on the *u*-PP for its reference also has consequences for the presupposed reference test. (44) suggests that both the *u*-PP and the possessum NP in copular property *be*-possessives have a stable reference:

(44) a. U fe-i   ne zelyon-yj   xvost.
          at fairy.F-GEN.SG NEG green-M.NOM.SG tail.M:NOM.SG
          'The fairy doesn't have a green tail.'
      b. U fe-i   zelyon-yj   xvost?
          at fairy.F-GEN.SG green-M.NOM.SG tail.M:NOM.SG
          'Does the fairy have a green tail?'
      c. #Fej   ne byv-ajet.
          fairy.F:GEN.PL NEG be.IMPF-3SG
          'Fairies don't exist.'
      d. #U nee   net   xvost-a.
          at she.GEN NEG.BE.PRS tail.M-GEN.SG
          'She doesn't have a tail.'

Negation in (44-a) and questioning in (44-b) are an attempt to suspend the reference of one of the arguments – however, it is not possible to reply to either sentence with either (44-c) or (44-d). I assume that the possessum NP has a stable reference as a consequence of its referential dependence on the *u*-possessor which serves as the Anchor element for the whole construction.

In Chapter 3 we also observed that copular property *be*-possessives do not appear in control configurations, and hypothetical examples are harder to construct than

it was the case for other *be*-possessives. This is more or less expected in my analysis as the structure in (38-b) does not provide a ground for a control configuration. First, there is no predication layer that could host PRO, and second, the Nominative NP is of the {e, t}-type, whereas PROs should be of the {e}-type.

When it comes to the Genitive of Negation, it seems that the structure proposed in (38-b) incorrectly predicts the occurrence of this case in copular property *be*-possessives: the Nominative possessum is of the {e, t}-type and it merges with a lexical predicate (Anchor). The only explanation I can offer at this point consists in hypothesizing that the Anchor predicate cannot be negated: it is a predicate that irreversibly connects two entities in a possession relation. Negation in copular property *be*-possessives is usually of the constituent type, here are examples from Chvany (1975) mentioned earlier:

(45)   a.   U Ivan-a   nekrasiv-yje glaz-a.
            at Ivan-GEN ugly-NOM.PL eye.M-NOM.PL
            'Ivan has ugly eyes.'

          b.   U Ivan-a   ne očen' krasiv-yje   glaz-a.
            at Ivan-GEN NEG very pretty-NOM.PL eye.M-NOM.PL
            'Ivan hasn't very pretty eyes.'   Chvany (1975: 268)

Even though the presence of the adverb *očen'* in (45-b) is supposed to show that the negation particle *ne* is not a lexical part of the adjective (in (45-a) the negation particle is written together with *krasivye* and the whole word means 'ugly'), *ne* in (45-b) is still constituent negation – this is the closest a copular temporary *be*-possessive comes to a negated variant (see the discussion of affirmative-negative sentential pairings in section 3.3).

A structure similar to (38-b) can also be applied to event-possessives as in (46):

(46)   a.   U nas   sobrani-je.
            at we.GEN meeting.N-NOM.SG
            'We are having a meeting.'

          b.   U menja gripp.
            at I.GEN flu.M:NOM
            'I have flu.'

The possessum in these constructions is an event in which the referent of the *u*-PP participates. It is possible to assume that the structure of event-nominals is bigger than that of usual NPs, e.g. *n*P:

(47)

AnchorP
PP   *n*P
Participant

Research on nominals has posited comprehensive internal structures with different positions for various arguments (Adger 2003; Procházková 2006). The participant argument in (47) can be situated in Spec*n*P if it is an agent, or projected as a complement of N, if it is a patient, etc. The *u*-PP can become associated with this participant variable through binding.

5.4   Chapter summary

In this chapter I have proposed a range of different structural configurations for constructions that have been referred to as *be*-possessives in the literature. One underlying structure would perhaps be the preferable theoretical option in principle – but at present this option unfortunately faces overly complicated and sometimes disfunctional derivations. Moreover, I have shown that what is referred to collectively as '*be*-possessives' is not a homogeneous group; not only is there the well-known existential-copular distinction, but also among the copular *be*-possessives predication relations are not formed in the same manner. I thus invite the contemporary generativist to consider a theory with many underlying structures. This may to some extent mean going back to the insights of the transformational era – except that now we have better tools and hopefully more knowledge.

Considerable attention in the chapter has been granted to the existential *be*-possessive – this is a reflection of how much has already been written about this construction: there are many theoretical statements that must be supported or disproved. An analysis of the existential *be*-possessive requires that one take a particular standpoint with regard to the existential construction, which is a huge topic by itself.

In this chapter I try either to derive the properties of *be*-possessives (such as reflexive binding, substitution by PRO) or make the analysis compatible with some properties, without providing a principled explanation for them (such as the occurrence of *jest'* in copular *be*-possessives).

One of the benefits provided by this analysis of *be*-possessives is the flexibility with regard to the properties of these constructions. In Chapter 4 I discussed how the negated copular temporary possessives are problematic for analyses like

Chvany (1975) and Harves (2003). The absence of GenNeg and non-occurrence of *net* in copular *be*-possessives is expected in my analysis. I assume that GenNeg is a case that occurs on $\{e,t\}$-type Themes under negation, and *net* is a conflation of the negation particle with V∃ (that occurs in the present tense); the structures proposed for the copular possessives do not satisfy these requirements in one way or another, which results in the ungrammaticality of *net* and GenNeg. In Chapters 6 and 7 I go beyond the area of *be*-possessives and apply the Anchor projection to more structural configurations.

In what ways can my analysis be considered compatible with the dynamic syntax approach? I restrict possessor semantics to a local configuration: the possessor element is introduced by the Anchor predicate. I demonstrate that AnchorP can in principle be merged in any position – to pacify a more traditional linguist, let me point out that the analysis does not go against the UTAH by proposing different merging sites for the possessor projection: as long as the possessor argument is introduced in the local configuration with its predicate, the UTAH is satisfied. With several possible merging sites of the Anchor phrase, the possessum element is also determined dynamically: it is the sister phrase of the Anchor predicate, which may be a variety of phrases, depending on what kind of construction we are looking at. In copular property possessives the possessum is the NP merged with AnchorP. In the existential possessive the 'possessum' is the existential statement – V∃P containing an entity that is interpreted as possessum. In copular temporary possessives AnchorP is the 'old' element to which a new element merges – this creates a dependency relation different from what is observed in the other two types of possessives.

Seen in this light, the semantic types of possession discussed in Chapter 2 are a product of structure as much as the nature of the phrase that merges with the Anchor phrase, the possessum element.

In the next chapter I discuss the Russian *have*-possessive and propose an analysis that does not involve the Anchor predicate; the latter does find an application when it comes to the anticausative possessive.

Chapter 6

Have-possessives

The chapter presents my view on the *have*-possessives in Russian – the *have*-possessive proper in (1-a) and the anticausative possessive that employs a reflexive *have*-form, (1-b):

(1)   a.   Ja   ime-ju   mašin-u.
           I.NOM have-1SG car.F-ACC.SG
           'I have a car.'
      b.   U menja ime-et-sja   mašin-a.
           at I.GEN   have-3SG-REFL car.F-NOM.SG
           'I have a car.'

These constructions were introduced in Chapter 2 and are described as two other means of encoding predicative possession in Russian, besides *be*-possessives. In Chapter 2 I argued that there are no typological or cognitive reasons to assign one underlying structure to different predicative possessive constructions, in contrast to what is commonly believed. Theoretically, differentiation of structures is also beneficial; moreover, formal objections to head-incorporation analyses of 'have' have already been raised in the literature. Ultimately, I propose that the Russian *have*-possessives should have a structure distinct from that of *be*-possessives.

## 6.1   The typological, cognitive and formal discussion

In the generative tradition of the last five decades a very popular approach has been to posit one underlying structure for all types of predicative possessives. According to Belvin and Dikken (1997: 154), the unification research tradition was

inaugurated by Benveniste (1966), who stated that *have* was simply *be* and a preposition inverted.[1] The statement referred to examples like (2), where the choice of *have* or *be*+P correlates with the different ordering of the possessor and possessum arguments:

(2) a. Marie a   la   fleur.
         Marie has ART flower
         'Marie has a flower.'

     b. La   fleur est à   Marie.
         ART flower is   PREP Marie
         'Marie has the flower.'   Dyakonova (2007: 23)

The main milestone of unification was set in Freeze (1992) who proposes one underlying structure for all predicative possessives (or *have*-predications, using Freeze's term), including them into the universal locative paradigm. As discussed in Chapter 4, Freeze proposes the following common underlying structure for locatives, existentials and possessives:

(3)

```
        IP
       /\
         I'
        / \
       I   PP
          /  \
        NP    P'
       kniga / \
       sestra P  NP
             na  |
             u  stole
               menja
```

The possessor argument is argued to always originate as the locative predicate of a PP small clause. The structure in (3) is posited as the underlying representation for locational possessives and *have*-possessives, and the surface differences are attributed to different derivations: in particular, P-to-BE incorporation is supposed to yield a *have*-verb. This proposal spawned numerous analyses attempting to connect *have* and *be* derivationally – represented, first of all, by Kayne (1993) and Den Dikken (1995); in Chapter 4 I discussed the treatments of the Russian *be*-possessives that are based on these two analyses.

Freeze (1992) supports his claims by typological observations, namely that cross-linguistically predicative possessives are expressed either through the

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[1]'... *avoir* n'est rien autre qu'un *être-à* inversé' Benveniste (1966: 197), cited from Belvin and Den Dikken (1997: 154).

locational strategy or through the *have*-strategy. In Chapter 2 I describe the typological picture of predicative possession and show that it is more complex than presented by Freeze. In fact, already Heine (1997: 215-222) criticizes the selectivity and misrepresentation of Freeze's typological sample: on the one hand, mainly constructions of the Locational possessive type are chosen; on the other hand, non-Locational possessive types are represented as Locational. Heine states the following in particular:

(4)   'treatments of the kind presented by Freeze (1992) or Kayne (1993) also
         ignore the fact that possessive constructions derive from a small range of
         quite different conceptual sources. Any attempts at reducing these sources
         to one, be that within a diachronic or a synchronic framework, are likely to
         result in an inadequate analysis.'   (Heine 1997: 222)

Heine's critique has largely gone unnoticed in generative research: analyses as recent as Jung (2011) still assume Freeze's typology of possession.

Coming back to the types of possessives presented in Chapter 2, the Topic possessive and the *with*-possessive are problematic for Freeze-inspired analyses. Remember that in the Topic possessive both the possessor and the possessum are non-oblique (the construction has also been referred to as a 'double subject construction') and a copular predicate is used:

(5)   Navajo
        Baa' bi-dibé   da-hólǫ.
        Baa' his-sheep 3PL-exist
        'Baa' has sheep.'   Stassen (2009: 61)

The P head assumed by Freeze (1992) does not appear either on the possessor or in the predicate. Freeze (1992) is indeed aware of possessives that employ a copular predicate and a non-prepositional possessor, but he writes them off as an idiosyncrasy of human possessors, cf. Freeze's (1992:585) discussion of Tagalog examples. However, as shown by Stassen (2009) Topic possessives constitute one of the four major strategies of encoding predicative possession and there are languages where the 'double subject' pattern is consistent with no regard to whether the possessor is human or not.

With-possessives present an even bigger challenge for Freeze (1992), as here it is the possessum argument that is oblique, whereas the possessor comes in an unmarked case:

(6) Tshiluba
     Mu-kalenge u-di   ne   ba-pika.
     CLASS-chief 3SG-be with slaves
     'The chief has slaves.'   Stassen (2009: 57)

A derivation departing from an underlying stage containing an oblique possessor
and arriving at a surface stage with an oblique possessum instead would be quite
complex, I surmise, and what is more important – empirically unmotivated and
theoretically forced.

Freeze's unifying analysis of possession is thus not motivated typologically.
Furthermore, Freeze (1992) and the analyses it brought about, such as Kayne
(1993) and Den Dikken (1995), have been subject to formal criticism in the
generative forum, especially with regard to P-movement.

Błaszczak (2007a, 2008) provides a range of critical comments on Freeze (1992).[2]
First of all, there is the issue of double case-marking. The possessor NP is
expected to be case-marked by P before P moves to incorporate into BE; then, on
top of the lexically assigned case, the possessor NP is assigned Nominative in
SpecTP. Second, Błaszczak (2008) points out that Freeze makes wrong predictions
on the possible possessive construction patterns. In particular, the 'PP HAVE
NP' pattern is ruled out in Freeze's analysis – but the pattern is actually attested
in some Slavic languages:

(7) Błaszczak (2007a)

     a. W samochodzie nie   ma silnik-a.
         in car.LOC   NEG has motor-GEN
         'There is no engine in the car.'   (Polish)

     b. Na stol-u   ima sir-a.
         on table-LOC has cheese-GEN
         'There is (some) cheese on the table.'   (Croatian)

     c. U Petr-a   nemaje mašin-y.
         at Peter-GEN NEG.has car-GEN
         'Peter has no car.'   (Ukranian)

In (7) a *have*-form is attested together with a PP: a locative PP in (7-a) and (7-b),
and a possessor PP in (7-c). If *have* is supposed to be derived by the incorporation
of a preposition into *be*, it is not clear where the *have*-forms in (7) come from.

Finally, Błaszczak questions the syntactic motivation for P-to-BE incorporation.
In the minimalist framework where movement must be triggered by

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[2]I discuss Błaszczak's criticism of Freeze's treatment of existentials and locatives in Chapter 4.

uninterpretable features, a P-incorporating *be* would have to have an uninterpretable [P] feature. This would basically mean that we are positing two kinds of BEs (cross-linguistically and within one language): with and without a [P] feature – this, however, would not be different from simply positing two distinct verbs, *have* and *be*.

Kayne (1993) adopts Freeze's head-incorporation proposal in his analysis of possessives (based on Szabolcsi's DP analysis of Hungarian possessives):

(8)

```
                    IP
                   /  \
                       I′
                      /  \
                     /    \
                I_NOM    BeP
                        /   \
                      Be    PP
                           /  \
                          P   AgrP
                             /    \
                          Subj   Agr′
                                /    \
                              Agr    NP
```

In Kayne's analysis a predicative possession construction is an extension of a possessed DP. The possessor argument is projected as the external argument of the nominal small clause and assigned case by the governing P/D. The verb *have* is derived by the incorporation of the P/D head into *be*. Den Dikken (1995, 1997) observes that such incorporation makes it impossible to derive possessive sentences with definite possessums, such as '*I have the car*'. In Chapter 4 we have seen that Jung (2011), who modernizes Kayne's (1993) analysis, expressly argues against a head-incorporation analysis of *have*, stating that this verb is a spell-out of Caseless functional head F.

Den Dikken (1995, 1997) and Belvin and Dikken (1997) present another attempt at perpetuating the incorporation campaign.

(9)   Belvin and Dikken (1997: 154)

    a.   Marc-us   libr-um   habe-t.
           Marcus-NOM book-ACC have-3SG

b.

In (9-b) *have* is derived by a complex incorporation sequence. The phonologically null P must incorporate, in keeping with Baker's (1988) view on incorporation as morphological licensing. Agr, in turn, incorporates into F in order to extend the domain for the movement of the possessor PP.[3] Błaszczak (2008: 33) criticizes this proposal with regard to the status of the domain-extending head-movement in recent minimalist theory. According to Chomsky (2000: 122), 'terms of the same minimal domain are 'equidistant' to probes', which with regard to (9-b) means that the possessum DP and the possessor PP are equidistant from F – the PP can thus freely move to SpecFP. There is no need for domain-extending movements and incorporation of Agr+P into F will not take place. Błaszczak's point can also be applied to Dyakonova (2007), who develops Den Dikken's proposal (see section 4.2.2).

Thus, any existing attempt to derive *have* from *be*+X faces some theoretical and empirical objections. The recent minimalist analyses have realized that a differentiated treatment of *have* and *be* is the preferred option. Błaszczak (2008) posits different base structures for locative *be*-sentences, existential *be*-sentences and *have*-possessives, assuming among other things that *have* is a lexical verb. Even Jung (2011), who assumes that *have* and *be* are spell-outs of one and the same functional head F, differentiates between the two allomorphs by giving them opposing values of the [Case] feature.

A P-to-BE-incorporation analysis of *have* also becomes suspect with regard to grammaticalization patterns described in Stassen (2009). Stassen presents interesting observations on the phenomenon of *have*-drift – a process of reanalysis of a possessive strategy into the *have*-strategy. The possessive strategies that 'feed' into *have*-drift are Topic possessives and *with*-possessives. Locational possessives can never act as a direct source for the *have*-possessive (Stassen 2009, 231) – this observation is quite negative for a Freezian linguist, as there turns out

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[3]Note that it is a 'beheaded' possessor PP that moves (Belvin and Dikken 1997: 155).

to be no broader grammaticalization counterpart for the syntactic derivation of *have* from *be* and a locative preposition. The only way a locational strategy can participate in the process of *have*-drift is through the rare process of first being re-analyzed into a Topic-Locational hybrid where the possessor element is represented twice in the sentence, as the sentential topic and as a locative element. Stassen hypothesizes that this process might have happened in Cornish – the following example set illustrates the three stages of development of the Cornish predicative possessive:

(10)   a.   Gallos a-m   bues.
            power   to-me   be.PRS.2SG
            'I have power.'

        b.   Why   a-s   byth   ancow.
            you.NOM   to-you   be.FUT.3SG   death
            'You will have death.'

        c.   An tekter   a-s-betheugh   why.
            the beauty   have-DEP.2SG   you.NOM
            'the beauty which you have'   Lewis and Pedersen (1961, 210-211)

Example (10-a) is from Early Cornish and represents the Locational possessive, with a prepositional possessor and the verb 'be'. (10-b) illustrates the hybrid Topic-Locational possessive, where the possessor is expressed as the topic of the sentence and doubled as a locational element inside the sentence; the verb 'be' agrees with the possessum. Sentence (10-c) represents the final step in the process, as the Dative pronoun and the verb 'be' are reanalyzed into the transitive verb 'have'.

What P-to-BE incorporation may indeed be suitable for are *have*-possessives stemming from *with*-possessives. A reanalysis of a *with*-possessive into a transitive possessive can be clearly observed in African languages. In Nuer the possessum is marked with the preposition *kè* 'with' and the verb can be either *à* 'to be present' or *taa/tɛkɛ* 'to remain, to stay' – the latter is illustrated in the *with*-possessive in (11-a). The combinations verb+*with* often merge into monomorphemic items, as in (11-b), that may be analyzed as the verb 'have'.

(11)   Nuer (Nilo-Saharan, East Sudanic, West Nilotic)

        a.   Ték`ɛ kè ɣʉk.
            3PL.be with cattle
            'They have cattle.'

        b.   Ték`ɛɛ ɣɔk.

3PL.be.with/have cattle.

'They have cattle.' Stassen (2009, 211)

The fusion of a verb and the oblique marker in (11-b) is just what a head-incorporation analysis of *have* is looking for. However, as discussed above, the oblique marker in *with*-possessives marks the *possessum*, such that appropriate changes should be made to Freeze's analysis before it can be applied to these data. The tenacious idea that is present across analyses is that possessors are locations semantically and PPs syntactically – the idea is there even though it may contradict the general spirit of an analysis. Jung (2011) does away with a head-incorporation analysis of *have* and argues that possessors are agents, but still posits a P/D head in *have*-constructions. Błaszczak (2008), who presents Polish possessors as external arguments with no P-projections, still assumes that possessors are a type of location. In current generative practice this idea may in part be the legacy of Freeze's typological misrepresentation, but it is to a greater degree rooted in the localist approach to possession that assumes the proximity relation to be the defining (and the only) characteristic of a possession relation: prototypical possession entails proximity, ergo some argument in this relation must be constructed as location and this argument must be the possessor. Analyses like Jung (2011) and Błaszczak (2008) stumble on this powerful assumption. In section 2.1.1 I point out that inclusion of proximity into the cognitive notion of possession should not be interpreted as a cognitive requirement to construe possession as a subcase of location, and propose to interpret Heine's (1997) event schemas as several ways to achieve proximity. In particular, in the Action schema that serves as the cognitive source for the *have*-possessive, the effect of proximity is derived by the 'direct action' nature of the predicate. This is reflected by the tendency of the transitive sources for *have*-predicates to have the general semantics of '*grab*, *seize*, *hold*' – predicates that require direct contact. Once it is clarified that the representation of possessors as locations does not have the status of a higher cognitive truth or a universal constant, there should not be any conceptual objections for an analysis that assumes different syntactic base structures for different possessive types. In particular, one of the main tools of a cartographist – the UTAH, does not have anything to say about different structural representations once different conceptualizations of a relation are appealed to. As discussed in Chapter 2, Baker (1997) explicitly allows variation at the conceptual level.

In Russian, the verb *imet'* 'have' stems from the now obsolete verb *imat'* 'take'; the two verbs even shared inflectional paradigms for some time (see McAnallen

2011).[4] The etymology of the verb indicates that the construction arose from the Action schema, and not as a result of a grammaticalization drift from some other possessive strategy.

I assume that the preceding discussion can be considered as sufficient ground to claim that *have*-possessives in Russian have a structure different from that of the *be*-possessive(s).

6.2   The properties and the structure

The Russian *have*-possessive has not received as much attention in the literature as *be*-possessives, which is due to the minor status of the former strategy in the language. The construction has various semantic restrictions acquired gradually as it lost its ground to the *be*-possessive. Safarewiczowa (1964), for instance, notes that the *have*-construction has become obsolete when the 'possessum' is a physical property of an animate entity, a sickness or an event (McAnallen to app.: 44) – see the examples comparing a *be*-possessive and a *have*-possessive in (12)-(14):

(12)   a.   U vs-ex   ranen-yx   byl-o   nebrit-oje
              at all-GEN injured-GEN.PL be.PST-N.SG unshaven-N.NOM.SG
              pozelenevš-eje   lic-o.
              green.PRT-N.NOM.SG face.N-NOM.SG
              'All of the injured had unshaven green faces.' McAnallen (to app.: 44)

        b.   ?Vs-e   ranen-yje   ime-l-i   nebrit-oje
              all-NOM injured-NOM.PL have-PST-PL unshaven-N.ACC.SG
              pozelenevš-eje   lic-o.
              green.PRT-N.ACC.SG face.N-ACC.SG

(13)   a.   Segodnja u menja oznob.
              today   at I.GEN chill.M:NOM.SG
              'Today I have fever.'   McAnallen (to app.: 44)

        b.   *Segodnja ja   ime-ju   oznob.
              today   I.NOM have:PRS-1SG chill.M:ACC.SG

(14)   a.   U menja poslezavtra   soveščani-je.
              at I.GEN day.after.tomorrow meeting.N-NOM.SG
              'I have a meeting the day after tomorrow.'   McAnallen (to app.: 44)

        b.   *Ja   ime-ju   poslezavtra   soveščani-je.
              I.NOM have:PRS-1SG day.after.tomorrow meeting.N-ACC.SG

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[4]According to McAnallen (2011, 25), the various *have*-verbs arose in the individual Indo-European languages after the break-up of Proto-Indo-European (in contrast to the Dative possessive construction that has been traced back to Proto-Indo-European).

At the same time, according to Safarewiczowa (1964) and Popov (1974), the *have*-possessive has become the preferable option e.g. with possessors denoting concrete objects:

(15)   a.   Ne vs-e   mineral-y   ime-jut   svo-i
               NEG all-NOM mineral.M-NOM.PL have:PRS-3PL REFL-ACC.PL
               etiketk-i   s   formul-oj.
               label.F-ACC.PL with formula.F-INST.SG
               'Not all the minerals have their own labels with a formula.'   Popov (1974:402)

        b.   *Ne u vsex   mineralov   (jest') svo-i
               NEG at all-GEN mineral.M-GEN.PL be:PRS REFL-NOM.PL
               etiketk-i   s   formul-oj.
               label.F-NOM.PL with formula.F-INST.SG

See Safarewiczowa (1964) and Popov (1974) for a more detailed overview of the restrictions. The verb *imet'* does not display uses that are immediately identifiable as auxiliary or functional, although according to McAnallen (2011, 43), early Russian used to employ *imet'* as a future auxiliary and a modal verb. Although the use of the *have*-possessive is rather restricted semantically, syntactically the *have*-possessive enjoys greater freedom than the *be*-possessive and the anticausative possessive due to the Nominative encoding of the possessor. The *have*-possessive is widely used in non-finite environments, where the semantic restrictions seem to be lifted. For instance, *imet'* is generally avoided with animate possessums in finite clauses, but non-finite clauses lift the restriction:

(16)   a.   Ime-ja   muž-a,   ona   mog-l-a   by i   ne
               have-GER husband-ACC.SG she.NOM can-PST-F.SG SUBJ AND NEG
               rabota-t'.
               work-INF
               'Having a husband, she didn't have to work.'

        b.   Ime-t'   det-ej   – èto otvetstvennost',   i   nemal-aja.
               have-INF children-ACC   it responsibility.F:NOM and big-F.NOM.SG
               'To have children is a responsibility and a big one.'

        c.   Čtoby   ime-t'   krasiv-yje   glaz-a,   nužno   xorošo
               in.order.to have-INF beautiful-ACC.PL eye.M-ACC.PL necessary well
               vysypa-t'-sja.
               sleep.enough-INF-REFL
               'In order to have beautiful eyes, you have to get enough sleep.'

The same ameliorating effect of syntactic surroundings can be observed with possessums that denote a physical property, as shown in the grammatical example

in (16-c). In finite clauses the possessor argument can be dropped without creating an ambiguity due to the presence of *imet'*.[5] The ability to drop the possessor argument in finite clauses allows the *have*-possessive to participate in subject-pivoted coordinations, as in (17) where both clauses lack the Nominative argument:

(17) Vs'-u   žizn'   ime-l   žen-u,   a   teper'
      whole-F.ACC.SG life.F:ACC.SG have-PST:M.SG wife-ACC.SG and now
      išč-et   n'an'k-u!
      look.for:PRS-3SG nanny-ACC.SG
      'His whole life he had a wife and now he is looking for a nanny!'

The syntactic flexibility of the *have*-possessive may be the reason why it has not completely yielded its ground to the *be*-possessive.

The anticausative possessive is the third means of expressing predicative possession in Russian. The construction consists of the reflexive form *imet'sja* 'have-*refl*', an *u*-possessor and a Nominative possessum. I have encountered conflicting opinions on the status of *imet'sja* in the language – I hypothesize that this might be due to the development of *imet'sja* over time (this is merely a surmisal, not based on any actual diachronic data). Chvany (1975) states that *imet'sja* can only be used in existentials (not in possessives), providing examples like (18):[6]

(18) a. V gorod-e   ime-jet-sja/suščestvu-jet
          in town.M-LOC.SG have:PRS-3SG-REFL/exist:PRS-3SG
          doktor.
          doctor.M:NOM.SG
          'There is a doctor in town.'   Chvany (1975, 47)
      b. My   ne   zna-jem,
          we.NOM NEG know:PRS-1PL
          jest'/ime-jet-sja/suščestvu-jet   li žizn'   na
          be.PRS/have:PRS-3SG-REFL/exist:PRS-3SG Q life.F:NOM.SG on
          Mars-e.
          Mars-LOC.SG
          'We don't know whether there is life on Mars.'   Chvany (1975, 49)

---

[5]Cf. the *be*-possessive that can be mistaken for an existential if the *u*-possessor is dropped. Of course, the context provides the possessor argument, but in the absence of the *u*-PP the possessive structure is not that visible as in the *have*-possessive.

[6]See Chvany's structure for *imet'sja*-constructions in Chvany (1975, 54).

In contrast to Chvany (1975), Arutjunova and Širyaev (1983) cite possession as one of the applications of *imet'sja*, though with some reservations. The authors namely state that the verb is rare and stylistically marked: it is mainly used in the official/business register, in other contexts it can be used to create irony. (19) are Arutjunova and Širyaev's 'ironical' examples of the *imet'sja*-possessive:

(19) a. U tebja   zeml'-a   ime-jet-sja?   – Ime-ju
          at you.GEN land.F-NOM.SG have:PRS-3SG-REFL   have:PRS-1SG
          zeml'-u,   ograničenn-uju   v predel-ax   zabor-a.
          land.F-ACC.SG limit.PRT-F.ACC.SG in limit.M-LOC.PL fence.M-GEN.SG
          'Do you possess land? – I have land within the limits of the fence.'

      b. U nix   dač-a   jest'? – U nix
          at they.GEN summer.house.F-NOM.SG be.PRS   at they.GEN
          ime-jet-sja   ne tol'ko dač-a,   no i
          have:PRS-3SG-REFL NEG only cottage.F-NOM.SG but and
          sredstv-o   peredviženi-ja   k nej,   kak-to
          means.N-NOM.SG transportation.N-GEN to she.DAT namely
          d'ural'k-a.
          motor.boat.F-NOM.SG
          'Do they have a summer house? – They have not only a summer house, but also a means of transportation to that house, namely a motor boat.'   Arutjunova and Širyaev (1983: 30-31)

In view of the possessive examples in (19) one could surmise that either Chvany had incomplete data, or the 'slice' of Russian represented in her 1975 book is older than that of Arutjunova and Širyaev's: Chvany namely acquired Russian from her emigrant parents. I have found examples of the *imet'sja*-possessive from as far back as 1726, illustrated in (20), but I do not have data on how frequent the anticausative possessive was at that stage.

(20) a. Oeconomisches Lexicon. On   u menja takže teper'
                                       he.NOM at I.GEN also   now
          ime-jet-sja.
          have:PRS-3SG-REFL
          'Oeconomisches Lexicon. I have it now also.' (1731)

      b. velen-o   ime-jušč-ije-s'a   u bibliotekar'-a
          ordered-N.SG have-PRS.PRT-ACC.PL-REFL at librarian.M-GEN.SG
          tri   tys'ači   knig   tablic   otda-t'
          three.ACC thousand-GEN.SG book.F:GEN.PL table.F:GEN.PL give-INF
          v moskovsku-ju   akademičesk-uju   kantor-u.
          in moscow.ADJ-F.ACC.SG academic-F.ACC.SG office.F-ACC.SG
          'it has been ordered to give the three thousand table books that the

> librarian has to Moscow academic office.' (1726)

The recent analysis of Dyakonova (2007) presents the *imet'sja*-construction as one of the ways of expressing predicative possession in Russian, with no stylistic reservations. A brief search in the Russian corpus reveals numerous examples from everyday speech, not restricted to any special register. Thus it seems that *imet'sja* has become more normalized in possessive sentences. Dyakonova furthermore asserts that *imet'sja* only has a possessive reading – I am inclined to agree with her.[7] Although *imet'sja* can be used in seemingly existential constructions like (21), there is a feeling that there is some implicit possessor:

(21) a. Ime-jut-sja   i   drug-ije   versi-i
          have:PRS-3PL-REFL and other-NOM.PL version.F-NOM.PL
          proisxoždeni-ja   piramid.
          origin.N-GEN.SG pyramid.F:GEN.PL
          'There are also other versions of the origin of the pyramids.'

     b. Vo Vselenn-oj   ime-jut-sja   struktur-y
          in Universe.F-LOC.SG have:PRS-3PL-REFL structure.F-NOM.PL
          dovol'no bol'š-ogo   razmer-a.
          rather   big-M.GEN.SG size.M-GEN.SG
          'There are structures of a rather big size in the Universe.'

In (21-a) the implicit possessor is the humanity or the scientific community, in (21-b) the possessor in this part-whole relation is the Universe.[8] The presence of possessive semantics in *imet'sja* may be observed in the fact that the verb cannot substitute *byt'* 'be' and *suščestvovat'* 'exist' in sentences like (22):

(22) a. Bog   est'/suščestvu-jet.
          god.M:NOM.SG be.PRS/exist:PRS-3SG
          'God exists.'

     b. Suščestvu-jut li čorn-je   dyr-y   v dejstvitel'nost-i?
          exist:PRS-3PL Q black-NOM.PL hole.F-NOM.PL in reality.F-LOC.SG
          'Do exist black holes really exist?'

     c. *Bog   ime-et-sja.
          god.M:NOM.SG have:PRS-3SG-REFL
          'God exists.'

     d. *Ime-jut-sja   li čorn-je   dyr-y   v dejstvitel'nost-i?
          have:prs-3pl-refl Q black-NOM.PL hole.F-NOM.PL in reality.F-LOC.SG

---

[7]For example, *imet'sja* in Chvany's example in (18-b) sounds quite awkward to me.

[8]I am not stating that the locational phrase *vo Vselennoj* 'in the Universe' directly represents the possessor argument. Rather, the Universe is understood to be the implicit possessor, even though the sentence is built as a locative existential.

I discuss in section 5.2.1 that sentences like (22-a-b) can be uttered in what Arutjunova and Širyaev (1983) refer to as contexts of conflicting worldviews: here the existence of some entity is (re-)asserted. Presumably, entities like God and black holes resist the notion of a possessor and that is why *imet'sja* is ungrammatical in (22).

The anticausative possessive, on a par with the *be*-possessive, cannot compete with the *have*-possessive in syntactic operations that require a structural-cased (Nominative) subject (control infinitives, infinitival subjects, gerunds); however, when the gapped argument does not have to be the highest but merely structural-cased, the anticausative possessive and the *be*-possessive are allowed, as in the participial examples in (23):

(23)   a.   A   cvetn-oj   printer,
           and color.ADJ-M.NOM.SG printer.M:NOM.SG
           ime-vš-ij-sja   u odn-oj   iz devic,
           have-PST.PRT-M.NOM.SG-REFL at one-F.GEN.SG of girl:GEN.PL
           vyše-l   iz stro-ja.
           go.out-PST:M.SG of order.M-GEN
           'And the colored printer that one of the girls had, broke down.'

       b.   Vs-e   byvš-ije   u menja 12go dekabr'-a
           all-NOM be.PST.PRT-NOM.PL at I.GEN 12th december-GEN
           somneni-ja   i   frivol'n-yje   mysl-i
           doubt.N-NOM.PL and frivolous-NOM.PL thought.F-NOM.PL
           otpa-l-i.
           fall.off-PST-PL
           'All the doubts and frivolous thoughts that I had on the 12th of december, disappeared.'

The anticausative possessive may be said to be the possessive that is most restricted in its use: this is due to semantic restrictions on the verb *imet'* on the one hand and the PP-encoding of the possessor on the other. This possessive construction seems to be particularly frequent in participial constructions as in (23-a), maybe because it constitutes the most effective way of constructing a (possessive) modifier. The past participle form *byvšij* as in (23-b) is quite rare, and in the present tense a participial form of *imet'sja* (*imejuščijsja*) is uncontested by *byt'*.

I derive both of the *have*-possessives from one *v*P-base. I first discuss the structure for the *have*-possessive:

(24)   a.   Ivan   ime-et   den'g-i.
            Ivan:NOM have:PRS-3SG money-NOM
            'Ivan has money.'

   b.

I assume that the verb *imet'* 'have' is a lexical predicate that takes two
arguments, the possessor argument in Spec*v*P and the possessum (Theme)
complement.[9] I assume that the Theme NP in the *have*-construction is of the {e,
t}-type, as strong quantifiers like *ètot* 'this' and *vse* 'all' receive a
type-interpretation (just like in the *be*-possessive, see section 5.2.2):

(25)   a.   Vs-e   xote-l-i   ime-t'   èt-ot   neobyčn-yj
            all-NOM want-PST-PL have-INF this-M.ACC.SG unusual-M.ACC.SG
            cvetok,   jego   vyrašč-iva-l-i   daže v goršk-ax.
            flower.M:ACC.SG he.ACC grow-IMPF-PST-PL self in pot.M-LOC.PL
            'Everybody wanted to have this unusual flower, it was grown even in
            pots.'
   b.   Det-i   ime-jut   vs-e   neobxodim-yje
            children-NOM have:PRS-PL all-ACC necessary-ACC.PL
            udobstv-a.
            amenity.N-ACC.PL
            'The children have all the necessary amenities.'

In (25-a) *ètot* 'this' refers not to a particular flower, but to a type of flower.
Likewise, *vse* 'all' in (25-b) refers to all types of amenities. Furthermore, the
have-possessive displays GenNeg which seems to almost obligatorily replace
Accusative under negation:

(26)   a.   Počemu zakl'učeni-je   Aristotel'-a, čto vozdux   ne
            why   conclusion.N-NOM.SG Aristotle-GEN that air.M:NOM NEG
            ime-jet   ves-a,   nevern-o?
            have:PRS-3SG weight.M-GEN.SG false-N.SG
            'Why is Aristotle's conclusion that the air is weightless false?'
   b.   Ja   ne   zna-ju   ni odn-ogo   gosudarstv-a,
            I.NOM NEG know:PRS-1SG not one-N.GEN.SG state.N-GEN.SG

---

[9]This is similar to Błaszczak's (2008) proposal for the Polish *have*-possessive.

kotor-oje   ne ime-jet   dolg-ov.
which-N.NOM.SG NEG have:PRS-3SG debt.M-GEN.PL
'I don't know of any one state that doesn't have debt.'

There are also some examples of Accusative Themes under negation, these seem to be exclusively abstract nouns or idiomatic possessums; GenNeg is also grammatical in these contexts. The Themes in the following examples from the Russian corpus were in the Accusative case, I provide Genitive case endings for comparison.

(27)   a.   Èt-i   mo-i   razglagol'stvovani-ja, naverno, ne
           this-NOM.PL my-NOM.PL yakety-yak.N-NOM.PL probably NEG
           ime-jut   otnošeni-je/-ja   k dann-omu
           have:PRS-PL relation-ACC.SG/-GEN.SG to given-M.DAT.SG
           fil'm-u.
           movie.M-DAT.SG
           'This yakety-yak of mine probably does not have a relation to the given movie.'

    b.   neposredstvenn-aja vysadk-a   fašistsk-ix   vojsk
           direct-F.NOM.SG   landing.F-NOM.SG nazi-GEN.PL troop.N:GEN.PL
           na amerikansk-ij   kontinent   ne ime-l-a
           on american-M.ACC.SG continent.M:ACC.SG NEG have-PST-F.SG
           mest-o/-a.
           place.N-ACC.SG/-GEN.SG
           'A direct landing of the Nazi troops on the American continent did not take place.'

    c.   Dlja menja vnešnost'   počti ne ime-l-a
           for   I.GEN appearance.F:NOM.SG almost NEG have-PST-F.SG
           značeni-je/-ja.
           significance.N-ACC.SG/-GEN.SG
           'For me appearance was almost insignificant.'

Examples of Accusative Themes under negated *imet'* are rare, however; GenNeg occurs in the vast majority of examples in the Russian corpus. In section 5.2.1 I assume that obligatory replacement of a structural case by GenNeg signals NP-status of the argument.

The weak referentiality of the possessum may be the reason for why the *have*-possessive is not pronouncedly agentive: when the Theme is a property, there is no need for a strongly volitional agent. Still there are some traces of agentivity according to some diagnostics. First of all, the *have*-possessive can be used in the imperative form, and imperatives are associated with agentivity:

according to Han (1998: 168), 'the situation described by the imperative presupposes an agent who is responsible in bringing it about'.

(28) a. Imej   v vid-u,   mne vs'-o   izvestn-o.
          have.IMP:SG in sight.M-LOC.SG I.DAT all-NOM known-N.SG
          'Bear in mind that I know everything.'

      b. Imej-te   terpeni-je.
          have.IMP:PL patience.N-NOM
          'Have patience.'

      c. Imej-te   vs'-o   otdel'n-oje,   ot   postel-i   do
          have.IMP-PL all-NOM separate-N.NOM.SG from bedding.F-GEN.SG till
          posud-y,   v tečeni-je   tr'-ox   nedel'.
          dishes.F-GEN.SG in period.N-ACC three-GEN.PL week.F:GEN.PL
          'Have everything separate, from bedding to dishes, as long as three
          weeks.'

      d. I   imej-te   xoroš-uju   aptek-u,
          and have.IMP-PL good-F.ACC.SG medicine.closet.F-ACC.SG
          čitaj-te   knig-i   po medicin-e.
          read.IMP-PL book.F-ACC.PL on medicine.F-LOC.SG
          'And have a good medicine closet, read medical books.'

Instantiations of imperative *have*-possessives in the Russian corpus are dominated by idiomatic expressions as in (28-a); also frequent are examples with abstract possessums (like and *terpenije* 'patience' in (28-b)) – this correlates with the general 'preference' of *imet'* for abstract possessums, not only in imperative contexts. Furthermore, there are examples with concrete possessums as in (28-c-d), which shows that the imperative use of the *have*-possessive is not restricted to idiomatic expressions, but is relatively productive.

In contrast to the *have*-possessive, neither the anticausative possessive nor a *be*-possessive can be used in an imperative construction. It is the *meaning* of the imperative, not its structure, that these possessives are incompatible with. The imperative singular form in Russian can be used with a subjunctive conditional meaning and all of the possessives can be used in this subjunctive imperative form, as illustrated in (29):

(29) a. Mnogi-je   rukovoditel-i   byl-i   by sčastliv-y,
          many-NOM.PL manager.m-nom.pl be.pst-pl sj happy.srt.adj-pl
          ime-j   oni   vozmožnost'   ves-ti   sebja
          have-imper they.nom possibility.f:acc.sg behave-inf refl.acc
          estestvenno.
          naturally

'Many managers would be happy if they had a possibility to behave
naturally.'

b. Bud'   u menja vybor,   ja   ni za čto   ne
    be.IMPER at I.GEN choice.M:ACC.SG I.NOM not for what.ACC NEG

    sta-l   by muzykant-om.
    become-PST:M.SG SJ musician.M-INST.SG
    'If I had had a choice, I would have never become a musician.'

c. Taka-ja   informaci-ja,   ime-j-sja   ona   u
    such-F.NOM.SG information.F-NOM.SG have-IMPER-REFL she.NOM at

    kogo-nibud',   ime-l-a   by stepen'
    who.GEN-nibud' have-PST-F.SG SJ degree.F:ACC.SG

    sekretnost-i   "pered pročteni-em   uničtoži-t"'.
    confidentiality.F-GEN before reading.N-INST.SG destroy-INF
    'Such information, if anyone had it, would have the degree of
    confidentiality "destroy before reading".'

Besides the use in imperatives, the somewhat agentive nature of the possessor in
the *have*-possessive is observed in the compatibility of the construction with such
control predicates as *starat'sja* 'try':

(30) a. On   nikogda ne ime-l   druz-ej,   i   ne
          he.NOM never   NEG have-PST:M.SG friend.M-GEN.PL and NEG

          stara-l-sja   ime-t' ix.
          try-PST:M.SG-REFL have-INF they.ACC
          'He never had friends and didn't try to have them.'

      b. Ja   vsegda stara-l-a-s'   ime-t' nekotor-yj zapas.
          I.NOM always try-PST-F.SG-REFL have-INF some   stash.M:ACC.SG
          'I always tried to have some stash.'

The control predicate *starat'sja* requires agentivity from (the PRO in) its
infinitival complement – the grammaticality of examples in (30) shows that the
possessor argument in the *have*-possessive satisfies this requirement. In view of
the imperative and the control tests I conclude that the possessor argument in the
have-possessive must be projected as the external argument, whose position is
usually understood to be Spec*v*P.
The *have*-possessive has presumably inherited its *v*P-structure from its
etymological source – the transitive verb *imat'* 'take'. Incidentally, the
have-construction can be used with animate Themes in a vulgar style of speech
with a meaning of 'have sex with' – as an example, consider the following pun from
a song where the author sings about his car that breaks down on him all the time:

(31)   Èto ne   ja   ime-ju   mašin-u,   èto ona   ime-et
       IT   NEG I.NOM have:PRS-1SG car.F-ACC.SG IT   she.NOM have:PRS-3SG
       menja.
       I.ACC
       'It's not me who has the car, it's the car that "has" me.'   (Grigorij
       Zarečnyj)

This ambiguity of *imet'* 'have' may be due to either the agentive nature of the
possessor or the verb's etymological source.

The anticausative possessive in my analysis is derived via the application of the
AnchorP projection to the *have*-base. I assume that reflexive verb forms in
Russian are characterized by the absence of the external argument; there may be
an implicit semantic argument x whose presence is signaled by the reflexive
morphology on the VP-dependent. This reflexive vP becomes the complement of
AnchorP that introduces the possessor argument into the structure:

(32)   a.   U nego   ime-et-sja   mašin-a.
          at he.GEN have-3SG-REFL car.F-NOM.SG
          'He has a car.'
       b.

As in the existential *be*-possessive, the *u*-PP becomes the 'possessor' of the whole
verbal event – in this case, the vP. The merging of the Anchor phrase is a local
'decision': the reflexive configuration can also proceed without the introduction of
an *u*-PP which would result in constructions like (21).

The NP-status of the Theme is, as in the other possessives, diagnosed by the
interpretation of strong quantifiers and the occurrence of GenNeg:

(33)   a.   U Ann-y   ime-jet-sja   èt-a   knig-a.
          at Anna-GEN have:PRS-3SG-REFL this-F.NOM.SG book.F-NOM.SG
          'Anna has this book.'

b. U nego   ne   ime-jet-sja   zadolžennost-i/*-’
    at he.GEN NEG have:PRS-3SG-REFL debt.F-GEN.SG/-NOM.SG
    pered   b’udžet-om.
    in.front.of budget.M-INST.SG
    ‘He doesn’t have a debt in the budget.’

The determiner *èta* ‘this’ in (33-a) refers to a particular book type, not a book token; under negation, the possessum is obligatorily Genitive, as shown in (33-b).

Neither of the *have*-possessives can take a DP Theme which can be observed in the ungrammaticality of temporary possession in (34) or R-expressions in (35), repeated from Chapter 5. (34) shows that whereas temporary possession can be expressed by a copular *be*-possessive, the meaning is unavailable for *have*-possessives:

(34) a. Tvo-ja   mašin-a   u Peti.
          your-F.NOM.SG car.F-NOM.SG at Petya-GEN
          ‘Petya has your car.’
      b. *Pet-ya   ime-jet   tvo-ju   mašin-u.
          Petya-NOM have:PRS-3SG your-F.ACC.SG car.F-ACC.SG
      c. *U Pet-i   ime-jet-sja   tvo-ja   mašin-a.
          at Petya-GEN have:PRS-3SG-REFL your-F.NOM.SG car.F-NOM.SG

In Chapter 5 I posited a small-clause configuration for the copular temporary *be*-possessive in (34-a) where the Anchor phrase can combine with a DP. The ungrammaticality of the examples in (34-b) and (34-c) presumably indicates that *have*-possessives can take only NP-Themes. Constructions like (35-a) were also discussed in Chapter 5; there I assumed that the occurrence of R-expressions in existential *be*-possessives is part of the general ability of the existential predicate to re-assert the existence of a definite Theme with regard to its function/usefulness. The *imet’* predicate does not seem to have such re-introduction abilities, as can be seen in (35-b) and (35-c):

(35) a. U menja jest’   Petya.
          at I.GEN be.PRS Petya-NOM
          ‘I have Petya.’
      b. *Ja   ime-ju   Petyu.
          I.NOM have:PRS-1SG Petya-ACC.SG
          ‘I have Petya (to turn to).’
      c. *U menja ime-jet-sja   Petya.
          at I.GEN have:PRS-3SG-REFL Petya-NOM.SG

Earlier in the section I talked about the ameliorating effects of non-finite syntactic environments on semantic restrictions on the verb *imet'* 'have'. Definite Themes, however, do not become grammatical even in non-finite environments with *imet'*:

(36)   a.   *Kto   dolžen ime-t'   tvo-ju   mašin-u   segodnja?
            who.NOM must   have-INF your-F.ACC.SG car.F-ACC.SG today
            'Who is supposed to have your car today?'

       b.   *Ja   xoč-u   ime-t'   Pet-yu.
            I.NOM want:PRS-1SG have-INF Petya-ACC
            #'I want to have Petya.'

This shows that the restriction on definite Theme is not merely a semantic restriction, but is a result of what kind of complements are allowed in the structure of *imet'*.

The possessor arguments in the two *have*-possessives have a subject status. For the possessor in the *have*-possessive one of the subjecthood diagnostics is presented in (30) which shows the substitutability of the possessor argument by PRO. In both constructions the possessor arguments can bind reflexives: (37) illustrates the *have*-possessive, and (38) presents examples for the anticausative possessive.

(37)   a.   Festival'   ime-jet   svo-ju   sistem-u
            festival.M:NOM.SG have:PRS-3SG REFL-F.ACC.SG system.F-ACC.SG
            ocen-ok.
            score.F-GEN.PL
            'The festival has its own score system.'

       b.   Professor   ime-l   s   soboj   dv-a
            professor.M:NOM.SG have-PST:M.SG with REFL-INST two-NOM
            binokl'-a.
            binoculars.M-GEN.SG
            'The professor had two pairs of binoculars with him.'

(38)   a.   U každ-ogo   naro-da   ime-et-sja
            at every-M.GEN.SG nation.M-GEN.SG have:PRS-3SG-REFL
            svo-j   nacional'n-yj   mif.
            REFL-M.NOM.SG myth.M:NOM.SG
            'Every nation has its own national myth.'

       b.   U nix   ime-et-sja   kompromat   drug
            at they.GEN have-3SG-REFL incriminating.evidence.M:NOM.SG friend
            na drug-a.
            on friend-ACC
            'They have incriminating evidence on each other.'

The structures in (24-b) and (32-b) allow movement of the possessor arguments to subject positions without preliminary re-ordering operations.[10]

The general manner in which the *have*-possessive and the anticausative possessive seem to substitute the *be*-possessive in non-finite environments (plus the ameliorating effect of non-finite environments on the semantic restrictions of *imet'*) may be regarded by some as an argument in favor of a common underlying structure for the three possessives. My position is that the three predicative possessive constructions exist side by side in Russian and if one construction cannot occur in a specific context due to syntactic or semantic restrictions, the language has the luxury of offering another construction. The assumption of different structures for the three types of predicative possessives is another step in the direction of dynamic economical syntax in that there is no need for re-ordering operations and incorporating movements.

6.3 Chapter summary

In this chapter I propose that the structure of the *have*-possessives in Russian is different from that of the *be*-possessive(s). The *have*-possessive has a quasi-transitive vP-structure, whereas the anticausative possessive is built on the *imet'*-base enhanced by the u-possessor. After decades of Freeze-inspired research, such a proposal may be hard to come to terms with – which is why I dedicated a separate section to the various (theoretical, typological, etymological) arguments in favor of the differentiating approach. First of all, I have referred to the typological observations of Stassen (2009) who describes four major types of predicative possessives – I point out that it would be difficult to derive all four construction types from one underlying structure. Furthermore, there are theoretical arguments in the literature against a head-incorporation analysis of *have* – with that off our theoretical agenda, doubts start emerging about the structural and conceptual status of the possessor element. In this thesis I assume that the notion of proximity that is argued to be essential to the relation of possession can be derived by event schemas other than location. In the end I come to the conclusion that *have*-possessives should have their own underlying structure, distinct from locational and other types of possessives.

I am convinced that a differentiating analysis does not go against the principles of economy that are so central to the Minimalist program. The assumption of several possible ways of forming a possessive construction seems to be uneconomical – if

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[10]Cf. the analyses of Dyakonova (2007) and Jung (2011).

one assumes that a possessive relation is conceptualized in the same way in all languages. If, however, one allows the possibility of different conceptual formulations of the possessive relation, positing different structures seems to be the more economical representation option. The differentiating option is certainly preferable with regard to economy of derivation: the availability of different base structures decreases the amount of necessary movement operations and (for those who believe in features) the amount of uninterpretable features.

Chapter 7

Related constructions with u-PPs

In this chapter I consider constructions that employ seemingly possessive u-PPs, these include the locative modifier use of u-PPs, external possession and involuntary causation constructions, constructions with world-creating u-PPs and modal possessive constructions.

(1) *location modifier*
    Knig-a   u Van-i   na stol-e.
    book.F-NOM.SG at Vanya-GEN on desk.M-LOC.SG
    'The book is on Vanya's desk.'

(2) *external possession*
    U menja v èt-om   god-u   syn   pojd-et   v
    at I.GEN in this-M.LOC.SG year.M-LOC.SG son:NOM.SG go.FUT-3SG in
    škol-u.
    school.F-ACC.SG
    'My son will go to school this year.'

(3) *involuntary causation*
    Ne   voln-uj-sja,   u menja tv-oj   reben-ok   so
    NEG worry:IMPR-2SG-REFL at I.GEN your-M.NOM.SG baby.M-NOM.SG from
    stul-a   ne   upad-jot.
    chair.M-GEN.SG NEG fall:FUT-3SG
    'Don't worry, under my watch your baby won't fall from a chair.'

(4)   *world-creating constructions*
        U tebja   vs-e   durak-i.
        at you.GEN all-NOM fool.M-NOM.PL
        'According to you, everybody is a fool.'

(5)   *modal possessive constructions*
        U menja jest'   čem   tebe   počini-t' velosiped.
        at I.GEN be.PRS what.INST you.DAT repair-INF bike.M:ACC.SG
        'I have something with which you can repair the bike.'

Attempts to group *u*-PP constructions in some way or another have long been present in the literature. Chvany (1975), discussed in Chapter 4, extends her analysis of *be*-possessives to the locative modifier use in (1). Mrázek and Brym (1962) discuss a range of *u*-PP constructions and define the general meaning of the Russian preposition *u* as a "relation of a very close participation of something in something". Cienki (1995) presents a unified cognitive linguistic analysis of *u*-PP constructions where the *u*-PPs serve as reference points with a different degree of *subjectification*.[1] Jung (2011) includes modal possessive constructions into her analysis of *be*-possessives.

In this chapter I show how the Anchor projection proposed for *be*-possessives can be applied to the constructions in (1)-(5).[2] Positing the Anchor predicate for these constructions expands the range of structural complements that the predicate can combine with. The analysis provides a possibility of derivational economy without recourse to complicated derivations.

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[1]Cienki (1995: 85) defines subjectification as a process where the meaning changes from referring 'less to the described situation and more to the discourse situation.' Subjectification is supposed to play an important role in the process of grammaticalization. See more on the notion of reference points in Chapter 5.

[2]I do not discuss the ablative use of *u*-PPs in (i):

(i)   On   zanja-l   u   menja den'g-i.
        he.NOM borrow-PST:M.SG from I.GEN money.PL-ACC
   'He borrowed money from me.'   Mrázek and Brym (1962, 101)

Ablative *u*-PPs seem to behave as subcategorized arguments of a group of verbs with the general meaning of removal of possession. Inasmuch as I associate possessive semantics with the Anchor predicate, perhaps this predicate should be posited in (i) as well. I leave this issue for future research.

7.1 The locative uses of possessive *u*-PPs

As noted earlier in the thesis, an *u*-PP can be used with the locative meaning 'at X's place', as in (6-a); furthermore, an *u*-PP can modify overt locative expressions, as in (6-b):

(6) a. My   u Van-i.
         we.NOM at Vanya-GEN
         'We are at Vanya's.'

     b. Knig-a   u Van-i   na stol-e.
         book.F-NOM.SG at Vanya-GEN on desk.M-LOC.SG
         'The book is on Vanya's desk.'

In Chapter 3 I discuss examples like these and stress that they should not be analyzed as *be*-possessives, as the possessive relation that is present in these structures takes place between the *u*-PP and the locative element. For these constructions I assume that the Anchor phrase merges with a locative element. The logic of the structure is the same as proposed in Chvany (1975), but the construction is simpler, because the possessive semantics in my analysis is not tied to the presence of V∃. The locative element can be overt or silent and the whole Anchor-modified location can occur in a variety of configurations. In (6) the anchored location is a predicate of a small clause:

(7)

```
                    SC
                   /  \
                 DP    Pred′
                 |    /    \
                my  Pred   LOC
                          /    \
                    AnchorP    Loc
                     /\         /\
                 u Vani        x
                            na stole
```

An Anchor-modified Location can also serve as the location argument in existential sentences, such as (8):

(8) a. U nego   v sad-u   jest' klubnik-a.
         at he.GEN in garden.M-LOC.SG be.PRS strawberry.F-NOM.SG
         'He has strawberries in his garden.'/ 'There are strawberries in his garden.'

b.

The sentence in (8-a) is existential and has the structure in (8-b): the *u*-PP here modifies the location argument. Any possessive meaning that is present in (8) is attained by extension – it is a consequence of the c-control relation between the *u*-PP and the location containing the NP: the strawberries can be found in the garden owned by some individual (the referent of the *u*-PP) and thus by extension belong to the same individual. An Anchor-modified locative phrase can also be a locative modifier of a lexical verb, as in (9):

(9) a. Ja perenoču-ju v gostinice.
     I.NOM overnight.FUT-1SG in hotel.F-LOC.SG
     'I will spend the night in a hotel.'

  b. Ja perenoču-ju u Vani.
     I.NOM overnight.FUT-1SG at Vanya-GEN
     'I will spend the night at Vanya's.'

In Chapter 3 I observed that it is difficult to find examples of *be*-possessives where the *u*-possessor is expressed by the reflexive *sebja*.[3] The locative modifier *u*-PPs constitute the majority of examples where one finds the *sebja*-reflexive bound by a c-commanding DP:

(10) a. Šef   u sebja?
     boss.M:NOM.SG at REFL.GEN
     'Is the boss in his office?'

  b. Ostal'n-yje   den'g-i   gubernator-y dolžn-y
     remaining-ACC.PL money.PL-ACC governor.M-NOM.PL must-PL
     bud-ut iska-t' u sebja v karman-ax.
     be.FUT-3PL search-INF at REFL.GEN in pocket.M-LOC.PL
     'As for the rest of the money, the governors will have to search for
     them in their own pockets.'

I assume that the distribution of possessive *u*-PPs that modify locative elements follows the distribution of the latter.

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[3]I presented one example from the Russian Corpus on p.46 – that, however, was an example of the arbitrary use of the reflexive.

7.2   External possession and involuntary causer constructions

In external possession constructions the possessor contributes to the referential specification of the possessed nominal but is encoded outside of that nominal. Some researchers describe this situation as the possessor being a semantic argument of the possessum, but a syntactic argument of the predicate (Paykin and van Peteghem 2003). This is in contrast to adnominal possession where the possessor is constructed as a semantic as well syntactic argument of the possessum. External possession has been discussed in such works as Kayne (1977), Vergnaud and Zubizarreta (1992), Landau (1999), Šarić (2002), among others.

In Russian, external possession has two modes of expression: a construction involving an *u*-PP as in (11) and a Dative construction as in (12). In addition to expressing possession, the external possessor arguments are claimed to emphasize that the possessor is affected by the situation.

(11)   a.   U mam-y   bol-it   golov-a.
              at mother-GEN.SG ache:PRS-3SG head.F-NOM.SG
              'Mother has a headache.'

        b.   U menja v èt-om   god-u   syn   pojd-et   v
              at I.GEN in this-M.LOC.SG year.M-LOC.SG son:NOM.SG go.FUT-3SG in
              škol-u.
              school.F-ACC.SG
              'My son will go to school this year.'

In (11-a) the *u*-PP is analyzed as the inalienable possessor of the noun *golova* 'head'. In (11-b) it is the relational noun *syn* 'son' that depends on the *u*-PP for its reference. In (12) the Dative DPs refer to the possessor of the Direct object *mašinu* 'car' in (12-a) and the prepositional complement *nogu* 'leg' in (12-b):

(12)   a.   On   mne mašin-u   razbi-l.
              he.NOM I.DAT car.F-ACC.SG crash-PST:M.SG
              'He crashed my car.'

        b.   Ja   nastupi-l-a   emu   na nog-u.
              I.NOM step-PST-F.SG he.DAT on foot.F-ACC.SG
              'I stepped on his foot (I stepped him on the foot).'

The Dative external possession construction is different from the *u*-PP external possession construction in certain properties, such as e.g. the scope of the external possessor: the Dative DP cannot scope over subjects, whereas the *u*-PP can, as

demonstrated in (11). Works like Paykin and van Peteghem (2003) and Strahov (2006) provide a review of the differences between the two constructions. In this thesis I am only concerned with external *u*-possessors and my analysis is in principle constructed to account only for this construction. The possessor in external possession constructions is characterized by special salience and can be used as a sentential topic of sorts, introducing a statement into the discourse. Compare the following two sentences:

(13) a. U menja sestr-a   uč-it-sja   v Kita-je.
          at I.GEN sister-NOM.SG study.PRS-3SG-REFL in China-LOC
          'I have a sister who is studying in China'
          'My sister is studying in China.'
      b. Mo-ja   sestr-a   uč-it-sja   v Kita-je.
          my-F.NOM.SG sister-NOM.SG study.PRS-3SG-REFL in China-LOC
          'My sister is studying in China.'

(13-a) eases the previously unmentioned sister into the conversation; (13-b) with an adnominal possessor *moja* 'my' is awkward in an out-of-the-blue utterance, when the listener does not know whether the speaker has a sister at all.
The external *u*-possessor can be associated with possessums in a variety of positions:

(14) a. U Dim-y   poter'a-l-a-s'   knig-a.
          at Dima-GEN get.lost-PST-F.SG-REFL book.F-NOM.SG
          'Dima's book got lost.'
      b. U menja kot   živ'-ot   v sad-u.
          at I.GEN cat.M:NOM.SG live:PRS-3SG in garden.M-LOC.SG
          'My cat lives in the garden.'
          'A cat lives in my garden.'
      c. U menja rebyonok   razbi-l   segodnja
          at I.GEN child.M:NOM.SG break-PST:M.SG today
          okn-o.
          window.N-ACC.SG
          'A/my child broke my window today.'
          'My child broke a window today.'   Strahov (2006: 60-61)

The possessum can be the argument of an unaccusative predicate as in (14-a), an unergative as in (14-b), or a transitive predicate as in (14-c). In addition, Strahov (2006) points out that the *u*-possessor can be associated with multiple nouns in the clause: in (14-b) the *u*-PP can be interpreted as the possessor of both the cat and the garden, in (14-c) the same can be stated of the child and the window.

The examples so far have involved sentence-initial *u*-PPs, but external *u*-possessors can also occur in the middle field:

(15)   a.   Ona   otbi-l-a   u čajnik-a   nosik.
            she.NOM break.off-PST-F.SG at teapot.M-GEN.SG spout.M:ACC.SG
            'She broke off the teapot's spout.'   Paykin and Van Peteghem
            (2003:336)

       b.   Devočk-a   ne vyxod-it   u nego   iz pam'at-i.
            girl-NOM.SG NEG come.out:PRS-3SG at he.GEN from memory.F-GEN
            'He cannot get the girl off his mind.'   Paykin and Van Peteghem
            (2003:339)

Paducheva (2004) observes that the middle-field external possessors associated with objects are highly lexicalized, as shown in Podlesskaya and Rakhilina (1999).[4] Unfortunately, I have not been able to obtain a copy of Podlesskaya and Rakhilina (1999), but it does seem that all middle-field *u*-PPs that are associated with objects, are restricted to part-whole relations, such as body-parts, emotions, physical reactions as in (16):

(16)   a.   Devk-a   razorv'-ot   u tebja   serdc-e.
            girl-NOM.SG tear.apart:FUT-3SG at you.GEN heart.N-ACC.SG
            'The girl will tear your heart apart.'   Paykin and Van Peteghem
            (2003:340)

       b.   Vyreza-t'   u cypl'onk-a   xrebet.
            cut.out-INF at chicken.M-GEN.SG spine.M:ACC.SG
            'Cut out the chicken's spine.' (cooking instruction)

       c.   Kak soxrani-t'   u rebyonk-a   interes   k
            how preserve-INF at child.M-GEN.SG interest.M:ACC.SG to
            process-u   obučeni-ja.
            process.M-DAT.SG education.N-GEN
            'How to preserve the child's interest to the educational process.'

       d.   Odn-o   upominani-je   o   škol-e   vyzyva-jet
            one-N.NOM mention.N-NOM.SG about school.F-LOC.SG cause:PRS-3SG
            u rebyonk-a   nervn-uju   drož.
            at child.M-GEN.SG nervous-F.ACC.SG trembling.F:ACC.SG
            'One mention of school cause the child to tremble nervously.'
            (Ruscorpora)

In addition, the predicate must satisfy certain requirements, e.g. a middle-field *u*-PP cannot be used with a verb that expresses an action directed at the

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[4]Paducheva (2004:354) uses the words 'splitting in the object position'.

possessum – in this case the Dative external possessor is preferred, as illustrated in (16-a):

(17)   a.   Vzgl'an-et   on   tebe/   *u tebja   v oč-i.
            look.FUT-3SG he.NOM you.DAT at you.GEN in eye.N-ACC.PL
            'He will look into your eyes.'

       b.   Veter   trepa-l   jemu/ u nego   volos-y   na
            wind.M:NOM.SG tousle-PST:M.SG he.DAT at he.GEN hair-ACC.PL on
            golov-e.
            head.F-LOC.SG
            'The wind was tousling his hair.'   Paykin and Van Peteghem
                                                            (2003:339-340)

When the verb expresses movement within a specific space, both types of external possessors are allowed, as in (17-b). A middle-field *u*-PP is also allowed when the verb expresses an action coming from the possessum, as illustrated in (15-b). For middle-field external possessors it is possible to conceive of an analysis where an Anchor predicate merges directly with the object DP – whether this yields a grammatical result would probably depend on the verb's specifications. Perhaps the ablative use of the *u*-PPs mentioned at the beginning of the chapter can be assigned the same analysis as middle-field external possessors. Sentence-initial *u*-PPs do not seem to be characterized by similar restrictions on the type of predicates, and they are not restricted to body-part possessums. In this section I focus on sentence-initial external *u*-possessors.

An *u*-PP may also have a Causer interpretation in similar configurations:

(18)   a.   Ne   voln-uj-sja,   u menja tv-oj   reben-ok
            NEG worry:IMPR-2SG-REFL at I.GEN your-M.NOM.SG baby.M-NOM.SG
            so   stul-a   ne upad-jot.
            from chair.M-GEN.SG NEG fall:FUT-3SG
            'Don't worry, under my watch your baby won't fall from a chair.'

       b.   U nego   pjatiklassnik-i   čita-jut   Tolst-ogo.
            at he.GEN fifth.grader-NOM.PL read:PRS-3PL Tolstoy-ACC
            'He makes fifth-graders read Tolstoy.'

       c.   Ty   u menja poplaš-eš!
            you.NOM at I.GEN dance:FUT-2SG
            'I will show you!' (lit. 'I will make you dance!')

In (18) the *u*-PP refers to a Causer with a varying degree of volition which can be described as increasing from (18-a) to (18-c). A possession relation between a Causer *u*-PP and a nominal inside the clause is not obligatory (in (18), for

instance, there is no clear possession relation established between an *u*-PP and another element), but can occur, as demonstrated in (19):

(19)   U Ivan-a   komp'juter-y   loma-jut-sja   na
       at Ivan-GEN computer.M-NOM.PL break:PRS-PL-REFL on
       vtor-oj   den'.
       second-M.ACC.SG day.M:ACC.SG
       'Ivan causes (his) computers to break on the second day.'

In (19) Ivan can be interpreted both as the possessor of computers and an involuntary Causer of their breaking. Causer *u*-PPs are discussed in Rivero and Savchenko (2004) who propose a unifying account for external possession and causer constructions. In general, however, it is external possession that receives the most attention in the literature.

At the moment I can identify two types of analyses of external possession constructions. Both types assume that the external *u*-possessor is some kind of topic – what they differ in is where the *u*-possessor is generated: directly in this topic position, or inside the possessum, raising subsequently to the topic position. The direct projection analysis is represented by Rivero and Savchenko (2004) who I follow in this thesis. The raising analysis is represented by scholars such as Landau (1999) and Strahov (2006).

Strahov (2006) follows Landau's (1999) analysis of external possession in Hebrew by assuming that in Russian the *u*-possessor originates in the specifier of the possessed DP. Strahov (2006: 63) presents arguments that the *u*-possessor does not originate in the specifier of NP: namely, the *u*-possessor can co-occur with prenominal possessives which, according to Babyonyshev (1997), originate in SpecNP. Strahov presents the following examples to support her point:[5]

(20)   Dim-a   razbi-l   u Ir-y   deduškin-y   očk-i.
       Dima-NOM break-PST:M.SG at Ira-GEN grandfather's-ACC.PL glasses-ACC
       'Dima broke grandfather's glasses on Ira.'   Strahov (2006: 63)

The possessum *očki* 'glasses' in (20) is simultaneously modified by the adnominal possessive modifier *deduškiny* 'grandfather's' expressing the true possessor and the *u*-PP expressing a transient possessor. The possibility of co-occurrence of the two modifiers in (20) suggests, according to Strahov, that they do not compete for the

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[5]I should note here that for me the *u*-PP in (20) does not have the meaning Strahov assigns to it. The only interpretation available to me is the locative reading 'at Ira's place'. I have not researched the issue further and ascribe the difference in interpretations to the possible differences between my and Strahov's dialects.

same structural position. From SpecDP, the *u*-PP moves to a Topic position driven by the [+Topic] feature. In contrast to the Dative external possessor that is dependent on the verbal predicate for case, the *u*-possessor receives its case directly from the preposition and thus enjoys greater structural freedom.[6] A raising analysis of external possession has to account for binding of multiple DPs of the type observed in (14); furthermore, it is unclear how a raising analysis would explain how external *u*-possessors can raise out of subjects. Strahov's (2006) analysis of external possession is reminiscent of Jung's (2011) treatment of *be*-possessives. Note that Jung herself, however, does not extend her PP/XP structure to these constructions, proposing instead that the *u*-PP in external possession is introduced by a high applicative, in the sense of Pylkkänen (2002).[7] This is a non-raising type of analysis, similar to what is proposed below.

In a study of anticausative constructions with external possessors, Rivero and Savchenko (2003) propose that external *u*-possessors are constructed as semantic topics, introduced by a high Applicative predicate. The authors further assume that the *u*-PP can be interpreted either as the possessor or as the causer, as indicated in the translations in (21-a). The structure for the two interpretations is the same, (21-b), the difference depends on which variable the *u*-PP binds:

(21)   a.   U Ivan-a   očk-i   sloma-l-i-s'.
           at Ivan-GEN glasses-NOM break-PST-PL-REFL
           'John's glasses broke.'/'John caused the glasses to break.'
       b.

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
[6] Strahov assumes that the Dative external possessor moves to SpecVP which explains why it cannot scope over subjects.

[7] Jung does not discuss external possession at much length.

The external possession interpretation in (21) is achieved by the *u*-PP binding an empty possessor θ-role within the clause-internal NP. For a Causer interpretation, the *u*-PP binds the implicit (semantic) Causer argument in the CauseP projection.[8] I follow Rivero and Savchenko (2004) in the non-raising analysis for external possession constructions – namely, I claim that Rivero and Savchenko's high applicative predicate is my Anchor predicate:

(22)   a.   U odn-ogo   iz   naš-ix   professor-ov   syn
             at one-M.GEN.SG from our-GEN.PL professor.M-GEN.PL syn:NOM.SG
             vyigra-l   v tanceval'n-om   šou.
             win-PST:M.SG in dance.ADJ-N.LOC.SG show.N-LOC.SG
             'One of our professors' son won in a dance show.'

      b.

In (22) the whole TP complement is constructed as the possessum of the *u*-PP, i.e. the complement of the Anchor predicate. Particular clause-internal DPs come to be interpreted as possessums of the *u*-PP when the latter binds a relational variable inside those DPs: this relational possessor variable has been argued for in Vergnaud and Zubizarreta (1992) and assumed in Rivero and Savchenko (2004) and Paykin and Van Peteghem (2003). The binding between the *u*-PP and the relational variable brings forth the adnominal possession 'feel' of the construction. A non-raising analysis of external possession allows us to associate the *u*-PP with multiple DPs in its scope and not run the risk of Left-branch extraction when subjects are interpreted as possessums.

Rivero and Savchenko assume that external *u*-possessors are quirky subjects and situate them in SpecTP; I assume that the complement of the Anchor predicate is the TP, which means that the *u*-PP is higher than the traditionally assumed subject position in SpecTP. One of the reasons for me to do so is the inability of the external *u*-possessor to bind reflexives. Rivero and Savchenko observe that

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[8]I cannot discern the causer reading that the authors claim to be present in (21). The only reading available to me is that of possession.

external *u*-possessors cannot bind reflexives inside the clause, as in (23-a):

(23) a. U Pavl-a   sloma-l-sja   jego/*sv-oj
          at Pavel-GEN break-PST:M.SG-REFL his/REFL-M.NOM.SG
          komp'-juter.
          computer.M:NOM.SG
          'Paul caused his own computer to break (accidentally).'

  b. Goš-e   očen' nrav-it-sja   sv-oj/jego
          Goša-DAT very like:PRS-3SG-REFL REFL-M.NOM.SG/his
          dom.
          house.M:NOM.SG
          'Goša likes his house very much.'   Rivero and Savchenko (2004:8)

For Rivero and Savchenko, who situate external *u*-possessors in SpecTP, the
ungrammatical reflexive in (23-a) is a problem: they have to explain why *u*-PPs
cannot bind reflexives, while Dative quirky subjects can, as shown in (23-b). The
account they provide employs the assumed idiosyncrasies of the semantic
Causer-argument that is involved in external possession constructions and cannot
act as a syntactic binder (see Rivero and Savchenko 2004 for further details).
Once we assume that the *u*-PP is situated beyond TP, as in (22-b), no
reflexive-binding is expected.

Positing AnchorP under CP for external *u*-possessors is motivated by the fact that
clause-initial *u*-PPs can be preceded by *wh*-words and complementizers:

(24) a. Kaki-je   u Ivan-a   očk-i   sloma-l-i-s'?
          which-NOM.PL at Ivan-GEN glasses-NOM break-PST-PL-REFL
          'Which glasses of Ivan broke?'

  b. Ja   skaza-l-a   emu, čto u menja syn
          I.NOM tell-PST-F.SG he.DAT that at I.GEN son:NOM.SG
          zabo-l-el.
          get.sick-PST-M.SG
          'I told him that my son got sick.'

The structure in (22-b) is also assumed for *u*-Causers; in (25) the *u*-PP is
introduced by the Anchor predicate and takes the whole clause as its possessum.
The Causer construction differs from external possession constructions in that
there is no binding of relational variables in clause-internal DPs:

(25) a. U nego pjatiklassnik-i   čita-jut   Tolst-ogo.
          at he.GEN fifth.grader-NOM.PL read:PRS-3PL Tolstoy-ACC
          'He makes fifth-graders read Tolstoy.'

b.

```
                    AnchorP
                   /       \
              u-PP          TP
                           /   \
                  pjatiklassniki
                             /  \
                            T    vP
                                /  \
                             čitajut ...
```

Speaking in cognitive terms discussed in Chapter 5, the *u*-PP has c-control over the situation described by the clausal complement – hence Causer semantics. My analysis of external possession makes clause-internal possessums that are found in these constructions more or less an 'accident'. What the Anchor predicate takes as possessum is actually the whole clausal complement; if the clause happens to contain a DP with an unbound R-variable, that DP comes to be interpreted as the possessum. A Causer construction arises when there is no binding relation between the *u*-PP and a clause-internal DP.

7.2.1   External possession and *be*-sentences

Paykin and van Peteghem (2003) observe that *be*-sentences with external *u*-possessors can be confused with *be*-possessives:

(26)   U nee   t'opl-oje   pal't-o.
       at she.GEN warm-N.NOM.SG coat.N-NOM.SG
       a.   'Her coat is warm.'
       b.   'She has a warm coat.'   Paykin and Van Peteghem (2003:332)

The authors provide two possible interpretations in (26-a) and (26-b) and explain the differences in terms of information structure. (26-a) is an external possession construction: here the adjective is the predicate at the clause level, and the *u*-PP is a semantic modifier of the possessum NP – the topic of the sentence includes both the possessor and the possessum. Alternatively, the sentence can be interpreted as a *be*-possessive as in (26-b): here the *u*-PP is the topic of the sentence, whereas both the adjective and the possessum are the focus. For the external possession interpretation in (26-a) to be possible, the adjective must be emphasized intonationally. A more natural word order for this interpretation would be as in (27):

(27)   a.   Pal't-o   u nee   t'oplo-je.
            coat.N-NOM.SG at she.GEN warm-N.NOM.SG

    b.   U nee   pal't-o   t'oplo-je.
         at she.GEN coat.N-NOM.SG warm-N.NOM.SG

In my analysis I assume two different structural configurations for the two interpretations in (26). The *be*-possessive interpretation in (26-b) has the copular property structure in (28) (repeated from Chapter 5):

(28)

          AnchorP
           /\
       PP   NP
       | /\
     u-PP AP   NP

In (28) the Anchor phrase merges directly to the modified NP. For the external possession interpretation in (26-a) and (27) the structure is the same as proposed for external possession construction earlier in the section:

(29)

           AnchorP
         /   \
     u-PP   TP
             / \
          T   SC
               / \
           DP   Pred′
           /\   /\
       ... *R* ... Pred AP

The Anchor phrase is merged to a TP projected by a small clause; the *u*-PP acts as an external possessor for the DP projected in the subject position of the small clause of which the adjective is the predicate. (29) states that in the region of control of the Anchor element the given predication relation takes place. The structures in (28) and (29) correspond to Paykin and Van Peteghem's descriptions of topic-focus relations.

The diagnostics that can be used to distinguish between the two structures are the use of short adjectives and strong quantifiers. In Chapter 5 I use Babby's (2010) analysis of Russian short adjectives as small-clause predicates to motivate the compact structure for copular property *be*-possessives in (28): the ungrammaticality of short adjectives in these *be*-possessives indicates that there is no space for a small-clause predicate. In external possession constructions, however, short adjectives are allowed, as shown in (30):

(30)   a.   U nego   dočer-i   ščastliv-y.
             at he.GEN daughter-NOM.PL happy.SRT.ADJ-PL

'His daughters are happy.'

b. Kak vid-ite,   u menja ob-a   ux-a
    as   see:PRS-2PL at I.GEN both-NOM ear.N-GEN.SG
    cel-y.
    intact.SRT.ADJ-PL
    'As you can see, both of my ears are intact.'

In addition, the possessum that has the status of an {e}-type DP in external possession constructions, can be modified by a strong quantifier like *oba* 'both', as shown in (30-b). In Chapter 5 I demonstrate that the {e, t}-type of NP possessums in copular property *be*-possessives results in the ungrammaticality of strong quantifiers.

Copular *be*-sentences with external possessors also seem to allow the emphatic use of copular *jest'* as shown in (31-b) and (31-c); (31-a) provides the context for the utterances.

(31) a. Na èt-oj   fotograf-ii   glaz-a   u Pet-i
          on this-F.LOC.SG photo.F-LOC.SG eye.M-NOM.PL at Petya-GEN
          vyšl-i   sin-ije.
          come.out.PST-PL blue-NOM.PL
          'Petya's eyes came out blue in this photo.'

      b. ?A oni   u nego   i   jest' sin-ije.
          but they.NOM at he.GEN and be.PRS blue-NOM.PL
          'Well, they *are* blue.'

      c. A oni   u nego   sini-je   i   jest'.
          but they.NOM at he.GEN blue-NOM.PL and be.PRS
          'Well, they *are* blue.'   (own examples)

In contrast to copular property *be*-possessives, copular *be*-sentences with external *u*-possessors do contain a Pred which can then be spelled out as *jest'* under emphasis. Tense coordination, where T may be spelled out as *jest'* in copular environments, also seems to be possible with these constructions:

(32) Volos-y   u nee   byl-i,   ?(jest') i   bud-ut   gust-yje.
      hair-NOM.PL at she.GEN be.PST-PL be.PRS and be.FUT-PL thick-NOM.PL
      'Her hair has always been and will be thick.'

In this section I presented an analysis of external *u*-possessors and *u*-causers, showing how the AnchorP predicate can be employed in these constructions as well. I also provided some diagnostics for distinguishing between *be*-possessives and *be*-sentences with external *u*-possessors.

7.3   World-creating *u*-PPs

The construction to be discussed in this section is mentioned already in Mrázek
and Brym (1962), but has been ignored in generative research, as far as I know.
Mrázek and Brym use the term *referential*, describing examples like (33):

(33)   U sil'n-ogo   vsegda bessil'n-yj   vinovat.
       at strong-M.GEN.SG always weak-M.NOM.SG guilty:M.SG
       'The strong one always holds the weak one as guilty.'   Mrázek and Brym
       (1962, 101), cited from Cienki (1995)

(33) describes a point of view of some individual (expressed by the *u*-PP).[9]
Boguslavskij (1996) states that the *u*-PP in these constructions has a
'world-creating' function (*miroporoždajuščaja funkcija*): the *u*-PP provides the
world within whose boundaries the opinion is true. In this thesis I use
Boguslavskij's term when referring to these constructions. A world-creating *u*-PP
introduces an opinion that is deemed erroneous by the speaker:

(34)   a.   U tebja   vs-e   durak-i.
            at you.GEN all-NOM fool.M-NOM.PL
            'According to you, everybody is a fool.'

       b.   U menja vs-e   xoroš-ije,   ja   vs-ex   opravd-yva-ju.
            at I.GEN all-NOM good-NOM.PL I.NOM all-ACC excuse:PRS-1SG
            'I think that everybody is nice, I excuse everyone.'

       c.   Počemu u tebja   vs-e   xoroš-ije   knig-i   dolžn-y
            why   at you.GEN all-NOM good-NOM.PL book.F-NOM.PL must-PL
            nepremenno zakančiva-t'-sja ploxo?
            necessarily end-INF-REFL   badly
            'How come according to you all good books must necessarily end
            badly?'   Goritskaya (2007)

(34-b) shows that the *u*-PP can also refer to the speaker himself: here the speaker
is aware of the erroneous nature of his belief about the general goodness of people.
Goritskaya (2007: 137), writing within the framework of functional grammar,
provides some characteristics for constructions with world-creating *u*-PPs. In
particular, statements with world-creating *u*-PPs are mainly generalizations and
thus often display universal quantifiers, such as *ves'* 'all', *vs'akij* 'any', *každyj*
'every', *vsegda* 'always' – see the examples above.

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[9]Cienki (1995: 96) describes the referential meaning in (33) as peripheral to the category of
possession, 'bordering on the pragmatic'.

The 'point-of-view' nature of the clausal complements is achieved by the use of evaluative or epistemic/deontic components. The evaluative lexemes in the previous examples are *vinovat* 'guilty', *duraki* 'fools', *xorošije* 'good'. (34-c) also contains a deontic modal that is used to describe a desired situation; compare (34-c) to (35) where the modal is dropped:

(35) #U tebja   vs-e   xoroš-ije   knig-i   zakančiva-jut-sja
      at you.GEN all-NOM good-NOM.PL book.F-NOM.PL end:PRS-3PL-REFL
      ploxo.
      badly
      'According to you, all good books end badly.'

The *u*-PP in (35) cannot have a world-creating interpretation, presumably due to the absence of deontic modality or evaluation in the main predication.[10] Strictly speaking, it is not the *u*-PP itself in these constructions that should be called world-creating: universal quantifiers and modals 'create' a world, whereas the *u*-PP delineates the boundaries of this world. I suggest that the world-creating *u*-PPs can be analyzed as anchor elements with propositional complements, declarative CPs:

(36)   a.   U tebja   vs-e   durak-i.
             at you.GEN all-NOM fool.M-NOM.PL
             'According to you, everybody is a fool.'
        b.   AnchorP
                  /   \
            u tebja   CP
                         / \
                      vse duraki

Some evidence showing that the analysis may be on the right track comes from the impossibility of embedding and reflexive-binding. (37) demonstrates that a world-creating construction cannot be embedded:

(37)   *Ja duma-ju, čto u tebja vs-e durak-i.
        I.NOM think:PRS-1SG that at you.GEN all-NOM fool.M-NOM.PL
        'I think that according to you, everybody is a fool.'

A complementizer like *čto* presumably takes TP-complements, whereas the Anchor predicate introducing a world-creating *u*-PP takes a proposition CP as its complement; as a result, embedding of the type in (37) cannot be derived.

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[10]The *u*-PP in (35) is rather interpreted as the author of the books: the good subset of this author's books end badly.

Furthermore, an *u*-PP in these constructions cannot bind reflexives inside its complement:

(38) *U tebja   vs-e   svo-i   učenik-i   leniv-yje.
       at you.GEN all-NOM REFL-NOM.PL pupil.M-NOM.PL lazy-NOM.PL
       'According to you, all of your pupils are lazy.'

The ungrammaticality of reflexive-binding in (38) is supposedly due to the size of the complement of the Anchor predicate.

At the moment I cannot offer more on these constructions. Hopefully, this section motivates further research into world-creating *u*-PPs. In my analysis these constructions represent the biggest structural complement that an Anchor predicate can take.

7.4 Modal possessive constructions

The *u*-PP with its possessive meaning is also used in constructions that I refer to as modal possessives, following Livitz (to appear). The construction contains an *u*-PP, existential *byt'* 'be', a relative pronoun and an infinitive:

(39) a. U Maš-i   jest'   čto   počita-t'.
          at Maša-GEN be.PRS what.ACC read-INF
          'Maša has something to read.'   Livitz (to appear: 1)
      b. U menja jest'   čem   tebe   počini-t' velosiped.
          at I.GEN be.PRS what.INST you.DAT repair-INF bike.M:ACC.SG
          'I have something with which you can repair the bike.'   Šimík (2011:
          203)

The sentences in (39) are possessive, the infinitival clauses describe a possessum with regard to its function: something to read, something to repair the bike with. Modal possessive constructions (MPCs) of the type in (39) exist side by side in Russian with modal existential constructions (MECs), more well-known in the literature:

(40) Maš-e   jest'   čto   počita-t'.
      Maša-DAT be.PRS what.ACC read-INF
      'There is something for Maša to read.'   Livitz (to appear: 2)

The MEC in (40) also involves existential *byt'* 'be' and an infinitive with a *wh*-word; instead of an *u*-PP a Dative DP is used here. A detailed analysis of MECs cross-linguistically (including Russian) is provided in Šimík (2011).

Livitz (to appear) compares MPCs and MECs with regard to their syntactic and
semantic properties. The two constructions differ in what their 'possessor'
arguments can do. First of all, the option of having different referents for the
possessor and the understood subject of the infinitive is available to MPCs, but
not to MECs:

(41)   a.   U Maš-i   jest'   čto   Ver-e   nade-t'.
            at Maša-GEN be.PRS what.ACC Vera-DAT wear-INF
            'Maša has something for Vera to wear.'
    b.   *Maš-e jest' čto Ver-e nade-t'.
            Maša-DAT be.PRS what.ACC Vera-DAT wear-INF

                                      Livitz (to appear: 3)

The MPC in (41-a) asserts the existence of a garment in Maša's possession that
Vera can wear; the MEC does not allow such disjoint reference. Furthermore, the
dative argument in MECs can occur in the infinitive, whereas the same is not
possible for MPCs:

(42)   a.   Zdes' jest'   cto   Maš-e   počita-t'.
            here be.PRS what.ACC Maša-DAT read-INF
            'There is something here for Maša to read.'
    b.   *Zdes' jest'   cto   u Maš-i   počita-t'.
            here be.PRS what.ACC at Maša-GEN read-INF

                                        Livitz (to appear: 3)

Finally, the MEC Dative can be expressed by a *wh*-word, as illustrated in (43-a).
(43-b) shows that the *u*-PP in MPCs cannot do the same:

(43)   a.   Jest'   komu   pomy-t'   pol-y.
            be.PRS who.DAT wash-INF floor.PL-NOM
            'There is someone to wash the floors.'
    b.   Jest'   u kogo   pomy-t'   pol-y.
            be.PRS at who.GEN wash-INF floor.PL-NOM
            'One can wash floors at someone's place.'
            '*There is someone to wash the floors.'   Livitz (to appear: 16)

Livitz demonstrates that an MPC interpretation is not available in (43-b); the
u-PP here can only be understood as the locative phrase 'at someone's place' and
the construction is in fact a MEC. Livitz states that the differences in (41)-(43)
can be accounted for by positing that in MECs the Dative argument raises from
within the infinitival complement of the existential predicate, whereas the *u*-PP in

MPCs is introduced in PossP intervening between the existential and the infinitive. In her view of possession Livitz (to appear) follows Szabolcsi (1994) and Jung (2008), assuming a predicative relation between the possessor and the possessum, the former constructed as the subject of the predication. Note that Jung (2008) also includes MPCs into her analysis:

(44) Jung (2011: 188)

    a. U menja jest' čto nade-t'.
        at I.GEN be.PRS what.ACC wear-INF
        'I have something to wear.'

    b.

The derivation after the representation in (44-b) is presumably the same as in the *be*-possessive: the infinitive (either the *n'*-level or just the CP) moves to SpecLowFocP above BE, after which the PP/DP would be able to remnant-move to the subject position. Livitz adopts Jung's proposal but construes the *u*-PP as a constituent to the exclusion of the possessum, introduced by the Poss predicate, as illustrated in (45):

(45) Livitz (to appear: 4)

    a. U menja jest' čto počita-t'.
        at Maša-GEN be.PRS what.ACC read-INF
        'I have something to read.'

b.

```
              TP
         ┌─────┴─────┐
       PP_i         BEP
       ┌┴┐      ┌────┴────┐
    u menja    BE       PossP
               │     ┌────┴────┐
             jest'   t_i       
                   ┌──────┴──────┐
                  Poss           CP
                             ┌────┴────┐
                          čto_j PRO počitat' t_j
```

The Poss predicate in Livitz's analysis relates the possessor to the possessum, similar to my Anchor projection. Livitz (p.9), however, ties the Poss predicate to the existential predicate, which is reminiscent of Chvany's (1975) analysis. In Chapters 4 and 5 I show that possessive semantics should be derivable independent of an existential predicate.

I suggest that Livitz's structure can be accommodated to my analysis once the possessor-introducing predicate is merged above the existential – similar to the structure I propose for the existential *be*-possessive in Chapter 5.[11]

(46)

```
            AnchorP
         ┌─────┴─────┐
        PP          V∃P
                ┌────┴────┐
               V∃         CP
                     ┌────┴────┐
                    wh_i       TP
                          ┌─────┴─────┐
                         PRO_j t_i
```

The structure in (46) asserts the existence in someone's possession of an entity described by the infinitival complement. On the internal structure of the infinitival complement see Livitz (to appear) and Šimík (2011); here I am concerned with the material outside of the infinitive.

The association of PossP with existential *byt'* in Livitz's (to appear) analysis forces her to distinguish between *u*-PPs in (existential) *be*-possessives and MPCs on the one hand and *u*-PPs in external possession constructions on the other hand: in Footnote 7 the author notes that external possessors occur with a variety of predicates and do not require an existential predicate. Livitz observes that possessive *u*-PPs in existentials differ from external *u*-possessors with regard to

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[11]A similar proposal for Russian MPCs is made in Šimík (2011: 203).

reflexive-binding:

(47) a. U menja s   sob-oj   jest'   ruč k-a.
          at I.GEN with REFL-INST be.PRS pen.F-NOM.SG
          'I have a pen on me.'

      b. U menja s   sob-oj   jest'   čto   počita-t'.
          at I.GEN with REFL-INST be.PRS what.ACC read-INF
          'I have with me something to read.'

      c. *U menja s   sob-oj   sloma-l-a-s'   tvoj-a
          at I.GEN with REFL-INST break-PST-F.SG-REFL your-F.NOM.SG
          ručka.
          pen.F-NOM.SG
          'Your pen broke when I had it on me.'   Livitz (to appear: 11)

In my analysis, where all of the *u*-PPs in (47) are introduced by the Anchor
predicate, the binding differences are derived structurally. In (47-a) and (47-b) the
u-PPs and the reflexives are situated within one clause (the matrix clause in the
case of the MPC in (47-b)), that is why binding is possible. In (47-c), however,
the *u*-PP is projected above TP, too high to bind the reflexive that needs a local
binder within the TP.

Where Livitz's analysis may at first glance seem to have the upper hand is in the
explanation of negation in MPCs. Livitz (to appear) notes that MPCs resist
negation in the present tense, *ne-wh* items that are available in MECs are
degraded in MPCs.

(48) a. Mne jest'   komu   pozvoni-t'.
          I.DAT be.PRS who.DAT call-INF
          'There is someone for me to call.'

      b. Mne nekomu   pozvoni-t'.
          I.DAT NEG.who.DAT call-INF
          'There is no one for me to call.'   Livitz (to appear: 18)

(49) a. U menja jest'   komu   pozvoni-t'.
          at I.GEN be.PRS who.DAT call-INF
          'I have someone to call.'

      b. U menja jest'   s   kem   pogovori-t'.
          at I.GEN be.PRS with who.INST talk-INF
          'I have someone to talk to.'

      c. ??U menja nekomu   pozvoni-t'.
          at I.GEN NEG.who.DAT call-INF
          'I have no one to call.'

       d. ??U menja ne s   kem   pogovorit'.
          at I.GEN NEG with who.INST talk-INF
          'I have no one to talk to.'   Livitz (to appear: 19)

Existing analyses of the *ne-wh* item in MECs require a locality of the negated
existential and the *wh*-item. Kondrashova and Šimík (to appear) observe that in
the present tense MECs negation is not expressed by the *net*-form as in the simple
existential sentences, but as a *ne-wh* item, as illustrated in (48-b). Kondrashova
and Šimík analyze negated BE in MECs as a Sportiche-style quantificational
determiner; this determiner must be in a local configuration with the *wh*-element
for the latter to raise to combine with the determiner semantically – the complex
is spelled out as a *ne-wh* item. Babby (2000) presents a slightly different
approach, arguing for a separate negated existential verb, but he also posits a
locality requirement on the verb and the *wh*-element. With the locality-based
analyses of *ne-wh* in mind (specifically Babby 2000), Livitz notes that in MPCs
ne-wh items are not characterized by sturdy grammaticality, as in (49-c) and
(49-d).[12] Livitz ascribes the incompatibility of (49-c) and (49-d) with the
possessive interpretation of the *u*-PPs to the fact that if PossP is present in the
structure, it would intervene between the negated BE and the *wh*-item. Livitz
claims that her analysis is supported by the fact that when overt *byt'* 'be'
separates the negation and the *wh*-item (such that there is no requirement for a
continuous spell-out), the utterance becomes acceptable, as in (50):

(50)   a. U menja ne byl-o   komu   pozvoni-t'.
         at I.GEN NEG be.PST-N.SG who.DAT telephone-INF
         'I didn't have someone to telephone.'   Livitz (to appear: 19)

       b. U nego   ne byl-o   čem   otda-t' dolg.
         at he.GEN NEG be.PST-N.SG what.INST repay-INF debt.M:ACC.SG
         'He didn't have anything with which to repay the debt.'

       c. Ona   ne ponima-l-a   smert-i,   u nee   ne
         she.NOM NEG understand-PST-F.SG death.F-GEN.SG at she.GEN NEG
         byl-o   komu   umira-t'.
         be.PST-N.SG who.DAT die-INF
         'She didn't understand death, she didn't have anyone who could die.'
         (Ruscorpora)

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[12]I agree with Livitz that what makes these examples marginally acceptable is the locative
interpretation of the *u*-PP resulting in the overall reading that at the speaker's place/house there
is no one who can be phoned or spoken to. If there is any control configuration in these examples,
then it is non-obligatory control, where PRO gets an arbitrary 'one'-interpretation that can refer
to anyone in principle, including the referent of the *u*-PP.

Here I wish to draw the reader's attention to the fact that *ne-wh* items sound better in MPCs when they encode the subject of the infinitive:

(51)   a.   U nee   nekomu   byl-o   my-t'   cexov-uju
            at she.GEN NE.who.DAT be.PST-N.SG wash-INF factory.ADJ-F.ACC.SG
            posud-u.
            dishes.F-ACC
            'She had no one who could wash the factory containers.'
            (Ruscorpora)

         b.   U doneck-ogo   gubernator-a   nekomu   ubra-t'   v
            at Doneck.ADJ-GEN.SG governor.M-GEN.SG NE.who.DAT clean-INF in
            dom-e.
            house.M-LOC.SG
            'The governor of Doneck has no one who could clean his house.'
            (Internet)

         c.   U nee   byl-o   nekomu   umira-t'.
            at she.GEN be.PST-N.SG NE.who.DAT die-inf
            'She had no one (no family) who could die.'   (own example,
            paraphrase of (50-c))

In (51-a) the referent of the *u*-PP is the manager of a medical factory and lacks workers who could wash the containers; I suggest that the interpretation of the *u*-PP here is possessive, but of course one could claim that the *u*-PP should be understood locatively to refer to the factory. (51-b) is a little more clear in this respect: here the *u*-PP 'at governor' co-occurs with the locative *v dome* 'in the house'. If the *u*-PP were to be understood locatively, this would result in a tautological statement of the type 'In the governor's house there is no one who can clean the house'; the presence of the overt locative *v dome* in (51-b) supports the possessor interpretation of the *u*-PP. (51-c) is my paraphrase of (50-c) and the two sentences are characterized by the same degree of grammaticality. Livitz, who ascribes the unavailability of possessive interpretation in (49) to an intervention effect that PossP would create for the spell-out of a *ne-wh* item, would have to explain why such intervention does not occur in (51). In view of the grammatical examples in (51) I propose a different explanation for the data in (49). It may be that with regard to the possibility of negation in (48) and (49) we are dealing with structure competition: the negations of these two constructions have (pragmatically) the same meaning and the Dative MEC 'wins' – as the more economical option, perhaps. The disjoint reference of the oblique argument and the subject of the infinitive is exactly where MPCs differ from MECs – and this is where *ne-wh* items are allowed. I spell out the proposal below.

According to Livitz (to appear), there is an interpretive difference between MECs and MPCs in that MECs assert the existence of a possibility, whereas MPCs assert the existence of an entity in the real world. Livitz demonstrates the difference in the following examples:

(52) a. Mne jest'   čto   izobres-ti.
          I.DAT be.PRS what.ACC invent-INF
          'I can invent something.'
      b. ??U menja jest'   čto   izobres-ti.
          at I.GEN be.PRS what.ACC invent-INF
          'I have things that I can invent.'   Livitz (to appear: 25)

The example in (52-a) can be uttered by an inventor who thinks that there is still room (and necessity) in the world for new inventions. In this same context (52-b) is ungrammatical, because the construction presumably asserts the existence of an entity in the real world, whereas the verb *izobresti* 'invent' implies that the entity does not exist yet. This is a difference illustrated for affirmative sentences. My hunch is that when negated, however, the two constructions have the same meaning: non-existence of an entity in the real world equals non-existence of some possibility or other that might be related to that entity. Considering that the negated meaning is the same, it is the MEC that 'wins over', perhaps because it is a more economical one with regard to involving raising of one element, and not control, a relation that involves two elements. The only area where an MPC can do what a MEC cannot is the possibility for a non-coreferential subject in the infinitive, which is why examples like (51) surface. More research into this question is necessary. The NE-WH evidence Livitz refers to to argue for the low position of PossP is inconclusive and can be ascribed to other factors, rather than the intervention of PossP.

Lastly, I would like to discuss a type of an existential sentence that has already been mentioned in Chapter 5, namely existentials with definite Themes, as in (53):

(53) a. V Moskv-e   jest'   Kol-ya.
          in Moscow-LOC be.PRS Kolya-NOM
          'In Moscow there is Kolya.' (who could help us)   Hartmann and
          Milićević (2008:181)
      b. U tebja   že   jest'   Len-a.
          at you.GEN EMPH be.PRS Lena-NOM
          'But you have Lena!'   Arutjunova and Širjaev (1983, 24)

(53-a) is an example of an existential *be*-sentence with a Theme that is expressed by a proper name; (53-b) is an existential *be*-possessive with an R-expression Theme. In Chapter 5 I described the interpretation of such existential sentences in the following way: the definite Themes are re-introduced into the discourse by virtue of some relevant property or function, the way they can be useful. This interpretation is reminiscent of MPCs where the infinitival complement describes a function of some entity and perhaps the analysis proposed for MPCs may be extended to (53). A crude way to represent this similarity syntactically is attempted in (54):

(54)

AnchorP
- *u*-PP
- V∃P
  - V∃
  - CP
    - Lena
    - XP
      - . . .

The definite Theme here is projected in some high position, e.g. where the *wh*-word usually is in modal possessives. The rest of the structure – the function of the referent – is left unexpressed.[13]

7.5 Multiple *u*-PPs and co-occurring Anchors

In this chapter I have added to the discussion more constructions whose analysis also involves the Anchor predicate: syntactic phrases of different size have been shown to be taken as complements by this predicate. It thus seems that the approach predicts prodigious co-occurrence of Anchor projections in one construction. In reality, however, the co-occurrence possibilities are restricted by the combinatorial properties of syntactic phrases and mutually exclusive derivational choices. For instance, an *u*-causer is not expected to be found with existential statements, event nominals, property possessives, temporary possessives, etc. – everything that cannot be 'caused'. Derivations resulting in an existential *be*-possessive and in a temporary copular *be*-possessive exclude each other from the beginning with regard to the semantic type and categorial status of the Theme and the nature of the predicates involved.

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[13]The ungrammaticality of the verb *imet'* 'have' in constructions similar to (53) would then correlate with the ungrammaticality of this verb with MPCs in Russian, and both phenomena could be attributed to the inability of the verb to take CP-complements.

The combinations that *are* expected should involve one Anchor phrase that takes a big complement, such as TP or CP – because all constructions, independent of their semantics and event-type, develop into a TP/CP. Among the constructions considered here the *u*-PPs that take TP/CP-size complements are external *u*-possessors, world-creating *u*-PPs and also *u*-PPs in MPCs (that involve embedded CPs). The prevalent option among the examples I have gathered is where one of the *u*-PPs is an external *u*-possessor. In (55-a) we observe an external *u*-possessor *u menja* and an *u*-possessor of the existential *be*-possessive; the approximate equivalent in (55-b) is meant as a disambiguation:

(55)   a.   U menja u babušk-i   jest' košk-a.
             at me   at grandma-GEN.SG is   cat.F-NOM.SG
             'My grandma has a cat.'

        b.   U mo-jej   babušk-i   jest' košk-a.
             at my-F.GEN.SG grandma-GEN.SG is   cat.F-NOM.SG
             'My grandma has a cat.'

(55-a) belongs to the colloquial register. (55-b) has almost the same meaning, with adnominal possession *mojej* 'my.GEN' indicating more discourse salience of the noun *babuški* 'grandmother.GEN'. There is a slight difference in discourse properties between the two examples. In (55-a) the grandmother has not been introduced into the discourse at a previous point in the conversation, there is thus a need to introduce her by the *u*-PP referring to the speaker, who is more salient. The structure for (55-a) that follows from my analysis is in (56):

(56)

The first Anchor projection introducing the *u*-PP *u babuški* takes V∃P as its complement, which results in a permanent possession interpretation; the *u*-possessor may raise to provide a subject for the verbal event, as indicated in (56-a). The second Anchor projection introducing the *u*-PP *u menja* takes the TP

as its complement; the *u*-PP receives an external possession interpretation from the binding of the relational variable R inside the DP *babuški*.

(57-a) presents another *be*-possessive type where an external *u*-possessor can occur (with an adnominal possessor variant in (57-b)):

(57) a. U menja u rebenk-a   ortopedičesk-ije   problem-y.
          at I.GEN at child.M-GEN.SG orthopedic-NOM.PL problem.F-NOM.PL
          'My child has orthopedic problems.'

      b. U mo-jego   rebenk-a   ortopedičesk-ije
          at my-M.GEN.SG child.M-GEN.SG orthopedic-NOM.PL
          problem-y.
          problem.F-NOM.PL
          'My child has orthopedic problems.'

Here the base is a copular property *be*-possessive whose possessor argument lacks discourse salience and is thus introduced by an external *u*-possessor:

(58)

Be-possessives with event possessums demonstrate that an external *u*-possessor can be separated from the lower *u*-PP by clause-internal material, such as a time adverb:

(59) U Aleck-i   segodnja u rebyonk-a   vypuskn-oj
      at Alečka-GEN today   at child.M-GEN.SG graduation.ADJ-M.NOM.SG
      utrennik   v detsk-om   sad-u.
      matinee.M:NOM.SG in kindergarten-LOC
      'Alečka's child has a matinee in the kindergarten today.'   (Ruscorpora)

The structure for (59) differs from (58) in the size of the complement for the lower Anchor predicate: for event possessives I assume the complement to be *n*P, as hypothesized in Chapter 5.

There are also examples with two external possessors:

(60)   a.   U menja u prijatel'nic-y   syn-a   tak satanist-y
              at I.GEN at friend.F-GEN.SG son-ACC.SG so   satanist-NOM.PL
              pribra-l-i.
              take-PST-PL
              'I have a friend whose son was taken by satanists in this manner.'

        b.   U menja u mam-y   znakom-aja
              at I.GEN at mother-GEN.SG acquantaince-F.NOM.SG
              zanima-jet-sja   repetitorstv-om, mog-u   segodnja spros-it'.
              do:PRS-3SG-REFL tutorship.N-INST can:PRS-1SG today   ask-INF
              'My mother has an acquantaince who tutors, I can ask today.'
              (Ruscorpora)

In both examples in (60) the higher *u*-PP is the external possessor of the lower
u-PP, the latter is the external possessor for a clause-internal DP: the Accusative
syna 'son' in (60-a) or the Nominative *znakomaja* 'acquaintance' in (60-b). The
higher *u*-PP is the most discourse-salient entity in (60). I assume that structures
like (60) are derived by the recursive merging of the Anchor predicate:

(61)

There are two variable-binding relations in these structures: the *u*-PP introduced
by the higher Anchor binds the R variable in the *u*-PP introduced by the lower
Anchor; the lower *u*-PP, in turn, binds the R variable in the clause-internal DP.
In all of the examples above the lower *u*-PP is the highest argument in the
complement of the higher *u*-PP. We also expect examples with the general
configuration in (62), where the complement of (the higher) external possession
u-PP$_1$ contains an argument that is higher than (the lower) *u*-PP$_2$:

(62)

The lower *u*-PP in such examples would have to be a middle-field external possessor, an ablative *u*-PP or a small-clause predicate (as in temporary *be*-possessives). The first two possibilities are illustrated in (63-a) and (63-b):

(63)   a.   U menja pap-a   prosto pal'c-ami   u vylovlenn-oj
              at I.GEN dad-NOM.SG simply finger.M-INST.PL at caught-F.GEN.SG
              ryb-y   žabr-y   vydira-jet.
              fish.F-GEN.SG gills-NOM pull.out:PRS-3SG
              'My dad simply pulls out with his fingers the gills on the caught fish.'

        b.   U menja doč   ukra-l-a   u podrug-i
              at I.GEN daughter:NOM.SG steal-PST-F.SG at friend.F-GEN.SG
              kukl-u.
              doll.F-ACC.SG
              'My daughter stole a doll from a friend.'

        c.   *U menja mašin-a   u Pet-i.   On   ee
              at I.GEN car.F-NOM.SG at Petya-GEN he.NOM she.ACC
              zan'a-l   na par-u   dn-ej.
              borrow-PST:M.SG on couple.ACC day.GEN.PL
              'Petya has my car. He borrowed it for a couple of days.'   (own
              examples)

The option where an external *u*-possessor co-occurs with a temporary possessor does not seem to be available, as shown in (63-c). I do not have an account for the ungrammaticality of (63-c). As it is now, the unavailability of a pattern like (63-c) can be used as an argument in favor of DP-internal analysis of possession relations, in the manner of Jung (2011).

As for world-creating *u*-PPs and MPC *u*-PPs, I have not found any examples containing them as the higher *u*-PP. When it comes to world-creating *u*-PPs, there are specific restrictions on the properties of the clausal complement: as discussed in section 7.3, the clause must contain modal and/or evaluative elements in the main predication. Copular property possessives satisfy these restrictions, in principle – (64-a), however, is ungrammatical:

(64)   a.   *U tebja   u vs-ex   xoroš-ix   knig   dolžen
              at you.GEN at all-GEN good-GEN.PL book.F:GEN.PL must.M.SG
              by-t'   plox-oj   konec.
              be-INF bad-M.NOM.SG end.M:NOM.SG

        b.   Po-tvojemu, u   vs-ex   xoroš-ix   knig   dolžen
              at   all-GEN good-GEN.PL book.F:GEN.PL must.M.SG be-INF
              by-t'   plox-oj   konec.
              bad-M.NOM.SG end.M:NOM.SG

'According to you, all good books must have a bad ending.'　　(own examples)

The intended meaning in (64-a) finds a grammatical expression in (64-b), where the holder of the opinion is referred to by *po*-PP. More understanding of the properties of world-creating *u*-PP constructions is needed.

As for MPC *u*-PPs, the restrictions come from the infinitival complement. The predicate in the complement must be a lexical predicate that can host PRO. An *u*-PP that we expect to find in the infinitival complement must not be higher than PRO, because a control configuration in general prohibits any arguments c-commanding PRO in the infinitive – this means that external *u*-possessors and *u*-causers are ruled out, as they take TP complements. This narrows the *u*-PP candidacy down to middle-field *u*-possessors and ablative u-PPs. A middle-field *u*-possessor co-occurring with an MPC is shown in (65-a):

(65)　　a.　U tebja　　jest'　　čem　　　u cyplenk-a　　　xrebet
　　　　　　at you.GEN be.PRS what.INST at chicken.M-GEN.SG spine.M:ACC.SG
　　　　　　vyreza-t'?
　　　　　　cut.out-INF
　　　　　　'Do you have something to cut out the chicken's spine with?'
　　　　b.　*U Kol-i　　　jest'　　čto　　　u Pet-i　　　ukra-st'.
　　　　　　at Kolya-GEN be.PRS what.ACC at Petya-GEN steal-INF
　　　　　　'Kolya has something what to steal from Petya.'　　(own examples)

An example of an ablative *u*-PP in an MPC is not immediately available, cf. the ungrammatical example in (65-b). It may be that such examples are in principle ruled out due to a clash in meaning between the matrix clause and the infinitival clause. The ablative use of *u*-PPs generally describes removal of possession, such that the infinitival clause in (65-b) describes something that is currently in Petya's possession, while the matrix clause states that that object is in possession of Kolya.[14] A middle-field *u*-possessor is thus the only Anchor-introduced *u*-PP that my analysis predicts to be able to co-occur with the matrix *u*-PP in MPCs, as

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[14]Note that a MEC counterpart of (65-a) is grammatical:

(i)　　Kol-e　　jest'　　čto　　u Pet-i　　ukra-st'.
　　　　Kolya-DAT be.PRS what.ACC at Petya-GEN steal-INF
　　　　'There is something that Kolya can steal from Petya.'

The contrast in grammaticality between (i) and (65-b) is in keeping with Livitz's (to appear) claims about the interpretations of MECs and MPCs (possibility as opposed to assertion of existence in the real world).

illustrated in (65-a).

I distinguish co-occurring Anchor projections discussed above from doubling and appositional constructions.[15] The doubling examples are presented in (66):

(66)   a.   U menja u sam-ogo   potek-l-i   sl'un-k-i.
            at I.GEN at self-M.GEN.SG flow-PST-PL saliva-DIM-NOM.PL
            'I myself started salivating.'

       b.   U nas   u vs-ex   primerno   odinakov-yje predstavleni-ja
            at we.GEN at all-GEN approximately same-NOM.PL idea.N-NOM.PL
            o   tom,   čto   xorošo   i   čto   ploxo.
            about that.LOC what.NOM good.ADV and what.NOM bad.ADV
            'All of us have approximately the same ideas about what is good and
            what is bad.'

The doubling in (66) is of the phrase-internal nature, as described in Yadroff (1999) and Strahov (2006). Yadroff (1999) assigns the doubling property to functional (as opposed to lexical) prepositions to which preposition *u* in Russian presumably belongs. Strahov's (2006) structural analysis of functional prepositions is that they do not project their own PP structure, but occupy the D head instead. Prepositional doubling of the type in (66) is seen as the recursion of the highest maximal projection (Strahov 2006: 82). To the extent that preposition *u* can be analyzed as a morphological form, my understanding of the data in (66) leans towards a spell-out of a dependency on multiple terms of the possessor. Appositional constructions also provide the possibility of multiple *u*-PPs:

(67)   a.   I   kak [u tebja, u dur-y,]   jazyk
            and how at you.GEN at fool.F-GEN.SG tongue.M:NOM.SG
            povernu-l-sja?
            turn-PST:M.SG-REFL
            'And how could you, you fool, say something like this?'

       b.   [u nego,   u direktor-a,]   ot   zabot
            at he.GEN at director.M-GEN.SG from worry.F:GEN.PL
            noč-ami   bol-it   serdc-e.
            night.F-INST.PL ache:PRS-3SG heart.N-NOM.SG

       c.   U nas   u vs-ej   grupp-y   po anglijsk-omu
            at we.GEN at whole-F.GEN.SG group.F-GEN.SG on English-M.DAT.SG
            trojk-i.
            three.F-NOM.PL
            'We, the whole group, have C's in English.'

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[15]There are, of course, also constructions where one of the *u*-PPs has a locative meaning. I do not give examples here, as those are easy to discern.

In each of the examples in (67) both u-PPs refer to the same individual and constitute an appositional construction. Heringa (2011) analyzes appositional constructions as syntactic constituents (to the exclusion of the rest of the clause) that simultaneously involve coordination-like and subordination-like structures.[16] Thus, although we observe double u-PPs in (67), they act as one syntactic constituent, a single Anchor element for the rest of the clause.

This section has presented some observations and predictions as to the expected patterns of co-occurring Anchor projections. I have stated that most of the co-occurrence possibilities are ruled out on independent grounds, such as structural restrictions and interpretive clashes. On the whole, more data are needed to verify the analysis.

7.6   Chapter summary

In this chapter I have applied the Anchor-analysis to a range of constructions employing u-PPs: external possession and involuntary causation constructions, MPCs and constructions with world-creating u-PPs. Unified treatments for these constructions have been proposed in non-generative approaches, such as the cognitive study of Cienki (1995); generative research, however, has proposed analyses only for subsets of these constructions so far. The analysis proposed in this thesis applies to these constructions without recourse to complicated derivations: continuing the line of reasoning from the previous chapters, the Anchor predicate is assumed to take complements of different size. The dynamicity of the notion of 'possessum' is thus extended even further into the clausal domain. I also show that whereas at first glance it seems that the analysis has no predictive power with regard to how many Anchor phrases there can be in one construction, the attested (and predicted) structural patterns can be derived in part by analysis-internal assumptions and in part by independent structural and interpretive restrictions.

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[16]There is an unfortunate terminological coincidence: the first element of an appositional construction is referred to as *anchor* by Huddleston and Pullum (2002) and Heringa (2011). The appositional term is not related to the use of the term *anchor* in this thesis.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

> But all I need is a couple of words
> and space for a step forward.
>
> ―――――――――――――――
> Kino, 'Mesto dlja šaga vper'od'
> (1989)

This thesis investigates a range of constructions whose common characteristic can be identified as the expression of possession in the Russian clausal domain. I show that a rigid universal argument structure for predicative possessives cross-linguistically is not motivated either typologically, cognitively or formally. In my analysis of these constructions I argue for a flexible approach to structure-building that is compatible with the dynamic approach to syntax as proposed in such works as Epstein (1995), Frampton and Gutmann (2002) and Zwart (2007).

Here is a chapter-by-chapter summary of the thesis.

Chapter 2 provides a general frame for the thesis. The first part of the chapter gives an overview of the object of the study – possession in the clausal domain. The two important points that I wish to emphasize here are: the typology of predicative possession includes more construction types than what is generally assumed in generative research at the moment; the proximity requirement in the pre-theoretic notion of possession can be satisfied by different conceptualization frames, not only by location. These two points have considerable consequences for generative analyses of possessive constructions. In particular, one underlying structure for all predicative possessives cross-linguistically is much harder to sustain in view of the significant typological diversity and the new understanding of the proximity requirement. In this part of the chapter I also describe the

predicative possession landscape of Russian that at present consists of three constructions: the *be*-possessive, the *have*-possessive and the anticausative possessive; furthermore, constructions employing *u*-PPs with a varying degree of possessive meaning are also discussed. The second part of the thesis introduces the formal part of the frame. I claim that a dynamic approach to syntax is more in the spirit of the Minimalist program as it employs the local configuration to drive the derivation; I discuss a number of works, such as Epstein (1995) and Zwart (2006b, 2007) who provide dynamic explanations of various syntactic phenomena. Global structural considerations that lie in the base of the cartographic approach to syntax are unnecessary complications to the theory.

Chapter 3 is a descriptive chapter providing an overview of the basic properties of the Russian *be*-possessive – the main means of expressing predicative possession in the language. I discuss the criteria that should be satisfied by a construction in order to be called a *be*-possessive: in particular, a relation of possession should be taking place between the *u*-PP and the Nominative noun phrase. This criterion allows one to set aside as irrelevant some of the examples that have surfaced in the discussion of *be*-possessives, such as phrases meaning 'at X's place'. I single out several structural types of *be*-possessives: existential, copular temporary and copular property. I show that the constructions differ with regard to the nature of the possessum nominal, binding possibilities, subjecthood and behavior of the verb *byt'* 'be'. I conclude the chapter by stating that all of the diverse properties should be derivable in an analysis of these constructions.

In Chapter 4 I review the existing analyses of *be*-possessives. The transformational account of Chvany (1975) presents *be*-possessives as dyadic unaccusatives, where the possessor and the possessum are arguments of the lexical existential predicate. The analysis accounts for many properties of *be*-possessives and provides a lot of insight into the syntax of these constructions; however, the obligatory association of possessive *u*-PPs with the existential predicate turns out to be the weakness of the analysis. Next I consider the minimalist analyses of Harves (2003), Dyakonova (2007) and Jung (2011). Harves (2003) provides a syntactic account of the phenomenon of unaccusativity in Russian and argues that all PPs occurring in *be*-sentences are unaccusative predicates; Harves takes the model of Den Dikken (1995) as the base of her analysis. I show that Harves's claims are based on an overgeneralization of the distribution of GenNeg. Another analysis based on Den Dikken (1995) is offered by Dyakonova (2007) who proposes that the possessor interpretation in all three types of predicative possessives in Russian is introduced by an applicative head, in the sense of Pylkkänen (2002). Jung

(2011) develops another analytical direction – the model of Kayne (1993), where the possessor and the possessum are projected in a small-clause configuration c-commanded by a prepositional complementizer. Neither Dyakonova's nor Jung's analyses can deal with copular temporary *be*-possessives. All of the minimalist analyses considered in this chapter depend on re-ordering operations; thus the benefit of economy of representation that is achieved by having one underlying structure for a variety of *be*-possessives is diminished by the amount of operations (head-incorporations, remnant movements) that are necessary in order to derive the attested word orders. I conclude that none of the analyses can properly account for the properties of *be*-possessives described in Chapter 3.

I combine the observations about the nature and typology of possession spelled out in Chapter 2 and the observations of the syntactic properties of Russian *be*-possessives offered in Chapter 3 to propose my own analysis of these constructions in Chapter 5. I adhere to a composite understanding of possession where the parameter of proximity is supplemented by the parameter of c-control. I also use the insights from cognitive linguistics that provides some useful imagery for the understanding of the possession relation in the locational possessive strategy. I propose that in the Russian *be*-possessive the duality of possessors is encoded in the nature of the possessor-introducing predicate, Anchor. The predicate is based on the locational cognitive frame, but at the same time caters for the prominent status of the possessor. The different types of *be*-possessives identified earlier in the thesis are derived by the different merging possibilities available to the Anchor phrase. In the existential *be*-possessive the Anchor phrase merges to the existential statement that contains an NP Theme, turning the whole phrase into its possessum. In the copular property possessive the Anchor phrase takes an NP complement directly (or an *n*P complement, in the case of event possessums). In the copular temporary possessive the Anchor phrase is constructed as a small-clause predicate.

A separate chapter, Chapter 6, is dedicated to the discussion of Russian *have*-possessives: the transitive *have*-possessive and the anticausative possessive that employs an *u*-PP. I refer to the typological evidence and the understanding of the notion of possession presented in Chapter 2 to argue that the *have*-possessive has a syntactic structure different from that of the *be*-possessive. I also refer to works where the P-to-BE incorporation analysis of *have* has been criticized from a minimalist point of view (Błaszczak 2007b). I then proceed to posit a *v*P structure for the Russian *have*-possessive; the anticausative possessive is derived by the merging of the Anchor phrase to the *have*-base.

The Anchor phrase is further exploited in Chapter 7 in the analysis of constructions employing the *u*-PP with a general meaning of possession. These are external possession and involuntary causer constructions, constructions with world-creating *u*-PPs and modal possessive constructions. I propose that constructions where the *u*-PP can be interpreted as an external possession or an involuntary causer share the general structural configuration: the Anchor phrase introducing the *u*-PP is merged to a TP phrase. In both of these constructions the *u*-PP serves as a reference point for an event; the difference is in whether the *u*-PP binds a relational possessor variable within a clause-internal DP. The TP-size of the complement is motivated by binding data and embeddability of these constructions. World-creating constructions present an interesting application of the *u*-phrase, not previously discussed in generative literature. I propose that the Anchor phrase takes a propositional CP-complement, with the *u*-PP delineating the boundaries of a hypothetical world. Modal possessive constructions are given the same analysis as the existential *be*-possessive, with the sole difference that the existential predicate takes a CP complement. I also discuss co-occurrence possibilities of Anchor phrases in one utterance. I show that the attested and predicted structural patterns can be derived in part by analysis-internal assumptions and in part by independent structural and interpretive restrictions.

The biggest part of the thesis is dedicated to predicative possession in Russian, the *be*-possessive in particular – the discussion of this construction is spread along three chapters. I hope that at least the descriptive account of the basic properties of *be*-possessives in Chapter 3 and the review of the existing analyses in Chapter 4 would be beneficial to a reader interested in predicative possession, regardless of whether my own understanding of the situation presented in Chapter 5 has the same effect.

Although I support the dynamic approach to syntax, my analysis still involves some degree of cartography: as I argue for a particular structural configuration, I refer to syntactic processes whose analyses still refer to such notions as syntactic position. The core of the analysis, however, has a dynamic principle. As soon as the various syntactic phenomena that I employ for evidence also receive dynamic accounts, my analysis of Russian *u*-possessors can easily be fitted into the overall system of grammar.

In this investigation I had to steer through many cases of misanalysis, hasty assumptions and circular reasoning – my own and others'. In this book I hope to have presented a clear picture of what is going on with all (or, rather, most of) those *u*-PPs. I started from disentangling the story of the existential *be*-possessive

and ended up contemplating the coils of modal possessives. At the very least this book can be seen as a coherent classification of the data. At its most, the book provides an adequate analysis for the observed phenomena and supports the dynamic approach to syntax.

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Sammenvatting

Deze dissertatie is een studie van verschillende constructies in het Russisch die we onder de noemer 'predicatieve possessiva' kunnen scharen. In deze context kunnen we in het Russisch drie typen constructie onderscheiden: possessiva uitgedrukt met 'zijn' (*be*-possessiva), possessiva uitgedrukt met 'hebben' (*have*-possessiva) en de anti-causatieve possessief. Daarnaast wordt ook aandacht besteed aan constructies met *u*-PPs die diverse graden van de possessieve betekenis kunnen duiden, zoals constructies met een externe bezitter en een onvrijwillige veroorzaker, constructies met wereld-creërende *u*-PPs en modale possessiva.

De typologie van predicatieve possessiva omvat meer typen constructies dan dat er op dit moment meestal wordt aangenomen in generatief taalkundig onderzoek. Daarnaast kan vastgesteld worden dat de zogenaamde 'proximiteitsvoorwaarde' (i.e. de veronderstelde nabijheid van het possessum en de possessor) die van toepassing is op de pre-theoretische notie van bezit, ingevuld kan worden door meer soorten kaders dan locatie alleen. Deze twee observaties hebben grote gevolgen voor de generatieve benaderingen van possessiva. Immers, als we de aanzienlijke typologische diversiteit en ons nieuwe begrip van de proximiteitsvoorwaarde in acht nemen, is het idee van één onderliggende structuur voor alle predicatieve possessiva een stuk minder aantrekkelijk. In mijn analyse van possessiva pleit ik daarom voor een flexibele benadering van het opbouwen van structuur. Deze is verenigbaar met de dynamische benadering van syntaxis die alleen betrekking heeft op de lokale (en niet de globale) configuratie, zoals wordt voorgesteld in Epstein (1995), Frampton and Gutmann (2002) en Zwart (2007). Het grootste gedeelte van dit proefschrift is gewijd aan de beschrijving van predicatieve possessiva in het Russisch, met name de *be*-possessiva, waarvan de bespreking zich uitstrekt over drie hoofdstukken. Hoewel ik beoog dat op zijn minst de descriptieve benadering van de basale eigenschappen van *be*-possessieva in hoofdstuk 3 en de kritische beschouwing van de bestaande analyses in hoofdstuk 4 van waarde zijn voor de lezer die geïnteresseerd is in de predicatieve

possessief, hoop ik dat de analyse die ik voorstel in 5 hetzelfde effect zal hebben. Hierin bestudeer ik bepaalde structurele varianten van de *be*-possessief in het bijzonder (de existentiële, de temporele copula en de eigenschap-copula possessief). Ik laat zien dat deze varianten verschillen wat betreft de aard van het nomen van het possessum, de bindingsmogelijkheden, de mogelijkheid om als subject te fungeren en het gedrag van het werkwoord *byt'* ('zijn') – deze verschillen vormen een probleem voor analyses waarin beoogd wordt om *be*-possessiva af te leiden uit één onderliggende structuur.

In mijn analyse streef ik naar een hybride begrip van de bezitsrelatie, waarbij de parameter van proximiteit wordt aangevuld door de parameter van c-controle. Hiernaast maak ik ook gebruik van ideeën uit de cognitieve linguïstiek, die inzichtelijke beeldspraak verschaffen voor het begrijpen van de bezitsrelatie in de locatieve possessieve strategie. Ik stel voor dat de dualiteit van possessors in de Russische *be*-possessief besloten ligt in de aard van het predicaat dat de possessor introduceert: het Anker. Het predicaat vindt zijn basis in het locatieve cognitieve frame, en draagt tegelijk bij aan de prominente status van de possessor. De verschillende typen *be*-possessiva kunnen vervolgens worden afgeleid uit de verschillende manieren waarop het Anker kan worden gemerged. In geval van de existentiële *be*-possessief, wordt het Anker gemerged met een existentiële uitspraak die een NP Theme bevat, hetgeen de gehele frase verandert naar zijn possessum. Voor de eigenschap-copula possessief geldt dat het Anker direct een NP als complement neemt (of een *n*P-complement, zoals in het geval van een event-possessum). Tenslotte wordt het Anker van een temporele copula possessief geconstrueerd als predicaat van een small clause.

De *have*-possessiva worden apart in hoofdstuk 6 besproken: de transitieve *have*-possessief, en de anti-causatieve possessief waarin gebruik wordt gemaakt van een *u*-PP. Ik maak gebruik van typologische, cognitieve en formele argumenten in een pleidooi voor een differentiërende analyse van de *have*-possessief. Hierin wordt een *v*P structuur geponeerd, i.e. de anti-causatieve possessief wordt afgeleid uit de merger van het Anker en *have* in zijn basispositie.

In hoofdstuk 7 wordt de notie Anker verder ingezet in de analyse van constructies met een *u*-PP die een meer algemene bezitsrelatie uitdrukken. Voor constructies waarin de *u*-PP geïnterpreteerd kan worden als externe possessor of een onvrijwillige veroorzaker, stel ik een algemene uniforme structuur voor. In deze gevallen wordt het Anker dat de *u*-PP introduceert, gemerged met een TP. In beide constructietypen dient de *u*-PP als referentiepunt voor een gebeurtenis; het verschil ligt in het wel of niet binden van een relationele possessor variabele

binnen een zinsinterne DP door de *u*-PP. De omvang van de TP in het complement wordt onafhankelijk gemotiveerd door bindingsdata en in hoeverre deze constructies ingebed kunnen worden. Wereld-creërende constructies vormen een interessante toepassing van de *u*-frase, die nog niet eerder aan het licht is gekomen in de literatuur. Mijn voorstel is dat het Anker in dit geval een propositioneel CP-complement neemt, waarin de *u*-PP de grenzen van een hypothetische wereld afbakent. Modale possessiva kunnen vervolgens op dezelfde manier benaderd worden als existentiële *be*-possessiva, met als enige verschil dat het existentiële predicaat een CP-complement neemt. Tenslotte bespreek ik ook de mogelijkheden van het gelijktijdig voorkomen van meerdere Ankers in één uiting. Ik laat zien dat de bevestigde en voorspelde structurele patronen ten dele volgen uit de interne assumpties van mijn analyse, en ten dele uit onafhankelijke structurele en interpretatieve restricties.

Voor dit onderzoek heb ik een weg gebaand langs vele verkeerde analyses, haastige aannames en cirkelredeneringen – die van mijzelf en die van anderen. Desalniettemin hoop ik een duidelijk en zo compleet mogelijk beeld geschetst te hebben van de Russische *u*-PP. Wat begon als een poging om de intrigerende eigenschappen van de existentiële *be*-possessief te ontwarren, eindigde in de krochten van de modale possessief. Op zijn minst kan dit boek worden beschouwd als een coherente classificatie van de data. Op zijn best geeft het een adequate analyse van de waargenomen feiten en ondersteunt het de dynamische benadering van de syntaxis.

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